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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three chapters exploring education and crime in the
modern economy. The first two chapters focus on inter-district school choice and
teacher labor markets in Massachusetts. The third chapter examines the demolition
of public housing in Chicago and its interaction with the geospatial distribution of
gang territory.
In the first chapter, I study the sorting of students to school districts using new
lottery data from an inter-district school choice program. I find that moving to a
more preferred school district generates benefits to student test scores, coursework
quality, high-school graduation, and college attendance. Motivated by these findings,
I develop a rich model of treatment effect heterogeneity and estimate it using a
new empirical-Bayes-type procedure that leverages non-experimental data to increase
precision in quasi-experimental designs. I use the heterogeneous effects to show that
nearly all the test score gains from the choice program emerge from Roy selection.
In the second chapter (joint with Scott Imberman and Marcus Winters), we de-
scribe the relationship between school quality, teacher value-added, and teacher at-
trition across the public and charter sectors. We begin by documenting important
differences in the sources of variation that explain attrition across sectors. Next we
demonstrate that while charters are in fact more likely to remove their worst teachers,
v
they are also more likely to lose their best. We conclude by exploring the type and
quality of destination schools among teachers who move.
In the third chapter, I study the demolition of 22,000 units of public housing
on crime in Chicago. Point estimates that incorporate both the direct and spillover
effects indicate that in the short run, the average demolition increased city-wide
crime by 0.5% per month relative to baseline, with no evidence of offsetting long
run reductions. I also provide evidence that spillovers are mediated by demolition-
induced migration across gang territorial boundaries. I reconcile my findings with
contradictory results from the existing literature by proposing and applying a test
for control group contamination. I find that existing results are likely biased by
previously unaccounted for spillovers.
vi
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1Chapter 1
The Consequences of Sorting for
Understanding School Quality
There is an emerging body of work documenting a causal link between educational
inputs, test scores, and later life outcomes. Whether it is the size of a kindergarten
classroom, the value added of a middle school teacher, or the type of high school a stu-
dent attends, educational interventions have far reaching consequences for outcomes
like teen pregnancy, incarceration, college attendance, and adult earnings (Cullen
et al., 2006; Chetty et al., 2011; Angrist et al., 2012; Chetty et al., 2014b; Deming
et al., 2014; Dobbie and Fryer, 2015; Angrist et al., 2016). Thus understanding school
quality is important for effectively targeting educational investments.
Recent work on school effectiveness leverages randomization in the school assign-
ment process to generate estimates of quality differences across institutions. Since
the results of the lottery are random, estimates of school quality based on compar-
isons between school choice lottery winners and school choice lottery losers are not
confounded by higher ability or better-resourced students choosing to attend better
schools. For this reason, researchers have used lottery estimates of school quality
to construct novel measures of value added, to validate observational methods of
ranking schools, and to estimate the relation between school effectiveness and edu-
cational inputs (Angrist et al., 2013a; Dobbie and Fryer, 2013; Deming et al., 2014;
Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2017; Angrist et al., 2017).
While school choice lotteries may seem like an attractive tool for learning about
2effectiveness, individual students may nonetheless experiences test score gains by
switching schools even in the absence of differences in average school quality. If stu-
dents use choice programs to sort to schools on the basis of idiosyncratic benefit, then
the gains identified by a comparison of lottery winners to losers have no straightfor-
ward connection to quality. More generally, school choice lottery estimates will not
be externally valid in the presence of Roy selection (Walters, 2017). Thus knowing
whether and to what degree lottery identified test score gains are driven by sort-
ing versus differences in quality is necessary for understanding the practical policy
relevance of this body of work.
In this paper, I use random admission offers from an inter-district school choice
program in Massachusetts to study the consequences of sorting for understanding
school quality. I provide three main contributions. The first contribution is a causal
evaluation of the impact of inter-district school choice on student outcomes using
new, hand-collected lottery data. The second contribution is an examination of the
role that Roy selection plays in generating the causal benefits of inter-district choice.
The third contribution is a new method for estimating treatment effect heterogeneity
that uses non-experimental data to increase precision in quasi-experimental designs.
I start with a program evaluation of inter-district school choice. I find that moving
to a more preferred district increases student math scores by 0.16 standard devia-
tions, with no effect on English Language Arts. The impact on math is large. The
unadjusted 10th grade black-white math score gap in Massachusetts is 0.56 standard
deviations. This result also stands in contrast to prior estimates of the effects of
school choice in the traditional public school sector, which find little to no impact on
test scores (for examples see Cullen et al. 2006, Hastings et al. 2012, Deming et al.
2014). I find that students who participate in the inter-district choice program are
more likely to take advanced placement and other advanced classes. I also find posi-
3tive effects on the probability that students who participate in the program graduate
from high school and go on to attend a four-year college.
The findings from this evaluation are interesting because they represent the first
lottery evaluation of a state-wide inter-district choice program. Such programs are
common in the United States (Wixom, 2016) and also controversial. Critics argue
that because funding typically follows the student, inter-district choice drains educa-
tional resources from underprivileged communities (O’Connell, 2017). Thus under-
standing the causal impact of inter-district choice is important for policy. Prior work
has been limited to examining the consequences of within-district urban assignment
mechanisms, choice to charter schools, the impact of private school vouchers, and
race-based desegregation programs.1
Next I analyze the role that Roy selection plays in generating test score gains. I
accomplish this by estimating a model of treatment effect heterogeneity that incorpo-
rates a rich set of student observables: lagged test scores, subsidized lunch recipiency,
race/ethnicity, gender, and measures of student behavior. I find that the observed
heterogeneity predicts student take-up behavior in a way that is consistent with Roy
selection. Students who would be negatively impacted by the program are much less
likely to apply; conditional on applying, negatively impacted students are less likely
to take up a randomly assigned offer to enroll; and once enrolled, negatively impacted
students are less likely to continue on in the program after their first year.
This finding is significant because selection on potential benefit drives a wedge
between the local average effect identified by the lottery and the average treatment
effect of interest: school quality. To get a sense of the bias this selection induces,
1For recent examples of choice among traditional public schools, see Cullen et al. (2006), Hastings
et al. (2012), Deming et al. (2014), and Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2017). For recent examples of choice to
the charter sector, see Hoxby and Murarka (2009), Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2011a), Dobbie and Fryer
(2011), Angrist et al. (2012), and Angrist et al. (2016). For examples of the impact of private school
vouchers, see Howell et al. (2002), Wolf et al. (2008), Mills and Wolf (2017), and Abdulkadiroglu
et al. (2018). For race based programs, see Angrist and Lang (2004) or Bergman (2018).
4I use the observed heterogeneity to extrapolate the average treatment effect for the
treated, the applicants and the non-applicants. I find that 38% of the treatment
effect for the treated comes from post-lottery selection into enrollment and that 78%
of the treatment effect for applicants is driven by pre-lottery selection into the ap-
plicant pool. Almost none of the local average effect identified with the lottery is
the result of quality differences across districts. The fact that families sort students
to school districts according to potential benefit suggests that research relying on
school choice lotteries to learn about differences in school quality may lack any broad
claim to external validity. These findings also add to a recent literature examining
the relationship between selection and heterogeneity for understanding optimal policy
(Walters, 2017; Mogstad et al., 2018; Hull, 2018).
The final contribution of this paper is a new estimator that leverages non-experimental
data to efficiently estimate heterogeneous treatment effect models in quasi-experimental
designs. In order to study the sorting of students to districts on the basis of potential
benefit, I must first fit a rich heterogeneous effects model using an instrumental vari-
ables (IV) strategy. Unfortunately, IV designs are notoriously noisy (Young, 2017).
This makes precise estimation of the heterogenous effects difficult with the lottery
sample at my disposal. However, I show that corresponding estimates using obser-
vational data on the universe of public school students in Massachusetts are highly
correlated with the estimates from the experimental sample. This suggests that the
non-experimental data contains information that is useful for pinning down the local
average effects identified by the IV design. I formalize this intuition by combining
the experimental and non-experimental estimates within a hierarchical model. The
estimator is consistent under the same conditions as IV and, under the assumption
that the heterogeneous effects are normally distributed, it is more efficient.
The estimator I propose adds to an emerging literature in Economics that uses
5random-effects and other bayesian or quasi-bayesian methods to synthesize informa-
tion from multiple sources (e.g. Hull 2018, Meager 2017, Meager 2018). In particular,
the method outlined in Angrist et al. (2017) is closely related. The authors of that
paper use a simulated method of moments approach that combines non-experimental
and lottery identified value added in a hierarchical model to generate a complete
quality ranking across oversubscribed and undersubscribed schools in Boston. The
method I develop is similar in spirit to the just-identified version of their model; how-
ever, because I am only interested in efficiency gains, whereas Angrist et al. (2017)
use the non-experimental data to solve an otherwise under-identified model, I do not
need to model the first stage, reduced form, and least square’s bias jointly within
the parent distribution. This allows me to find a closed form solution with simple,
transparent intuition. And unlike Angrist et al. (2017), this approach allows for the
possibility that the local average treatment effect identified by the lottery is different
from the average treatment effect in the population.
This econometric method also offers a partial answer to a recent critique of in-
strumental variable designs. Young (2017) argues that due to their lack of precision,
the typical IV design in economics generates no increase in knowledge beyond what is
learned from the corresponding least squares regression. However, the decision about
whether to use IV or least squares need not be binary. Provided the econometrician
cares about a collection of parameters beyond the average treatment effect, the esti-
mator I propose offers a principled way to average the IV and least squares estimates
and thus fully leverage the available information.
1.1 Increasing Access with District Choice
The purpose of inter-district choice in Massachusetts is to weaken the link between
geography and access to a high quality education. The program was originally es-
6tablished in 1993 as one portion of a broader set of education reforms known as the
Massachusetts Educational Reform Act (MERA). Broadly speaking, the reforms cen-
tered around three areas: school funding, accountability, and access. To further the
latter objective, MERA established provisions allowing for both charter schools and
inter-district choice (Chester, 2014). Between 2001 and 2016, over 70,000 students
enrolled in a school outside their home district via the inter-district choice program.
To put this number in context, over the same time span the charter sector in Mas-
sachusetts enrolled around 119,000 students.2 Figure 1·1 shows enrollment in the
inter-district choice and the charter sector over time.
At the district level, the program operates in several stages that may or may
not culminate in a lottery for admission. By default, every public school district in
Massachusetts participates in the program. However, each year the local school board
may vote to opt out. If the school board votes to opt out, the district is not required to
enroll students from other districts; however, voting to opt out does not preclude local
students from using the program. The law then requires that participating districts
project capacity and enrollment and make excess seats available to any student in the
state. The projection methods are determined locally. Since 2001, nearly 200 districts
out of approximately 295 traditional public school districts3 in Massachusetts have
enrolled at least one student via the program, with 156 districts participating in an
average year. Figure 1·2 shows the geospatial distribution of choice districts as of
2016. When the number of students who apply exceeds the number of seats available,
the district is required to allocate the seats via lottery. Once a student is offered a
spot in the district and accepts, she becomes a full public school student of the district
until she graduates or leaves voluntarily. However, transportation is the responsibility
2Both calculations are my own and were made using administrative student micro-data provided
by the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education.
3Over this period, some districts consolidated into regional districts.
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Figure 1·1: Enrollment in Inter-district Choice and Charter Schools
Over Time
of the family.4 The sending district is then required to pay the receiving district the
lesser of 75% of average per-pupil expenditures in the sending district or $5,000.
However, the sending district must pay the full cost of any special education services
as determined by the state funding formula. In practice, the $5,000 cap is binding
for non-special education students.
The way the program is implemented in practice sometimes differs substantially
from the text of the law. For example, an advisory memo from the Massachusetts
Office of General Counsel concluded that the non-discrimination language in the law
was so strong that even sibling preference should not be considered when administer-
ing lotteries for admissions purposes (Moody, 1994). In practice, nearly every district
offers some form of sibling preference.5 In addition, there are a number of districts
which are regularly oversubscribed yet conduct admissions on a first-come first-serve
4There are some exceptions to this rule for students with disabilities.
5This assertion is based on conversations I had with state level program officials and district level
administrators while collecting data.
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9basis.6 Finally, there are some portions of the law which simply never made it in to
practice. For example, the original bill asked participating districts to submit their
enrollment and capacity projections to the Massachusetts Department of Elementary
and Secondary Education (DESE). I learned from my conversations with state level
program administrators that, in practice, this information has never been collected.
1.2 Collecting District Choice Data in Massachusetts
The data I use for this project come from several sources. I start with hand collected
lottery records from school districts in Massachusetts. I then match and merge these
lottery records to administrative data on the universe of public school students in
Massachusetts. These administrative data include information on standardized test
scores, teachers and coursework, as well as data on college outcomes via an extract
from the National Student Clearinghouse. I also make use of of several spreadsheets
provided to me by DESE which describe information such as which districts were open
to choice in a given year, how the structure and coverage of districts has changed over
time, and the within district distribution of education spending. Finally, I augment
these sources with publicly available data on property values from the Massachusetts
Department of Revenue and district level data on the parental characteristics of public
school students from the Census’ Education and Geographic Estimates project. I will
now briefly discuss each of these data sources in turn. For a complete characterization
of the data matching and cleaning process, see Appendix A.
1.2.1 New Lottery Data
In May of 2016, I contacted every public school district in the state of Massachusetts
that had ever enrolled a student via inter-district choice and asked them to share their
6While collecting data, at least five districts indicated this to me, but not all districts offered this
information when responding to my emails.
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lottery records with me.7 Of the districts I contacted, approximately 75% responded.
Of the districts that responded, 36% confirmed that they had ever conducted a lottery.
Typically, districts that did not conduct a lottery were not over-subscribed. A small
number of districts accepted new students using a first-come first-serve procedure
despite being over-subscribed. Of the districts that had ever conducted a lottery,
38% had maintained records that they were willing to share with me. By far the
most common reason for not sharing data was poor record keeping. Some districts
elected not to participate out of privacy concerns. Of the records I collected, a
substantial portion were unusable due to insufficient documentation of the lottery
process. Ultimately, I was left with approximately 3,000 student level lottery records
from 203 lotteries across 14 districts.
Districts used a variety of randomization mechanisms to conduct the lotteries.
The most common randomization method involved having a secretary or administra-
tor randomly select some subset of the applicants to receive offers of admission. I
code these random offers as a binary “initial offer” instrument. This randomization
procedure was used in 91% of the lotteries in my sample. Typically, the remaining
applicants were then randomly assigned a waitlist number. When available, I also
code these numbers as a “waitlist number” instrument. There was one district which,
for a single year in my data, randomly chose students from a waitlist pool instead
of assigning them lottery numbers. I code these random offers as a binary “waitlist
offer” instrument and include it for completeness. There was also one small district
whose records consisted of randomly assigned lottery numbers, with no indication
as to who actually received an offer of admission. For this district, I code the raw
number as a “lottery number” instrument. In practice, all the lottery results I present
in this paper are driven by initial offers.
7A number of these districts were vocational districts, internet based learning programs, or other
non-traditional programs that I subsequently learned were not required to use a lottery based ad-
missions process. For this reason, I don’t count these districts when calculating response rates.
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Figure 1·3: Distribution of Lotteries by Grade
The typical lottery in my sample is small. The average number of students I view
in a single lottery is 9.6; the median is 7. The lotteries also span a considerable
time-period. The earliest lottery in my data occurs in academic year 2002-2003;
the latest occurs in academic year 2016-2017. None of the 2016-2017 lotteries are
included in my estimation sample since, as of the time the analysis was conducted,
the necessary outcome variables were unavailable post-lottery. Finally, I will note
that the lotteries in my sample span all grade levels. However, as can be seen in
figure 1·3, the lotteries are clustered at grades which are typically within-district,
cross-school transition points for students.8 For more detailed descriptive statistics
regarding the raw lottery data, see Appendix A.
I merge these student lottery records to the data provided by DESE by looking
for exact first and last name matches within the implied application grade / year.
8For example, students often move from grammar to middle school in the fifth, sixth, or seventh
grade, and from middle to high-school in ninth grade.
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When available, I break ties using middle names / initials, home-town and date of
birth. When town of residence is unavailable and I am otherwise unable to break a
tie, I choose individuals that live within the empirical distribution of towns that lose
students to the receiving district via choice. If I am unable to break a tie in this
way, I consider the student un-matched and drop her from the sample. When this
procedure fails to find any exact match, I repeat it using fuzzy first and last name
matching. For this reason, all of my specifications will include indicators for whether
a student was matched via the exact or fuzzy version of the algorithm. Overall, I
obtain an 89% match rate.
I will note here that my lottery sample exhibits some imbalance along predeter-
mined characteristics. Figure 1·4 presents point estimates and two standard deviation
intervals from a within-lottery regression9 of all baseline observable and otherwise ex-
ogenous characteristics on the initial offer indicator for the sub-sample of students
where I observe at least one test score prior to the lottery. The joint F-statistic across
all pre-determined characteristics is 1.64. Of particular concern is the fact that the
coefficient for black students is negative and the 2 standard deviation interval does not
include zero. However, the administrators conducting the lottery could not directly
observe race,10 the magnitude of the coefficient is small, white students also have a
negative point estimate, and the point estimate for black students is not significantly
different than the point estimate for white students (or any other racial group). For
these reasons, it seems unlikely that racial discrimination is the culprit. In Appendix
A, I consider the possibility that this imbalance is driven by differential attrition and
conclude that this is also unlikely to be the case.
9Within lottery is the level of variation at which the instrument is randomly assigned. In practice,
I do this by including lottery fixed effects. I also drop all students from this regression that received
sibling preference or were indicated as applying late.
10Of course, it is possible that lottery administrators were able to infer race from student or parent
names or that they were able to observe race if a student or her family dropped the application form
off in person.
13
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
Approximate Match
Days Suspended
Unexcused Absences
Subsidized Lunch
ELL
Any Disability
Male
Hispanic
Hawaiian
Indian / Alaskan
Asian
Black
White
Baseline Years in Choice
Baseline Choice
PARCC Test
Baseline ELA
Baseline Math
−0.50 −0.25 0.00 0.25 0.50
Regression Coefficient
Co
v
ar
ia
te
Figure 1·4: Covariate Balance by Initial Offer Status
While it is possible that the covariate imbalance is due to some form of cheating on
the part of districts, I believe this is unlikely for two reasons. First, all of the districts
that provided lottery data to me did so voluntarily and described to me in detail
the process they used for randomization. Second, cheating would open the district
up to potentially serious liability. As I discussed in section 1.1, the legal office in
the department of education in Massachusetts concluded that the anti-discrimination
language in the inter-district choice law was even stronger than that used in the
charter sector. Further, there was no consequence for opting not to share data with
me. Thus if a district was cheating, it had a strong incentive to not provide me with
data. One explanation for the imbalance is the possibility that some of the lottery
records I obtained did not track things like sibling preference or late applications
properly. Another potential explanation is that this imbalance is simply the product
14
of sampling variation. In any event, I show in Appendix A that conditioning on earlier
pre-lottery test scores increases my precision substantially and, more importantly,
that such specifications pass all of the standard falsification tests used in lottery
designs. For this reason, every specification in this paper using the lottery variation
is restricted to the sample of students for whom I observe at least one test score prior
to the lottery year and will include baseline test scores as controls.
1.2.2 Administrative Student Records and Other Data Sources
For this project, the state of Massachusetts provided me with data on the universe
of public school students. I retrieved demographic and socioeconomic information
from the Student Information Management System (SIMS) spanning academic years
2001-2002 through 2016-2017. This included variables related to race / ethnicity, gen-
der, attendance, discipline, disability, and whether the student received a subsidized
lunch, as well as the variables necessary for matching. It also includes administrative
information on the district, school, and grade-level where students are assigned in a
given year, including an indicator for whether a student was enrolled in a district via
inter-district choice. I drop observations appearing in adult education programs, col-
laborative or special education schools, online schools, charter schools, and vocational
schools.
I retrieve test scores from the Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System
(MCAS) spanning academic years 2001-2002 through 2016-2017. I standardize the
test scores at the grade, year, and test-type11 level to have mean zero and standard
deviation one. I retrieve coursework taken by students from Student Course Schedule
(SCS) data spanning academic years 2010-2011 through 2016-2017. I also use data on
11The state transitioned testing regimes from the original MCAS exam to the Partnership for
Assessment and Readiness for College Careers (PARCC) exam over the course of my sample frame.
There are 3 years in my data where the old and new examinations appear simultaneously. For this
reason, all regressions will also include test-type fixed effects.
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college attendance contained in an extract from the National Student Clearinghouse
purchased by DESE.
For some auxiliary regressions, I make use of additional spreadsheets provided
to me by the state level officials who administer the program. These spreadsheets
describe district finances, as well as the outcome of the annual district level votes on
choice status spanning academic years 2007-2008 to 2016-2017. I also make use of
district level socio-economic and demographic data on parents of public school stu-
dents from the Census’ Education, Demographic and Geographic Estimates (EDGE)
project, as well as data on property values which I downloaded from the Massachusetts
Department of Revenue.
For further description of the various data sources along with a detailed break-
down of the cleaning process, see Appendix A.
1.3 Program Take-up by Students and Districts
Students in my lottery sample are positively selected both relative to the state as a
whole and relative to their home district peers. Table A.1 illustrates this fact. The
column labeled “All Districts,” provides averages of observables across the entire state
for students in test taking grades in academic years 2001-2002 through 2016-2017.
The column labeled “Choice Students” restricts the state-wide sample to observations
where a student is currently participating in inter-district choice. The column labeled
“Sending Districts” restricts the state-wide sample to districts that lose a student to
choice via a lottery I observe in my data. The column labeled “Lottery Sample”
includes students found in my lottery data as observed at baseline.12 The column
labeled “Compliers” uses the method of Abadie (2003) to re-weight the lottery sample
12There are ≈ 80 students involved in lotteries that did not use an initial offer mechanism and that
I do not include here. Including them does not meaningfully change the averages in this column, and
excluding them facilitates calculating the complier averages in column four. To view the averages
for the entire estimation sample, see Appendix A.
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Table 1.1: Student Selection into Inter-District Choice
All Students Choice Students Sending Districts Lottery Sample Compliers
Math 0.02σ 0σ -0.21σ 0.11σ 0.05σ
ELA 0.02σ 0.04σ -0.21σ 0.14σ 0.11σ
White 83% 93% 68% 90% 87%
Black 11% 6% 29% 10% 12%
Hispanic 15% 8% 27% 5% 3%
Male 51% 48% 51% 46% 47%
Subsidized Lunch 33% 28% 55% 21% 21%
Limited English 6% 1% 11% 0% 1%
Disability 12% 12% 13% 11% 12%
Days Attended 165.12 163.5 161.68 167.91 168.66
Observations 3,879,633 56,440 178,458 881 881
such that the averages reflect those of initial offer lottery compliers.
Compared to their home district peers, the lottery sample is disproportionately
white, less likely to receive a subsidized lunch, less likely to be identified as limited
English proficiency, less likely to be diagnosed with a disability, and has higher average
test scores. However, when compared to the state as a whole, the differences are
smaller. One notable pattern is the enormous difference in subsidized lunch recipiency
across sub-samples. This is likely due to the fact that transportation to the new
district is the responsibility of the family. For this reason, we should expect families
with the resources to transport their children long distances to be more likely to apply
to the program and subsequently accept lottery offers.
At the district level, the decision not to opt out of inter-district choice is typically
determined by a desire to supplement revenue. When a district observes that it has
extra space in a classroom, in the sense that it is below the target student to teacher
ratio in a given grade level, the district will use the program as a source of additional
funds. However, in the greater Boston area, participation is quite low. This is likely
due to the fact that many suburban districts in the Boston area participate in the
METCO program. As discussed in Angrist and Lang (2004), METCO is the nation’s
oldest voluntary school desegregation program. It provides a separate mechanism for
filling excess seats whereby predominantly white suburban districts enroll minority
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Table 1.2: Select Predictors of District Participation
Accepting New Choice Students
(1) (2) (3)
Student-Teacher Ratio −0.07 −0.07 −0.002
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Per-Pupil-Spending: Pupil Services 0.15 0.23 0.03
(0.08) (0.07) (0.05)
Metco Students (tens) −0.01 −0.01 0.01
(0.005) (0.005) (0.02)
Estimation Method OLS Post-Lasso OLS
District/Year Fixed Effects No No Yes
Dependent Variable Mean 0.55 0.55 0.55
Observations 2,280 2,280 2,280
Observations (Districts) 285 285 285
Adjusted R2 0.34 0.31 0.88
students from Boston. Thus METCO leads to a crowding out of inter-district choice.
These explanations are supported both by informal discussions I have had with
district officials and by suggestive regressions in my data. Table 1.2 displays select
coefficients from a joint regression of district characteristics on an indicator that
takes a value of one in years when a district did not vote to opt out of inter-district
choice. Column (1) displays select results from the joint regression estimated via OLS.
Column (2) displays select results from the variables chosen when estimation is done
using post-Lasso. Column (3) displays select results from a joint regression that also
includes district and year fixed effects; in effect, column (3) asks whether trends in
the independent variables are predictive of changes in participation status. In levels,
the student teacher ratio, various per-pupil expenditure categories, and the number
of METCO students are predictive of the decision to participate. Other observables,
such as the district demographic composition and urbanicity, are not. And almost
none of the variables considered exhibit trends which predict changes in participation
status. See Appendix A for complete results including the variables not displayed in
table 1.2.
Finally, I note that as a result of this participation disparity, the net student
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Figure 1·5: Net Student Gain/Loss to Inter-district Choice in 2016
gain / loss to choice is not evenly distributed across the state. Figure 1·5 shows the
geographic distribution of the net gains and losses. The largest net winners and losers
are concentrated in the middle and western regions. The winners tend to be suburbs
and large regionalized school districts. The losers tend to be urban and rural.
1.4 Program Evaluation
In this section, I evaluate the benefits of inter-district choice for students that partici-
pate. For identification, I examine applicants to oversubscribed districts and compare
the district choice lottery winners to the district choice lottery losers within a two-
stage least squares framework. I find that participating in district choice causes large
test score gains in math. I find no effect on English Language Arts scores. I also find
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that participating in district choice increases the quality of the coursework that stu-
dents take. Finally, I provide evidence that participating in district choice increases
the probability a student will graduate from high-school and attend a four-year col-
lege.
1.4.1 Identification and Estimation
Consider the following two-stage least squares framework:
yit = δ0 + βdi + δ` + γWi + it (1.1)
dit = δ
′
0 + ΠZi + δ
′
` + γ
′Wi + ηit (1.2)
Where yit denotes the outcome of student i during a post-lottery period of time t
(typically an academic year), dit is an indicator for whether student i was enrolled
out of district via the choice program at time t, δ` is a lottery fixed effect,
13 δ0 is a
reference lottery, Wi are covariates observed at baseline,
14 and Zi denotes the vector
of four lottery instruments15 discussed in section 2.2.1.
The parameter β identifies a local average treatment effect (LATE) specific to the
instrument vector Zi under a standard set of instrument-by-instrument conditions:
13To be precise, a lottery is defined as the interaction of the grade, application district, and year
where the student appears in my lottery data.
14All specifications will include an average of all test scores observed prior to the lottery year;
academic year and grade fixed effects; indicators for PARCC testing; and indicators for whether
or not a student was matched to the state data via an exact or fuzzy process. One district asked
students who were not given a random initial offer whether or not they wanted to be included
on the waitlist before assigning them a random waitlist number; I include an indicator where this
happens in my data. However, the results are not sensitive to dropping these observations. I also had
a district that, for one lottery, indicated “admission rounds” in their lottery spreadsheet without
further explanation. For this reason, I also include indicators for these admissions rounds. The
results are not sensitive to dropping this lottery. See Appendix A for more detail.
15These include random initial offers of attendance, random offers from the waitlist, lottery num-
bers, and waitlist numbers. However, 91% of the students in my estimation sample were involved in
lotteries that used an initial offer mechanism. In practice, this instrument drives virtually all of the
results I will present.
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exclusion, random assignment, first stage, and monotonicity (Imbens and Angrist,
1994). Exclusion requires that the result of the lottery affect potential outcomes only
via takeup of the treatment. Random assignment requires that within each lottery the
results are, in fact, random. First stage requires that the results of the lottery change
take-up behavior for some subset of the population (i.e. that Π > 0 for some element
of Zi). Monotonicity is a restriction on the heterogeneity of potential treatment status
permitted in the first stage; it requires that all individuals whose behavior is changed
by the results of the lottery behave consistently with respect to take-up. Provided
these four conditions are satisfied, β is properly interpreted as the average treatment
effect of moving to a more preferred school district for lottery compliers who applied
to over-subscribed districts that maintained and were willing to share high quality
lottery records. I save a discussion of heterogeneity and external validity for section
1.5.
I restrict the sample to the set of students appearing in my lottery data such that
I observe at least one pre and one post lottery test score. I drop students who received
sibling preference or applied late. When students apply to lotteries in multiple years,
I randomly choose which observation to use. I also drop all students involved in a
lottery if I am unable to match at least one student who receives a lottery offer and one
student who does not; otherwise, the lottery would contribute no identifying variation
to the estimate. Finally, I restrict the data to the set of student-year observations
occurring after the lottery randomization.
For the standard errors, I follow the design based approach of Abadie et al. (2017)
and cluster at the level at which treatment is assigned (i.e. the student). Other
sensible approaches would be to cluster at the school-by-grade level, as in Angrist
et al. (2013a) or at the level of the lottery. In practice, neither of these alternatives
materially changes the standard errors.
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Table 1.3: Test Score Results
Math English Language Arts
OLS RF FS 2SLS OLS RF FS 2SLS
Choice −0.005 0.16 −0.05 −0.01
(0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.08)
Initial Offer 0.08 0.51 0.001 0.51
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Waitlist Offer −0.10 0.96 −0.19 0.96
(0.13) (0.05) (0.21) (0.05)
Lottery Number −0.004 0.01 0.004 0.01
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Waitlist Number 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
F-Stat Excluded Instruments 120.9 120.9 120.1 120.1
Observations 1705 1705 1705 1705 1705 1705 1705 1705
Observations (students) 966 966 966 966 969 969 969 969
Adjusted R2 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.66 0.56 0.56 0.33 0.56
1.4.2 District Choice Benefits the Average Student who Participates
I begin with results on test scores. Table 1.3 shows ordinary least squares, reduced
form, first stage and two-stage least squares results side-by-side for my baseline speci-
fication. The two-stage least squares estimates imply that the causal effect of moving
to a more preferred district is to increase math test scores by 0.16 standard deviations.
There is no detectable impact on English Language Arts.
The effects in table 1.3 are large in both absolute terms and relative to the existing
literature on choice between traditional public schools. The unadjusted black-white
test score gap in Massachusetts in 2016 was 0.56σ; hence the point estimate from
inter-district choice represents approximately 30% of that gap. Prior lottery evalu-
ations of choice between traditional public schools have examined the impact that
attending a student’s most preferred school has on test scores within the context of
large, urban district assignment algorithms. In that environment, attending a most
preferred school does not typically impact test scores (Cullen et al., 2006; Hastings
et al., 2012; Deming et al., 2014). For additional specifications where I include pre-
determined student level controls, as well as robustness checks using student fixed
effects to achieve identification via trend changes across lottery winners and losers,
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Table 1.4: Coursework Results
Class Type Indicator
AP Remedial General Advanced
Choice 0.14 −0.07 0.01 0.20
(0.06) (0.03) (0.01) (0.05)
Mean Dependent Variable 0.19 0.09 0.99 0.28
Observations 809 2,418 2,418 2,418
Observations (students) 470 933 933 933
Adjusted R2 0.26 0.12 0.04 0.36
see Appendix A.
Next I examine the impact that moving to a more preferred district has on course-
work. For the coursework regressions, I am forced to drop a small number of students
that only appear in the sample frame prior to the first year MA DESE kept student
level records on courses taken. Table 1.4 presents results from the baseline two stage
least squares using as an outcome indicators for whether the student was enrolled in
coursework labeled as Advanced Placement (AP), Remedial, General, or Advanced.
AP classes consist of a nationally recognized curriculum known for rigor and college
preparedness. Remedial, General, and Advanced are designations from the state of
Massachusetts. When examining AP coursework, I restrict the sample to years when
students appear in grades 11 and 12, since access to AP coursework is uncommon at
earlier grades.
Table 1.4 tells a consistent story: moving to a more preferred district increases
the quality of coursework that a student takes. There is a substantial increase in
the probability that students enroll in advanced and AP coursework, and a moderate
decrease in the probability that a student enrolls in a remedial class. In Appendix
A, I present additional results on coursework using intensive margin variation which
suggests that the pattern of substitution moves children from remedial to general
coursework, and from general to advanced.
Finally, I present results pertaining to the impact of inter-district choice on grad-
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Table 1.5: Post-Secondary Outcomes Results
Post-Secondary Outcome
Graduate Attend-2yr Attend-4yr
Initial Offer 0.02 −0.05 0.04
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04)
Choice 0.03 −0.08 0.06
(0.05) (0.08) (0.07)
Observations (Students) 518 518 518 518 518 518
F-Stat Exluded Instruments 226.75 226.75 226.75
Dependent Variable Mean 0.88 0.88 0.39 0.39 0.61 0.61
Adjusted R2 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.21 0.21
uation and college attendance. For table 1.5, I restrict the data to the sample of
students whose on-time graduation date relative to their lottery grade-year is 2016
or prior. Since the estimates are imprecise, I present both the reduced form and
two-stage least squares estimates. The point estimates from table 1.5 suggest that
students who participate in inter-district choice are more likely to graduate from high-
school and less likely to attend a two-year college. However, the decline in two-year
attendance is approximately compensated for by an increase in four-year college at-
tendance. This suggests that lottery winners are substituting four year college for two
year college. Combined with the results on coursework, it is tempting to conclude
that this is coming from the increase in college application competitiveness that ac-
cess to advanced and AP coursework bestows upon lottery winners. However, this is
purely speculative. It is not possible to rule out other potential mechanisms or even
the absence of an effect.
1.5 School Quality and External Validity
A minimal definition of school quality is that it is equal to the expected test score
gain a student randomly selected from the population would experience if sent to
that institution.16 It follows that to credibly relate estimates of test score gains from
16I call this a minimum criterion because, in the presence of treatment effect heterogeneity, it is
not obvious how to properly define school quality. A stronger, but somewhat more natural, criterion
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choice lotteries to school quality, we need to know if the local average treatment effect
(LATE) identified with the lottery is equal to the average treatment effect (ATE) for
the relevant student population. Thus whether, and to what degree, the program
evaluation results presented in section 1.4 communicate information about school
quality is at its core a question about externally validity.
Of particular concern for the external validity of choice lottery estimates is the
potential for test score gains to emerge from Roy selection. Simple models of economic
behavior would predict that families should use inter-district choice to sort students
to schools on the basis of potential benefit (Hoxby, 2000). This selection on gains will
drive a wedge between the LATE and the ATE by ensuring that students with higher
average benefit are disproportionately likely to apply for inter-district choice, accept
admissions offers, and subsequently remain in the program. Thus school choice can
generate positive test score gains even when there are no quality differences across
schools.
It is possible to test for this sorting under weak conditions. Consider the following
simple version of the potential outcome framework:
yi = diy
1
i + (1− di)y0i = βidi + y0i (1.3)
Were yi is the observable test score of student i, di is a treatment indicator denoting
whether the student accepted an offer to switch schools, (y1i , y
0
i ) represents the stu-
dent’s test score in the treated and control state respectively, and βi = y
1
i − y0i is the
benefit of the program to student i. Let τi denote an indicator for whether or not a
student applied to the program.
would be that a school is higher quality if it benefits every student in the population relative to
the reference school; however, the weaker criterion is still a reasonable measure for many practical
applications despite the fact that optimal policy should, to the greatest degree possible, account for
observed heterogeneity rather than rely on averages.
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Then a necessary condition for the LATE to be externally valid is that application
and take-up behavior are unrelated to potential benefit:
βi ⊥ (di, τi) (1.4)
In general, a linear extrapolation is appropriate to any sub-sample of the population
where this condition holds. Hence, I will refer to condition (1.4) as weak linearity.
With a rich model of heterogeneity, I can test weak linearity under weak condi-
tions. Without loss of generality, suppose I am interested in testing for selection on
post-lottery take-up behavior (di). Then weak linearity implies that E(βidi) = 0;
however, βi is unknowable and hence we cannot test this implication directly. In-
stead, let k = k(Xi) be an injective mapping between covariates and student types
as indexed by k. Suppose βi = βk + vi where βk is the treatment effect for students
of type k. Now I can test whether:
E(βkdi) = 0 (1.5)
A finding that E(βkdi) 6= 0 would imply a violation of weak linearity except in the
knife-edge case where the correlation between take-up behavior and the observable
heterogeneity is exactly off-set by the correlation between take-up and the unobserved
heterogeneity.17 In practice, this is the test I will take to my data in section 1.7. In or-
der to implement it, however, I will first need to estimate the observable heterogeneity
(βk).
17More precisely, E(βkdi) = −E(vidi) implies that it is possible to find E(βkdi) 6= 0 even when
the data generating process exhibits no selection on gains.
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1.6 Estimating Treatment Effect Heterogeneity
In order to understand the relation between potential benefit, application, and take-up
behavior, I need to estimate a rich model of treatment effect heterogeneity. However,
my estimation sample is only moderately sized (≈ 1, 000 students), and I am using
a noisy estimation procedure (two-stage least squares). This makes it difficult to
precisely estimate the necessary number of interaction terms.
To overcome this technical challenge, I develop a new empirical-Bayes type esti-
mator that uses non-experimental data to increase the precision of quasi-experimental
estimates. The model assumes a hierarchical structure for the heterogeneity. This
allows the posterior mean of the experimental estimates to incorporate information
from the non-experimental data. The resulting estimator swaps noisy experimental
variation for precise non-experimental variation according to the correlation of the
heterogeneous effects across samples. The estimator is consistent under the same con-
ditions as IV and, under the joint normality assumption required for the hierarchical
model, it is more efficient. I also provide simulation evidence that the estimation
procedure dominates standard methods on mean squared error.
1.6.1 A Hierarchical Model of Heterogeneous Effects
Suppose that we wish to estimate treatment effect heterogeneity in a population with
I observations. Further, assume that a subset of size E from this population are
exposed to some quasi-experiment, while the remaining N = I − E are not. Let
k = k(Xi) be an injective mapping between covariates Xi and a student’s type as
indexed by k.
Suppose we are interested in estimating the following model:
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yi = βidi + ui (1.6)
βi = βk + vi (1.7)
Here, βk is the local average treatment effect for individuals of type k identified via the
quasi-experiment (e.g. a lottery design). Let βˆek denote the estimate of βk from the
quasi-experiment, and let βˆnk denote an estimate using only observational data (e.g.
a lagged test score model using the N observations not exposed to the experiment).
Let the joint asymptotic distribution of the estimators be given by:
[
βˆek
βˆnk
]
a∼ N
([
βk
βk + bk
]
,Ωk
)
(1.8)
Where bk is the difference between the local average treatment effect βk identified
by the quasi-experiment and the estimand of the observational design. Note that up
to this point, we have not assumed anything beyond what is ordinarily required for
identification and inference.
In general, the econometrician may prefer the experimental estimates because with
a compelling quasi-experiment these should be unbiased (or at least consistent) for
the local average effect of interest. However, if the experimental sample E is small, or
if the quasi-experiment requires a noisy technique such as IV (or both), the estimated
heterogenous effects may still be far from the local average effect due to sampling
variation. At the same time, the non-experimental estimates will be inconsistent for
the local average effect in general. Despite this fact, the non-experimental estimates
can still contain valuable information useful for pinning down the heterogeneous ef-
fects in the experimental sample. Intuitively, realizations of the estimators (βˆek, βˆ
n
k )
that are highly correlated are unlikely to emerge from chance alone. Hence such a
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realization should give the econometrician more confidence that the point estimates
from the experiment are close to the local average effect of interest. The following
model formalizes this intuition.
Assume a hierarchical model for the estimands of the experimental and non-
experimental designs:
[
βk
βk + bk
]
∼ N
([
β0
β0 + b0
]
,Σ
)
(1.9)
Where β0 is the center of the distribution of the heterogeneous effects identified by the
experiment, and b0 is the difference between the centers of the experimental and non-
experimental distributions. The assumption that the estimands are jointly normal
induces a Bayesian structure:
P
([
βk
βk + bk
] ∣∣∣ [βˆek
βˆnk
])
∝ P
([
βˆek
βˆnk
] ∣∣∣ [ βk
βk + bk
])
P
([
βk
βk + bk
])
(1.10)
With the parent distribution from the hierarchical model taking on the role of the
prior. Specifying the joint distribution of the estimands in this way allows the poste-
rior mode of the experimentally identified heterogeneous effects to be influenced by
the realization from the non-experimental sample in a way that I will make precise
later. First, I discuss identification.
Observe that in order to operationalize this model empirically, I will need values for
Ωk, Σ and (β0, β0 + bk). One option would be to specify a prior on these parameters
and estimate the model in a fully Bayesian framework. Another option, and the
one I pursue in this paper, is to estimate these quantities from the data and thus
implement the model via an empirical-Bayes procedure. The main advantage of this
approach is that I will be able to provide a simple analytical representation of the
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resulting estimator that makes transparent how the non-experimental variation is
used to inform the posterior mode. The center of the joint distribution (β0, β0 + bk) is
identified via the corresponding pooled regressions that assume no heterogeneity (i.e.
βk = β). The population covariance matrix Σ is identified by calculating the cross-
design variance-covariance matrix: cov(βˆe, βˆn). And the joint asymptotic covariance
matrix is calculated from the residuals of the experimental and non-experimental
heterogeneous effects regressions.18 For more detail, see Appendix A.
From equation (1.10), we can use standard properties of the multi-variate normal
distribution to calculate the posterior-mode of βk as follows:
βsk = β0 + αk(βˆ
e
k − β0) + δk(βˆnk − β0 − b0) (1.11)
Equation (1.11) consists of three terms. The first term (β0) anchors the estimator to
the center of the experimental distribution. The next two terms consist of a weighted
average of the experimental variation in the heterogeneous effects (βˆek − β0) and the
non-experimental variation (βˆnk −β0− b0). For now, assume the off-diagonal elements
of Ωk are zero as would typically be the case when the observations in the experimental
data are not also included in the non-experimental data.19 The weights are given by:
αk =
φkn − ρ2
φknφ
k
e − ρ2
(1.12)
δk =
ρ (ω
k
e )
2
σeσn
φknφ
k
e − ρ2
(1.13)
Where ρ ≡ corr(βk, βk + bk) is the correlation between the experimental and non-
18When the quasi-experimental estimates are generated via ordinary least squares (as opposed to
IV or 2SLS), this is analogous to estimating the covariance matrix of a seemingly unrelated regression
model via Zellner (1962).
19For a more general expression, see Appendix A.
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experimental estimands and φkj ≡
σ2j+(ω
k
j )
2
σ2j
is the inverse of a standard empirical
Bayes weight,20 commonly referred to as the signal to noise ratio. The parameters
(ωke , ω
k
n, σe, σn) come from the diagonals of Ωk and Σ. When ρ = 0, the system de-
couples and equation (1.11) reduces to a standard empirical-Bayes estimator applied
to the experimental data alone. Otherwise, the resulting estimate is a mixture of the
two sources of variation. I show in Appendix A that after plugging in the empiri-
cal counterparts for (αk, δk, β0, β0 + b0), the resulting posterior modes are consistent
under the same conditions as IV21 and, under the normality assumption on the par-
ent distribution, more precise than standard two-stage least squares. I also provide
simulation evidence that the consensus estimates using all the data dominate the
individual estimators (and their decoupled empirical-Bayes counterparts) on mean
squared error. See Appendix A for more detail.
1.6.2 Estimating Student Heterogeneity in Practice
In practice, I want to estimate a rich model of student level treatment effect hetero-
geneity using all of the available covariates at my disposal. However, some of these
covariates are continuous or have many support points. Thus constructing indicators
for student types based on their full interaction is infeasible. For this reason, I assume
the heterogeneity takes the following form:
βit = βk(Xit) + vit = α0 + αXit + vit (1.14)
The vector Xit includes student age, indicators for race / ethnicity; lagged values for
20Here j = e and j = n refer to the experimental and non-experimental weights respectively
21While this is true, a better model for the large sample behavior of this estimator might be to
fix the ratio of the sample size between the experimental and non-experimental data. This should
slow the rate of convergence for the experimental sample and thus preserve the experimental /
non-experimental sample size disparity in the limit. However, this is left for future work.
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attendance, days suspended, and test scores; and lagged indicators for whether the
student received a subsidized lunch or was diagnosed with a disability.
Moving to a two-stage least squares framework, this yields the following model for
the experimental data:
yit = δ0 + δ` + βkdit + γwWi + γxXit + it (1.15)
βk = α
e
0 + α
eXit + vit (1.16)
dit = δ
′
0 + δ
′
` + pi0Zit + piXitZit + γ
′
wWi + γ
′
xXit + ηit (1.17)
Note that in equation (1.16), I have added the superscript e to distinguish the im-
portant parameters estimated from the experimental data from those estimated using
the non-experimental data (which I will superscript by n). In practice, I plug equa-
tion (1.16) into equation (1.15) and proceed with two-stage least squares to estimate
(αe0, α
e) via the corresponding interaction terms.
For the non-experimental data, I consider the following model:
yit = δh + δg + δt + βkdit + θxXit + uit (1.18)
βk = α
n
0 + α
nXit + v
′
it (1.19)
Where δh, δg, and δt are home district, grade, and academic year fixed effects re-
spectively. In practice, I plug equation (1.19) into equation (1.18) and proceed with
ordinary least squares to estimate (αn0 , α
n) via the corresponding interaction terms.
Thus the comparison I have in mind with equation (1.18) is between two children who
would by default be assigned to the same grade and district during academic year t
and who have similar values for the covariates Xit; however, the first child has left the
home district via inter-district choice (dit = 1), while the second has not (dit = 0).
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Table 1.6: Comparison of Pooled Models
Standardized Math Test Score
2SLS OLS
Choice 0.19 0.08
(0.08) (0.003)
F-Stat Excluded Instruments 149.79
Observations 1,705 6,549,952
Observations (Students) 966 1,784,770
Adjusted R2 0.68 0.44
Note that I drop all students used in the quasi-experiment to estimate (αe0, α
e) from
the observational sample used to estimate (αn0 , α
n).
Before proceeding to the fully heterogeneous models, I first present a comparison
of estimates from the fully pooled versions that assume no heterogeneity (i.e. αe =
αn = 0). The coefficients on the treatment indicator from these pooled regressions are
the estimates of β0 and β0+b0 that I use in the parent distribution when estimating the
cross-design posterior-modes. Table 1.6 contains the results. Note that the estimate
of β0 here using two-stage least squares is different from the estimate of β0 found in
the program evaluation due to the inclusion of the vector Xit in equation (1.15). The
non-experimental estimate appears to indicate a moderate benefit to participating in
inter-district choice. However, the point estimates across designs are quite far apart.
Next I estimate the fully heterogeneous models. Figure 1·6 plots the predicted
treatment effects from the non-experimental model against the predicted treatment
effects from the experimental model over the support points of Xit contained in the
experimental data.22 While the two sets of estimated treatment effects are not one
to one, there is still a moderately strong relationship between them. The correlation
between the two sets of estimates is 0.35. This suggests that knowledge of the het-
erogeneous effects from the non-experimental model is informative about the value
22To be precise, the experimental treatment effect is given by βˆek = αˆ
e
0 + αˆ
eXit and the non-
experimental treatment effect is given by βˆnk = αˆ
n
0 + αˆ
nXit where Xit comes from an observation in
the lottery sample.
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Figure 1·6: Correlation Across Experimental and Non-Experimental
Models
we would expect in the experimental model. Hence, it seems reasonable to use a
hierarchical model to incorporate information from the non-experimental data into
the estimates.
Next I estimate the consensus posterior-modes. Figure 1·7 provides a visualization
of how the estimator mixes the two sources of information in practice. For each
support point Xit in the experimental data, figure 1·7 plots its rank in the distribution
of experimental treatment effects against the predicted treatment effect from the
experimental model (denoted by purple circles), the non-experimental model (denoted
by green triangles), and the consensus posterior mode (denoted by yellow squares).23
Thus we can observe directly, for each observation in the data, how much mixing
occurs between the experimental and non-experimental predicted values.
23I trim a small number of observations whose predicted value in the experimental sample would
be less than negative one. I do this to keep the scale of the y-axis small, which makes it easier
to see in the figure how the consensus posterior modes mix the corresponding experimental and
non-experimental estimates.
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Figure 1·7: Visualizing Cross-Design Mixing
Finally, I will note here that in principle is also possible to extract implied con-
sensus regression coefficients from the estimated posterior modes.24 Thus it is also
possible to see directly how much of the consensus estimate is driven by the under-
lying sources of heterogeneity. This is useful when the sources of heterogeneity are
themselves relevant for policy. In Appendix A, I provide simulation evidence that
both the predicted heterogeneous effect and the implied consensus regression coef-
ficients do better than their IV, OLS, or standard empirical-Bayes counterparts on
mean squared error relative to the corresponding population values. For a more de-
tailed examination of the factors driving the observed heterogeneity in my data, see
Appendix A.
24These are just a linear combination of the posterior modes αˆs = (X ′X)−1X ′βˆs and hence have
a known distribution.
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1.7 Inter-district Choice and Roy Selection
In this section, I examine the consequences that Roy selection has for the interpreta-
tion of the program evaluation LATE identified with the lottery. To test for selection
on gains, I examine three phases of the admissions process and, in each case, I find
that treatment effect heterogeneity is predictive of the take-up decision. First I ex-
amine the sub-population of students who have already taken up offers to switch
districts. I find that students who are negatively impacted by the program are more
likely to subsequently return to their home district. Second, I re-examine the first
stage of the two-stage least squares estimates from the program evaluation. I find that
holding constant the outcome of the lottery, students who are negatively impacted
by the program are less likely to take-up treatment. Third, I extrapolate treatment
effects to the pool of students who were eligible to apply for the school choice slots
in my lottery data. I find that students who would be negatively impacted by the
program are less likely to apply.
I conclude by using observed heterogeneity to extrapolate the average benefit of
inter-district choice to students that took up offers of treatment, to students that
applied, and to students that did not apply. I find that 38% of the treatment effect
for the treated comes from post-lottery selection into enrollment and that 78% of
the treatment effect for applicants is driven by pre-lottery selection into the applicant
pool. Almost none of the lottery LATE is attributable to differences in average quality
across districts.
1.7.1 Testing for Selection on Gains
Recall from section 1.5 that for a lottery estimate to identify educational quality
differences, it must be the case that weak linearity holds: individual benefit (βi)
is unrelated to both pre-lottery application behavior (τi) and post-lottery take-up
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behavior (di). Hence we should expect to find patterns of treatment effect hetero-
geneity that are consistent with no selection on gains: E(diβi) = E(τiβi) = 0. Since
individual potential benefit (βi) is unobserved, I cannot test for selection on gains
directly. Instead, I will test E(βkdi) = 0 and E(βkτi) = 0, where βk is the observable
heterogeneity. This is a valid test for selection on gains provided we rule out the
knife edge case where the correlation between take-up behavior and unobserved het-
erogeneity exactly off-sets the correlation between take-up behavior and the observed
heterogeneity.
This discussion motivates tests of weak linearity via models of the following form:
di = α + ρβk + i (1.20)
Where ρ 6= 0 indicates a failure of weak linearity, and ρ > 0 implies Roy selection.
However, the parameter ρ is difficult to interpret directly since βk is measured in units
of standardized test score gains.
Another natural test of selection on gains is to ask whether students who would
be negatively impacted by the treatment are less likely to apply or to take it up. This
motivates models of the following form:
di = α + ρ1(βk < 0) + i (1.21)
Here ρ 6= 0 implies a violation of weak linearity, with ρ < 0 indicating Roy selection.
Specifications like (1.21) have the advantage of a straightforward interpretation.
1.7.2 Assessing the Impact of Roy Selection
First, I restrict the sample to students that I use for lottery estimation and who also
accept an offer to enroll in a district outside of their home district. I then restrict
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the data to student-years after the first post-lottery year and estimate the following
model:
dit = δg + δd + δt + ρβˆk + it (1.22)
Where δg, δd and δt are grade, district, and academic year fixed effects; dit is an
indicator for whether student i participated in choice in year t; and βˆk is the estimated
heterogeneous treatment effect. With model (1.22), the comparison I have in mind is
between two students who accepted lottery offers and are now attending school under
the choice program in the same grade, district and year. The parameter ρ tells me
whether students with high potential test score gains are more likely to remain in the
program relative to those with low potential test score gains.
To look at the participation decision, I use the entire lottery estimation sample
and revisit the first stage of the two-stage least squares, but now including βˆk as a
predictor:
dit = δ
′
0 + δ
′
` + ρβˆk + piZit + γ
′
wWi + ηit (1.23)
The comparison I have in mind with model (1.23) is between two students who entered
the same lottery and had a similar lottery outcome. The parameter ρ tells me whether
students with high potential benefit are more likely to take up treatment than those
with low potential benefit.
Finally, I wish to compare the potential benefit of students who applied to the
inter-district choice program to those who were eligible to apply but did not. In the-
ory, every student in the state is eligible to enter every lottery. In practice, commuting
costs make it unreasonable for students to apply to choice spots far away from their
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home. To find a reasonable group of comparison students, I use the empirical distri-
bution of home districts for each lottery25 and only consider students in the relevant
grades / districts. Since the pool of eligible students is large, I use a randomly chosen
1% sub-sample within grade, year, and district. I consider all students that appear
in my lottery estimation sample as having applied.26 I then estimate models of the
following form:
τi = δg + δd + δt + ρβˆk + i (1.24)
Where δg, δd and δt are grade, district, and year fixed effects and τi is an indicator
for whether student i did, in fact, enter the lottery for which they were eligible. With
model (1.24), the comparison I have in mind is between two students currently in
the same grade, district, and year who are eligible to enter one of the lotteries in my
sample. The parameter ρ tells me whether the students with high potential benefit
are more likely to apply.
For all three models, I also estimate specifications where I replace βˆk with an in-
dicator for negative potential benefit 1(βˆk < 0). As I argued in the previous section,
the magnitudes in these models are easier to interpret. For a general discussion of the
procedure I used to estimate βˆk, see section 1.6. To ensure there is no mechanical cor-
relation between the participation indicators (dit, τi) and the estimated heterogeneity
(βˆk), I calculate the heterogeneous effects for these models using a leave-lottery out
jack-knife procedure (in the case of the observations in the lottery data) or a split
sample procedure (in the case of the non-experimental observations). See Appendix A
25In other words, if only students from districts A and B appear in lottery 1, I only consider
students from districts A and B as lottery eligible for the purposes of finding a comparison group.
26I continue to exclude students that received preferences in the lottery or applied late, and I also
continue to exclude students that were missing a baseline test score since I am unable to calculate
the necessary heterogeneous effect.
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Table 1.7: Testing for Selection on Gains
Take-up Indicator
Continue Participate Apply
Heterogeneous Effect 0.10 0.15 0.32
(0.07) (0.10) (0.05)
Heterogeneous Effect < 0 −0.08 −0.05 −0.17
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02)
Subsample Ever-Enrolled Ever-Enrolled Applicants Applicants Eligible Eligible
Observations 860 860 1,621 1,621 2,730 2,730
Observations (students) 395 395 894 894 2,730 2,730
Dependent Variable Mean 0.85 0.85 0.46 0.46 0.38 0.38
Adjusted R2 0.38 0.38 0.32 0.32 0.21 0.22
for more detail. I calculate asymptotic standard errors clustered at the student level
and, to account for the increased variability introduced by the generated regressor, I
also calculate standard errors using the parametric bootstrap by resampling from the
distribution of βˆk. In all cases, I choose the most conservative value.
Table 1.7 reveals important selection at each stage of the admissions and enroll-
ment process. Students with a negative predicted treatment effect are 17% less likely
to apply. Conditional on applying and receiving a randomly assigned offer, they are
5% less likely to enroll. Conditional on enrolling, they are 8% less likely to continue in
the program. These results continue to hold in the reduced form linear specification.
Taken together, the results in table 1.7 suggest it is unlikely that potential benefit
is unrelated to application and take-up. This implies that the program evaluation
LATE is not externally valid and hence unrelated to school quality. However, if the
component of selection on gains that is driven by the sorting of students to schools
is small, it is possible that the LATE identified by the lottery is still “close” to the
quantity of interest in the sense that the majority of the estimated effect could still
be driven by average quality differences across schools.
To quantify the magnitude of the wedge induced by the Roy selection, I average
the predicted heterogeneous effects for three sub-populations: the treated, the appli-
cants, and the non-applicants. For this exercise to be valid, the extrapolation from
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the complier population to the applicants and non-applicants must be accurate condi-
tional on the observed heterogeneity. This will be the case when there is no selection
on the unobserved heterogeneity: vi ⊥ (di, τi) = 0. This assumption is unlikely to
be true. However, I note that this assumption is strictly weaker than the stronger
weak linearity assumption that implicitly drives much of the interpretation of lottery
estimates in the literature. Thus the exercise generates value by demonstrating in
practice how far from the truth estimates that do not account for heterogeneity can
be.
I find that virtually all of the test score gains generated by inter-district choice
are driven by selection. The average treatment effect on the treated27 is .11σ, the
average treatment effect for applicants is .08σ, and the average treatment effect on
non-applicants .02σ. This suggest that 38% of the treatment on the treated comes
from post-lottery selection into the program, and that 78% of the treatment effect
for applicants is driven by selection into the applicant pool.28 The point estimates
suggest that at most 18% of the LATE can be attributed to differences in average
quality across sending and receiving districts.29 Finally, I will note that if there is also
selection on unobserved heterogeneity, we would expect the extrapolated estimates
presented here to be an upper bound. Thus I cannot rule out the possibility that the
entirety of the program evaluation LATE is the result of sorting.
27There are three possible explanations for why the estimate here is lower than the program
evaluation LATE: 1) it is constructed with the consensus posterior modes and hence shrunk towards
the non-experimental estimate, 2) it is a student weighted average as opposed to a conditional
variance weighted average, and 3) it includes the extrapolated effect to always takers, instead of
being solely based on compliers.
28There were over 170,000 eligible applicants which is large relative to the number that applied
(≈ 1, 000). Hence the treatment for the non-applicants is effectively the population average treatment
effect in this case.
29This is based on the ratio of the treatment for the treated and the ATE. If I use the program
evaluation LATE instead of the treatment on the treated, this number would change to 12.5%.
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1.8 What Can Lotteries Say About School Quality?
In this paper, I have shown how the sorting of students to school districts on the
basis of potential benefit leads to lottery estimates of test score gains that have no
straightforward connection to school quality. I accomplish this in three steps. First, I
document that the inter-district choice program is substantially beneficial to students
who participate. Inter-district choice increases math test scores and the quality of
coursework students take as well as increasing the probability a student graduates
from high-school and goes on to attend a four year college. Next, I provide a new
method for estimating treatment effect heterogeneity. This method leverages infor-
mation contained in non-experimental data by positioning the heterogeneity within
a hierarchical model. The resulting estimator is a weighted average of experimental
and non-experimental variation, with the weights chosen according to the correlation
of the heterogeneous effects across samples. Finally, I show that the heterogeneous
treatment effects associated with inter-district choice predict student take-up behavior
in a manner that is consistent with Roy selection. I find that this Roy selection is re-
sponsible for almost the entirety of the program evaluation treatment effect identified
with the lottery. Taken together, these results suggest that research using lotteries
to identify school quality should exercise caution with regard to the external validity
of their estimates.
The fact that families sort students to districts on the basis of potential benefit fits
within a broader pattern of facts in the literature which suggest that some of the gains
to charter attendance are conditional on initial selection into a large urban district.
Within Boston, charter takeovers and expansion generate lottery gains commensurate
with already established charters (Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2016; Cohodes et al., 2018a).
This suggests that the charter model generates a real quality difference for students
within Boston. However, the effect of charters in Massachusetts outside of urban
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areas is negative (Angrist et al., 2013a). Indeed, a recent meta-analysis of charter
effectiveness found that controlling for the quality of a student’s fall-back option
attenuates much of the effect of factors associated with the highly-touted set of charter
teaching practices known as the “No Excuses” philosophy (Chabrier et al., 2016). This
is consistent with the idea that selection across districts is an important mediator of
effective educational practices. Why selection at this more aggregate level leads to
an equilibrium where some students in urban areas appear to be so poorly served by
the teaching methods of the traditional public education system relative to charters
is an open question.
Last, I will note that the patterns of heterogeneity and selection I find across
districts call into question the use of test scores for the purpose of evaluating and
ranking schools. As pointed out in Hoxby (2000), simple Tiebout models imply that
in equilibrium students should be sorted among districts based on school types and
individual ability to benefit. In a world where test-score gains are driven by more
aggregate levels of sorting, ranking schools on the basis of test score gains is unlikely
to be a useful exercise. Put simply, there are no straightforward policy implications
from the fact that Jane experiences smaller test score gains at the school where she is
best suited than Jill experiences at the school where she is best suited. On the other
hand, leveraging heterogeneity to design an education system that provides students
opportunities to better match with the education type that best suits them seems
like a promising area for future work.
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Chapter 2
Are High Quality Charter Schools Better
able to Remove their Worst Teachers and
Retain their Best?
Coauthored with Scott Imberman (Michigan State University) and Marcus Winters
(Boston University)
2.1 Introduction
One of the defining features of charter schools is increased flexibility in teacher em-
ployment practices. Proponents of the charter system argue that such flexibility
allows charters to better remove their ineffective teachers and retain their most effec-
tive teachers. Traditional public schools are potentially hindered in this capacity by
additional regulation and collective bargaining agreements. However, it is an open
question whether, and to what extent, charters are able to capitalize on their com-
parative labor market flexibility.
Understanding the role that employment flexibility plays in the charter sector
is particularly important given the wide variation in charter school impacts found
nationwide (CREDO, 2015). Existing work on the role that flexible employment
practices play in the ability of charters to maintain a high value added workforce has
largely turned up null results (Cowen and Winters, 2013). However, this body of work
is small and has only considered environments where charter schools do not appear
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to offer substantial benefits relative to the local public school alternative. Hence
these studies cannot account for the substantial variability in school quality found
within the charter sector. Thus it remains possible that employment flexibility plays
a crucial role among successful charters despite the findings from earlier work.
We study the role of employment flexibility in the charter sector empirically by
exploring the relation between school quality, teacher value added, and teacher at-
trition in Massachusetts. Prior work has documented a wide degree of variability in
charter quality in this setting (Angrist et al., 2013b). If flexible employment practices
are important, we expect to find that high quality charters differentially lose their
worst teachers and better retain their best relative to traditional public schools. We
find mixed evidence for this prediction.
Charter schools in our sample lose both their best and worst teachers at higher
rates than traditional public schools. Surprisingly, there is very little difference in
attrition between low and high performing charters at any given point of the teacher
value-added distribution. Instead, the differential attrition among low value-added
teachers emerges from the fact that high-quality traditional public schools exhibit
relatively little attrition in the lower tail of the teacher value-added distribution.
This finding is hard to reconcile with the claim that the flexibility afforded charters
is an important component of their success.
While losing their high value-added teachers may represent a significant cost to
the charter sector, differential attrition in the upper tail of the teacher value-added
distribution may still benefit the education system in aggregate. If high value-added
teachers move to schools where they are better than the average teacher, then this
attrition will create a positive externality on the recipient schools. To that end, we
find that the differential attrition among low value added teachers largely emerges
from teachers exiting the profession, while the differential attrition among high value
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added teachers results from teacher switching. Thus the charters in our sample appear
to effectively operate as filters for educational quality.
Our key empirical challenge is to generate accurate state-wide estimates of teacher
value-added and school quality.1 This is a technically demanding statistical exer-
cise. While there is high-quality, lottery based evidence that teacher value-added and
school quality models perform well within large urban school districts (Chetty et al.,
2014a; Deming, 2014; Bacher-Hicks et al., 2014; Koedel et al., 2015; Angrist et al.,
2017), recent work has documented that sorting across school districts can compli-
cate the interpretation of test score gains even in the presence of random assignment
(Bruhn, 2019). There is also substantial evidence documenting the importance of
school level inputs within the charter sector for generating test score gains (Angrist
et al., 2013b; Dobbie and Fryer, 2013) along with more limited evidence arguing that
teacher-school match effects are important drivers of value-added (Jackson, 2013).
Standard value-added models will conflate the impact of these school inputs and
other sectoral differences with teacher value added. This may lead to spurious sta-
tistical relationships when we subsequently predict teacher turnover with test score
gains. For example, if a no-excuses discipline philosophy generates large benefits for
students but decreases job satisfaction for teachers, we risk conflating the effect of
no-excuses on test score gains with attrition.
We address this challenge by estimating mutually consistent measures of school
quality and teacher-value added within a correlated random effects framework. This
approach effectively attributes all cross-school variation in test score gains to schools.
While this has the drawback that we are unable to interpret our teacher estimates as
reflecting a global distribution of teacher value-added, it does allows us to address the
question of whether charters differentially remove their worst teachers under relatively
1While both quality and value-added here are meant to refer to test score gains, to avoid confusion
we will reserve the term “value-added” to refer to teacher test score gains and the term “quality” to
refer to school based test score gains.
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weak assumptions. We validate our model by comparing the results from our method
with results from the charter literature based on lotteries in Boston (Angrist et al.,
2013b; Cohodes et al., 2018b). Our model broadly replicates key empirical patterns
from existing work.
We begin the empirical analysis by documenting important quantitative differ-
ences in the nature of teacher attrition across sectors. We find that at any number of
years of tenure,2 as much as 20% of the variation in attrition in the charter sector can
be explained with school indicators. In traditional public schools, these indicators can
account for no more than 5% of the variation in attrition. This suggests that while
the majority of variation in attrition in both sectors emerges within school, there are
important cross-school differences in the charter sector that do not exist in traditional
public schools. However, school quality and teacher value-added are quantitatively
unimportant in both settings. We also find that charter teachers and traditional
public school teachers exhibit opposite associations with respect to key variables at
the classroom level. For example, within school increases in the fraction of pupils
receiving a subsidized lunch are associated with an increase in retention probability
in the charter sector and a decrease in retention probability in the traditional public
sector.
Next we show that charter schools are more likely to lose both their best and their
worst teachers. Broadly speaking, attrition patterns in the charter sector exhibit a
U-shape with respect to teacher quality, while attrition in the traditional public sector
is either flat or exhibits a small downward slope. This is true for english language
arts (ELA) and math teachers, both before and after the introduction of employment
protections in the traditional public sector. The net effect of these patterns is that
charters exhibit relatively higher attrition in both the upper and lower tails of the
2To avoid confusion, throughout the paper we will reserve the term “tenure” to refer to the
length of time a teacher has been employed within a school and we will use the term “employment
protections” to specifically refer to such institutions.
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value-added distribution. However, we find that the differential attrition among low
value-added teachers emerges from the fact that high-quality traditional public schools
have relatively low attrition among low value-added teachers. Attrition patterns are
broadly similar among low and high quality charters at all points of the value-added
distribution. It follows that if employment flexibility is important for the charter
model, it must operate through indirect channels3 rather than through the direct
exercise of personnel actions.
We conclude by presenting suggestive evidence that high attrition in the charters
may create positive externalities via differential selection of high value-added teachers
into the educator labor force. Charter schools are free to hire non-certified teachers
and other individuals who may come from non-traditional teacher backgrounds (e.g.
Teach for America). If charters act as filters by pushing out the low quality teachers
while simultaneously providing a pathway into the broader profession for the high-
quality teachers, then this could improve the quality of the statewide educator labor
force. We find that in the lower tail of the teacher value-added distribution, differen-
tial attrition largely emerges from charter teachers exiting the Massachusetts public
education system, while in the upper tail of the teacher value-added distribution, dif-
ferential attrition results primarily from charter teachers switching schools. Among
teachers who move, current school quality plays a large role in determining the quality
of the next school, while value-added generally does not. In general, teachers move
to worse schools than the one where they start. However, within school comparisons
reveal that high value-added teachers who switch from a charter school to a tradi-
tional public school move further down the school quality ladder than the average
teacher at their school. The opposite is true among traditional public school teach-
3For example, the threat of sanction (as bestowed upon charters by flexible employment regula-
tions) could lead to equilibria where teacher productivity is higher on average without ever needing
to exercise the sanction. However, this is not the claim made by school reformers when arguing for
the necessity of flexible employment regulations in charter schools.
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ers. This suggests that the incidence of the externality falls disproportionately on low
performing schools.
This paper builds on a rich literature that seeks to understand the role of teach-
ers, regulations, and personnel practices for generating positive student outcomes.
While we do not have space to discuss them all in detail, relevant examples include
Baker and Dickerson (2006); Angrist and Guryan (2008); Smith and Stuit (2010);
Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2011b); Imberman (2011); Strunk (2011); Carruthers (2012);
Jackson (2012) and Mansfield (2014). Of particular importance is Loeb et al. (2012)
which uses data from a large Florida school district and a similar empirical strategy
to estimate the relation between school quality, teacher value added, and attrition.
They find that more effective schools are better able to retain higher quality teachers,
but not able to differentially remove ineffective teachers. Our findings in the public
sector are broadly consistent with their work.
2.2 Measuring Test Score Gains and Teacher Attrition
We use data from the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Ed-
ucation (DESE) to match students to their primary math and english language arts
(ELA) teachers in grades 4-8.
We use this linked sample to estimate mutually consistent measures of school
quality and teacher value added. Our preferred approach uses a correlated random
effects model where we assume that the school component is fixed and the teacher
component is random. This method effectively attributes all cross-school variation in
test score gains to the school, while the within school variation goes to the teachers.
We prefer this approach because standard methods of estimating teacher value-added
will conflate the impact of school level inputs with the value-added of the teacher.
This is important in our context because prior work has found that variation in school
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level inputs predicts test score gains (Dobbie and Fryer, 2013; Angrist et al., 2013b)4.
We validate our method by comparing moments of the estimated teacher value
added and school quality distributions to findings from Angrist et al. (2013b) and
Cohodes et al. (2018b) on school quality and teacher value added within Boston. Our
model produces school quality and teacher value added estimates that are broadly
consistent with the literature on charter schools in Massachusetts.
2.2.1 The Universe of Administrative Student and Teacher Records
This paper uses data on the universe of public school students and their teachers as
provided by DESE. Student level demographic and socioeconomic variables come from
the Student Information Management System (SIMS) data spanning academic years
2008-2009 through 2016-2017. Student test scores in Math and English Language Arts
come from Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS) data span-
ning academic years 2008-2009 through 2016-2017. Teacher level variables, including
school level assignments necessary to determine transitions, come from the Education
Personnel Information Management System (EPIMS) data spanning academic years
2008-2009 through 2016-2017. Information on student and teacher classroom assign-
ments necessary to link students with their teachers comes from the Student Course
Schedule (SCS) data spanning academic years 2011-2012 through 2016-2017. For a
detailed description of the data cleaning process for each of these individual data sets
prior to linking, see appendix B.
In order to estimate teacher value added, we need to link student-year observations
to both their test scores and the educator primarily responsible for teaching the rele-
vant content area to that student. To accomplish this task, we filter the SCS data to
only include courses with state level codes indicating math and ELA content instruc-
4For example, prior work has found that school level inputs such as discipline philosophy, length
of school day, and intensive tutoring predict test score gains. These are also areas where charter
schools often differ from the comparable local public schools.
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tion. For primary school grades, we also keep non-differentiated courses that cover
all content instruction. We then link these student-year-course level observations to
the EPIMS data by Massachusetts Educational Personnel Identifier (MEPID), year,
district, school, course, section, and term of instruction. We fail to match 1.9% of
student-course-year observations to any educational staff in the EPIMS data. We
drop these observations. We then restrict the sample to observations where the staff
assigned to the course has a job assignment classified as “Teacher” or “Co-teacher”.
We also restrict the data to class assignments designated as “Core Subject”. This ef-
fectively removes supporting staff and specialists from the data. From there, we merge
in student demographic characteristics from SIMS using the State Assigned Student
Identifier (SASID), year, and school district. Approximately 1.6% of the sample of
student-course-year observations do not have a corresponding student match in the
SIMS data. The vast majority of these matching failures occur in 2011, which is the
first year the state tracked student course work. In all other years, the non-match
rates is less than 0.1%. We drop the unmatched observations. We then drop ob-
servations that correspond to courses taught in alternative education programs and
courses taught prior to third grade.5 To find a student’s assigned math teacher, we
look within non-differentiated and math courses at the student-year level. Where we
find only one teacher, we consider that to be the student’s primary math teacher.
When we find multiple teachers, we drop the student from the sample. We find the
student’s assigned ELA teacher using an identical procedure. Finally, we merge in
math and ELA test scores6 from the MCAS data at the student-year level.
After matching students to distinct math and ELA teachers, we apply a few
5We impose this restrictions here to facilitate merging in the MCAS data, since the state stan-
dardized testing begins in third grade. We will later restrict the sample to grades 4-8 for the purposes
of value added estimation, since these are the grades where it is generally possible to find both a
lagged test score and a distinct math/ela teacher for the majority of students.
6Prior to merging, we standardize test scores at the year, grade, subject, and test-type level to
have mean zero and standard deviation one. See the appendix for more details.
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additional student level sample restrictions. Since we wish to control for lagged test
scores when estimating value added, we drop observations that are missing test scores
from the previous year. Note that this removes students in grades 3 and below, since
that is the year when state standardized testing begins. We also drop students in
grade 9 and above. This restriction is necessary because high-school students typically
have multiple content area instructors, so it is difficult to pair students with distinct
math/ELA teachers. We also drop students who took alternative assessments.
Next we apply several sample restrictions at the classroom level similar to those
employed in Chetty et al. (2014b). Specifically, we drop students that appear in
classrooms with less than 10 or more than 50 students, as well as the classrooms
of teachers linked to more than 200 students in a given year. The first condition
is necessary to ensure the classroom level sample size is sufficient for value added
estimation. The second two conditions likely reflect measurement error in the data. In
practice, these restrictions causes us to lose less than 1% of student year observations.
We also drop students in classrooms where more than 25% of students are classified
as having a non-specific learning related disability. This causes us to lose 7% of the
remaining student-year observations. We then drop students that attend school on
an island, which causes us to lose less than 1% of student-year observations. The final
data set contains 609,038 distinct student level observations across 1,361 traditional
public schools and 71 charter schools.7
Table 2.1 provides summary statistics for the students in our sample. “Math” and
“ELA” refer to math and english language arts standardized test scores. “Subsidized
lunch” refers to students who receive free or reduced price lunch. “Any Disability”
refers to students who have been diagnosed with one of 13 official disability categories
tracked by the state. These categories include relatively modest impairments such as
7Without applying any restrictions, there are 1,709 traditional public schools and 83 charter
schools.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics: Students
Charter Traditional Public
Math 0.14σ 0.17σ
ELA 0.08σ 0.17σ
Female 52% 50%
White 63% 85%
Black 32% 10%
Hispanic 25% 14%
Subsidized Lunch 50% 33%
Any Disability 14% 14%
Limited English 5% 5%
Observations 63,356 1,518,382
Observations (students) 30,769 590,490
Schools 71 1,361
a specific learning disability as well as more serious disabilities such as neurological
problems and blindness. “Limited English” refers to students who are classified as
English Language Learners (ELL).
In our analysis sample, charter schools serve a more diverse, lower SES, and lower
performing student population than their traditional public school peers. However, it
is important to note that these differences largely reflect selection into neighborhoods
on the part of the Massachusetts charters, which disproportionately operate in poorer,
urban areas (Angrist et al., 2013b).
Table 2.2 provides summary statistics for teachers. “Tenure” refers the number
of years between a teacher’s hire date in the current district and the present year.8
“Attrit” refers to a teacher who was employed in a given school at time t and is no
longer employed in that school at time t + 1. Thus teachers who attrit have either
moved across schools within Massachusetts or they no longer work in the education
system in Massachusetts in year t + 1. “TPS Move” refers to teachers who have
8For clarity of exposition, we will reserve the term “tenure” to describe length of employment in
the current district. When referring to employment protections afforded teachers in Massachusetts
who have exceeded 3 years of tenure, we will use the phrase “professional status,” since that is the
term used by the state of Massachusetts to refer to this institution.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics: Teachers
Math ELA
Charter TPS Charter TPS
Tenure (Years) 4.5 10.1 4.4 10.2
Female 74% 83% 83% 86%
White 90% 96% 93% 96%
Black 7% 3% 6% 3%
Hispanic 3% 2% 2% 2%
Attrit 22% 14% 23% 14%
TPS Move 10% 8% 11% 8%
Charter Move 2% 0% 3% 0%
Exit 9% 5% 9% 5%
Observations 3,836 93,448 3,666 97,202
Observations (teachers) 1,065 13,332 1,026 13,920
attrited and appear in a traditional public school in year t + 1. “Charter Move”
refers to teachers who have attrited and appear in a charter school in year t + 1.
“Exit” refers to teachers who attrited and are no longer employed as a teacher in the
education system in Massachusetts in year t+ 1. In practice, when teachers in either
sector leave their current school of employment, they almost always either exit the
profession or move to a traditional public school.
2.2.2 Estimating School Quality and Teacher Value Added
Estimating the relation between teacher value-added and attrition poses a significant
technical challenge. At issue is whether, and to what degree, cross-school variation
in test score gains should be attributed to teachers versus the schools themselves. If
schools have different resource levels or otherwise determine policy variables such as
educational curricula or discipline philosophy, off the shelf value-added models will
attribute these school-level differences to underlying teacher value added. This could
lead to a spurious relationship when we go on to compare attrition rates across sectors.
For example, if a no excuses discipline philosophy is highly effective at educating
students while also decreasing teacher job satisfaction, we would expect to find a
54
differential relationship between value added and attrition across sectors even when
there are no differences in the underlying attributes that contribute to test score gains
at the teacher level. For this reason, we use a correlated random effects model with
a fixed school effect.
This approach generates mutually consistent measures of school quality and teacher
value added that attribute all cross-school variation in test score gains to schools. The
drawback of this approach is that we will not be able to interpret our teacher value
added estimates as reflecting the global distribution of teacher quality. However,
we believe that the assumptions necessary to identify the global distribution are in-
defensible at the state-wide level. To construct a global distribution requires both
that teachers are conditionally randomly assigned to schools across the state of Mas-
sachusetts and that school level inputs to educational production do not affect test
score gains. Recent research has demonstrated that school level educational inputs,
and in particular the practices favored by charters, are predictive of test score gains
both in Massachusetts and elsewhere (Angrist et al., 2013b; Dobbie and Fryer, 2013).
Further, Cohodes et al. (2018b) demonstrates that some Boston charter schools are
successful precisely because they compress the value added distribution by taking
important policy variables out of the hands of teachers.
At a more conceptual level, the argument favored by school reformers is that weak
employment regulations will allow charters to remove their worst teachers. Removing
these teachers will only improve student outcomes if the teachers being removed have
lower (global) value added than the expected (global) value added of the replacement
teacher the school will go on to hire. If schools differ in their ability to hire teachers
that rank highly in the global value added distribution, our approach will (correctly)
consider this as a causal effect emerging from the school itself. Ultimately, the author-
ity to initiate removal of a teacher is housed at the level of the school administration;
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thus the relevant policy margin for the removal decision is where the teacher falls in
the within school distribution of value-added, which is precisely what is captured by
our model.
A Random Effects Model for Quality and Value Added
We estimate our quality and value added measures in two steps using a procedure
that is similar to Chetty et al. (2014b). First, we construct within-teacher test score
residuals to purge the standardized tests of selection. Next, we estimate a correlated
random effects model with a fixed school component. The school fixed effect will
give us an unbiased estimate of school quality provided students are conditionally
randomly assigned to schools. The teacher random effect will give us a consistent
estimate of within school teacher value added provided students are conditionally
randomly assigned to teachers within school.
To construct test score residuals, we regress the test score yijst of student i assigned
to teacher j at school s in year t on a school-by-teacher fixed effect δjs and a vector
of controls Xist as follows:
yijst = δjs + ρXist + ijst (2.1)
Our baseline control vector Xist is similar to Chetty et al. (2014b). It contains a third
order polynomial in lagged test scores interacted with current student grade; a third
order polynomial in lagged school-by-grade level average test scores interacted with
current grade; fixed effects for year and city of residence; indicators for race, ethnic-
ity, gender, any disability, subsidized lunch recipiency, and limited english proficiency;
class and school level averages in these demographic characteristics; class size; indi-
cators for the type of test as well as the type of the lagged test;9 and indicators for
9The state transitioned from the MCAS to PARCC testing regimes during the course of the
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missing-ness.
Next, we construct test score residuals leaving in the fixed teacher component:
y˜ijst = yijst − ρˆXist ≈ δjs + ijst (2.2)
From there, we estimate a teacher value added model of the following form:
y˜ijst = ωs + δjs + uijst (2.3)
Where ωs is a school fixed effect and δjs is a teacher-by-school random effect. From
this model, we extract our school quality measure (ωˆs) and our within school teacher
value-added measure:
δˆjs = αjs(δ˜js − ωˆs) (2.4)
Where δ˜js is a teacher fixed effect and αjs is the appropriate element of the feasi-
ble generalized least squares weighting matrix and which shrinks noisy observations
towards 0.
Shrinkage estimators of this form are standard in the value added literature, the
idea being that they will reduce the variance of value added estimates for teachers
who do not have a long teaching history at the expense of possibly introducing some
bias into the point estimate for any individual teacher. Provided we care about the
mean squared error over the collection of value added estimates and not just the point
estimate for one or two specific teachers, we will do better on average by applying
shrinkage.
sample frame. See appendix B for more detail.
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Figure 2·1: Distribution of School Quality
Figure 2·1 plots the estimated distribution of school quality. Reassuringly, our
school quality estimates are consistent with the lottery based estimates from Angrist
et al. (2013b): Boston charters generate larger test score gains than their public school
counterparts within the city. However, outside of Boston, charters tend to generate
smaller test score gains than the local public schools.
Figure 2·2 plots the estimated within school distribution of value added by sector
for the entire state of Massachusetts over the relevant time period. We find that, at
the state-wide level, the variance of the within school distribution of teacher value
added is lower in the traditional public sector (σ = 0.147 for Math and σ = 0.132 for
ELA) than it is in the charter sector (σ = 0.153 for Math and σ = 0.144 for ELA).
However, within Boston, we find that the variance of teacher effects within the
charter sector is lower in Math than it is in the traditional public sector, with no
meaningful differences for ELA. Figure 2·3 plots the standard deviation of within
school value added over time in Boston and the rest of the state from 2008-2013,
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Figure 2·2: Distribution of Teacher Value Added within Schools
which is the period of time where our data overlap with the data in Cohodes et al.
(2018b). Thus our value added model partially replicates the findings from Cohodes
et al. (2018b) that Boston charters have smaller variance of teacher effects than the
Boston public schools. The fact that our results for ELA differ from Cohodes et al.
(2018b) may be due to the fact that their data includes additional years which we do
not have access to (2002-2007). This difference may also be attributable to the use
of different value added estimation methods across papers.
2.3 Explaining Teacher Attrition
In this section, we describe teacher attrition patterns in Massachusetts. First we
examine the relation between attrition, teacher tenure, and classroom observables.
Then we examine the quantitative importance of teacher and school test score gains
for predicting attrition across sectors.
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Figure 2·3: Standard Deviation of Teacher Value Added
We find that, at every length of teacher tenure, attrition is higher in the charter
sector than it is in traditional public schools. However, these difference are largely
attributable to charter teachers exiting the Massachusetts public school teacher work
force rather than moving to different schools within the Massachusetts public educa-
tion system. We also find that within school the fraction of students in a teacher’s
classroom who receive a free or reduced price lunch is an important predictor of at-
trition. However, in the charter sector, having a high fraction of free or reduced price
lunch students is associated with a lower likelihood of attrition while in traditional
public schools it is associated with an increased likelihood of attrition.
At any given level of tenure, we find that school indicators can account for as
much as 20% of the variation in attrition in the charter sector but only as much
as 5% in the traditional public schools. Thus while the majority of variation in
both sectors emerges within school, there exist quantitatively important differences
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across-sectors in the cross-school sources of variation in attrition. However, we find
that virtually none of the cross-school explanatory power is attributable to test score
based measures of school quality and, at most levels of tenure, we find no evidence
that teacher value-added can explain additional variation in attrition beyond what is
captured by a school fixed effect.
2.3.1 Predictors of Teacher Attrition Across Sectors
First we examine the relation between teacher attrition, tenure, and observables. Let
djst denote a generic indicator for different types of attrition behavior that takes a
value of 1 when teacher j in school s at time t goes on to change their employment
status at time t + 1. Thus we allow djst to represent teachers attriting,
10 moving
schools,11 and exiting12 the Massachusetts teacher labor force; which of these behav-
iors we are examining will be clear from the context. Let cs be an indicator that takes
a value of 1 if school s is a charter. Let τjst denote the number of years since teacher
j was hired by school s as of time t.
Figure 2·4 plots a non-parametric estimate of the conditional expectation function
E(djst|τjst, cs) constructed with the full interaction of indicators for each value of τjst
and cs for teachers in our sample with 1 to 7 years tenure (i.e. τjst ∈ {1, 2, . . . 7}).
We impose this latter restriction to ensure all cells have at least 100 observations.
Examining figure 2·4, there are three patterns which stand out. First, we observe
that both charter and traditional public schools have higher attrition in year one than
they do in subsequent years. However, this difference is driven entirely by an increase
in the probability of teachers exiting the profession in the charter sector.
10Recall that we say a teacher has attrited if they are employed in school s at time t but not at
time t+ 1.
11Recall that we say a teacher has switched schools if they have attrited at time t but they are
employed in some other school in our data at time t+ 1.
12Recall that we say a teacher has exited if they have attrited at time t but do not work as a
teacher in any public school in Massachusetts at time t+ 1.
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Figure 2·4: Teacher Attrition Patterns and Tenure
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Second, there is a discrete drop in attrition probability between 3 and 4 years
tenure in the traditional public sector which does appear to occur among teachers
working in charters. Year 4 is when teachers in traditional public schools in Mas-
sachusetts gain employment protections. There is also a large drop in attrition prob-
ability in the charter sector between 5 and 6 years of tenure which is largely driven
by a decline in the probability that teachers in charter schools move. However, the
number of observations used to estimate the conditional means in the charter sector
declines significantly with years of tenure which leaves us underpowered at larger
levels of tenure; hence it is entirely possible this change in probability is driven by
sampling variation.
Third, at any given length of tenure, most of the differences in attrition between
the charter and traditional public sectors in Massachusetts emerge from the fact that
teachers in the charter sector are more likely to exit the profession.
Next we quantify the importance of various classroom observables on teacher
attrition. Let w`jt denote a scalar measuring a characteristic ` of the classes taught by
teacher j at time t. These ` characteristics include average math test scores, fraction
male, fraction hispanic, fraction white, fraction black, fraction receiving a free or
reduced price lunch, fraction with limited english proficiency, fraction diagnosed with
any disability, and average class size. When teachers are assigned to more than one
class at a given point in time, we take student weighted averages of the characteristics
at the classroom level. To facilitate comparisons across characteristics, we standardize
each w` to have mean zero and standard deviation one.
We quantify the relation between classroom characteristics and teacher attrition
within school by separately estimating the following regression for each of the ` char-
acteristics:
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Figure 2·5: Classroom Predictors of Teacher Attrition
djst = β
`w`jt + β
`
cw
`
jtcs + δs + ujst (2.5)
Thus β` and β`c quantify the association between a given w
` and attrition in the
public and charter sectors respectively. For these estimates, we use the same sample
of teachers with 1 to 7 years of tenure and cluster the standard errors at the teacher
level.
Figure 2·5 plots the estimated regression coefficients along with two standard error
intervals for each of the classroom characteristics in the charter and traditional public
sectors. Within school, a one standard deviation increase in the proportion of free
and reduced price lunch students in a teacher’s classroom is associated with a 12.7%
decline in the probability of attrition in the charter sector, while the same comparison
within a tradition public school reveals a nearly 5% increase. Also notable is the fact
that a one standard deviation increase in the proportion of limited english proficiency
students is associated with an 8.8% decline in attrition probability in the charter
sector but a 0.9% increase in the public sector. Directionally, a similar pattern holds
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for the fraction of students who are black or hispanic; however, we do not have the
power to distinguish between the two coefficients.
2.3.2 Explaining Variation in Attrition Using Test Score Gains
In this section, we quantify the importance of test score based measures of teacher
value-added and school quality for explaining variation in teacher attrition. Ideally,
we would like to fit a predictive model, calculate R-squared out of sample, and com-
pare these numbers across predictors and sectors. Unfortunately, our charter sample
is small enough that even withholding small sub-samples will cause us to lose identi-
fication when we include school fixed effects and school-by-value added interactions.
For this reason, we use in-sample estimates of predictive power. Thus how we control
for overfitting is crucial for the credibility of this exercise. The charter sector will
have fewer observations per regressor, and hence there is the potential to conflate the
smaller degrees of freedom in the charter sector with increased predictive power.
In practice, there are two straightforward ways to address this problem. The
first approach would be to fit the model and then use an in-sample estimate of fit
that penalizes degrees of freedom directly (e.g. adjusted R-squared). Alternatively,
we could control the overfitting directly at the model selection stage using penalized
regression. In practice, we will combine both ideas.
Thus we estimate versions of the the following Least Absolute Shrinkage and
Selection Operator, commonly referred to as a LASSO regression:
arg min
β
E(d− y(X; β))2 (2.6)
||β|| < λ (2.7)
Where X is a vector of covariates whose predictive power we would like to asses.
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In practice, we choose the tuning parameter λ using the data driven method from
Belloni et al. (2012).
Penalizing the regression using the `1 norm as in equation (2.7) yields a constraint
set with kinks that tend to bind at zero. Thus the LASSO regression controls for
overfitting by eliminating uninformative variables from the model. Asymptotically,
LASSO will choose the correct set of regressors even as the number of variables grows
with the sample size provided the true data generating process is approximately sparse
(Belloni et al., 2012). To assess predictive power, we calculate adjusted R-squared
based on residuals constructed from a post-LASSO regression,13 since this will reduce
the bias induced by regularization.
Figure 2·6 plots the results. Column labels refer to different models for y(X, β).
The “School Quality” model specifies y() as a third order polynomial in school quality;
“School Fixed Effects” specifies y() using a complete set of school indicators; “Teacher
VA x School” includes the complete interaction of our teacher value added measures
and school indicators. There are several patterns of note in this figure.
First, observe that the school indicators account for a large fraction of the variation
in attrition in the charter sector, but not in the traditional public sector. This suggests
either that there are important, school level differences within the charter sector that
do not exist to the same degree in the traditional public sector or that the relation
between school level inputs and attrition is fundamentally different between the two.
Next, note that on its own, school level differences in quality explain virtually
none of the variation in attrition in either sector. The fact that school quality is
largely unrelated to attrition where employment protections are weak (i.e. prior to
year 4 of tenure in the public schools and in the charters) and where employment
protections are strong (i.e. after year 4 in the public schools) suggests that school
13In other words, we take the set of variables which the LASSO did not eliminate from the model:
S = {j|βLASSOj 6= 0} and use OLS to estimate Y = βOLSX˜ +  where X˜ = (Xj)j∈S
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Figure 2·6: Explaining Attrition Variation
quality alone is unlikely to be an empirically important channel for understanding
differences in attrition.
Finally, observe that adding interactions between teacher value added and the
school indicators does not have a consistent effect on the explanatory power of the
model relatively to using school indicators alone. This suggests that teacher value-
added is also unlikely to be an empirically important channel for explaining attrition
patterns in either sector. However, these findings do not preclude the possibility that
teacher value-added is important for explaining the differences across sectors, which
is what we will examine in the next section.
2.4 Differential Attrition Patterns Across Sectors
In this section, we document that charter schools are more likely to lose both their
best and worst teachers. Broadly speaking, attrition patterns in the charter sector
exhibit a U-shape with respect to teacher quality, while attrition in the traditional
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public sector is either flat or exhibits a downward slope. This is true among early
and mid-career teachers and for both math and english language arts subject areas.
The net effect of these patterns is that charters exhibit relatively higher attrition in
both the upper and lower tails of the value added distribution.
Surprisingly, we find that the differences in the lower tail emerge from the fact
that high quality traditional public schools have relatively low attrition among low
value-added teachers. Attrition patterns across high and low quality charter schools
are not meaningfully different. This pattern, in conjunction with the finding from
the previous section that value-added is largely irrelevant for predicting attrition,
lead us to conclude that the direct exercise of personnel actions are unlikely to be an
important channel for charter quality.
We conclude this section by exploring how attrition varies with school quality on
average. We replicate the finding from Loeb et al. (2012) that attrition declines with
school quality in the public sector. We also find that this gradient is most pronounced
among early career teachers who are unlikely to have employment protections. In the
charter sector, there is no clear pattern relating school quality to attrition.
2.4.1 Charter Schools Differentially Lose their Best and Worst Teachers
In this section, we wish to estimate the conditional expectation function that maps
teacher value added and tenure into attrition probabilities for each sector:
E(djst|δjs, τjst) (2.8)
However, we face several technical limitations.
First, δjs is continuous which will prevent us from saturating the model and hence
we will be unable to estimate equation 2.8 directly. Instead, we will fit a parsimonious,
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non-parametric model by binning δjs at quintiles of the value added distribution.
Second, the number of observations per cell becomes small if we fully interact
indicators for each value of τjst with the teacher value added bins. For this reason,
we will split the sample into teachers with 1-3 years employment tenure and 4-7 years
employment tenure rather than condition on the full support of tenure values. The
logic for this split is that year 4 is when employment protections are introduced in
the public sector. In practice, the basic results are robust (if more noisy) when we
condition on the full support of the tenure variable. We do not examine teachers with
greater than 7 years of tenure because there are very few of them in the charter sector
over this time period;14 hence, we are underpowered to make cross-sector comparisons
for teachers at later stages of their career. However, the basic message does not change
if we examine teachers with greater than 7 years of tenure as well. See appendix B
for more detail.
Finally, δjs is unobservable. Thus we are forced to use the estimated teacher value
added, δˆjs, in it’s place. In practice, this will require us to account for the additional
variability induced by the first stage value added estimation when performing infer-
ence. We account for this additional variability by calculating standard errors via a
parametric bootstrapping procedure that effectively clusters at the teacher level. See
appendix B for more detail.
Figure 2·7 displays the results for attrition. The purple dots are conditional means
for the charter sector within the corresponding value added quintile as indicated on the
x-axis. Whiskers give two standard error intervals around the mean. The horizontal
lines are unconditional averages. Yellow triangles are identical estimates for teachers
employed at traditional public schools.
Among very early career teachers, attrition in the charter sector exhibits a U-
shaped pattern with respect to value added, while in the traditional public sector,
14See appendix B for histograms that count the number of teachers by year of tenure.
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Figure 2·7: Attrition and Teacher Value Added
it is fairly flat. Among early mid-career teachers (i.e. after employment protections
are introduced in the traditional public schools), we see a similar pattern for Math.
For ELA teachers, the gap in the upper tail remains, while the gap in the lower tail
declines; however, we sound a note of caution here. The charter school estimates,
especially in the post-tenure period, have a much smaller sample size and hence are
noisier. The broad pattern, across all panels, would seem to indicate that there is
more attrition in both tails of the distribution in the charter sector than there is in
the public sector, with perhaps the one exception being the lower tail of the ELA
charter distribution among mid-career teachers.
On its face, this pattern would appear to provide mixed evidence for the claims
made by school reformers that flexible employment regulations allow charter schools
to remove their worst teachers and better retain their best. On the one hand, the
consistent finding that teachers in the upper tail of the value-added distribution leave
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at relatively higher rates in the charter sector clearly cuts against this claim. On
the the other hand, there is (inconsistent) evidence that low-value added teachers
differentially attrit from the lower tail.
However, it is possible that these patterns obscure important heterogeneity with
respect to the quality of the school. This is especially important in our setting, where
the literature has recovered a wide range of charter school impacts. If the attrition
gap among high value-added teachers decreases with school quality as a result of
flattening upper tail attrition in the charter sector, this would provide clear evidence
that high quality charters are able to better retain their best teachers. Similarly,
we would expect the gap in the lower tail of the teacher value-added distribution
to increase with school quality as a result of higher lower-tail attrition among high
quality charters. We address this possibility in the next section.
2.4.2 Does Differential Attrition Vary with School Quality?
In this section, we wish to understand the relationship between the quality of a school,
the value added of the teacher, and the probability that teacher attrits. Formally, we
would like to estimate:
E(djst|δjs, ωs, τjst) (2.9)
However, due to the limited amount of data available in the charter sector, we will
once again need to approximate the relevant conditional expectation function. We do
this by cutting the sample into high-quality and low-quality schools. We define high
quality to mean the school is in the top two quintiles of the school quality distribution
in the relevant sector, and we define low-quality to mean the school is in the bottom
two quintiles.15 To increase power, we pool math and ELA teachers. For this reason,
15We collapse the top two quintiles and the bottom two quintiles of the school quality distribution
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Figure 2·8: School Quality, Teacher Value-Added, and Attrition by
Sector
we also include an indicator for whether the teacher is a math or ELA teacher. The
results are qualitatively similar, if noisier, when we disaggregate across subjects. See
appendix B for more detail.
Figure 2·8 presents the results. Among early career teachers, we find that low-
quality schools in both sectors exhibit similar rates of attrition; however, high quality
schools in the charter sector exhibit relatively higher rates of attrition in the lower
tail of the teacher quality distribution. Surprisingly, attrition rates in the lower tail
for early career teachers are similar at high and low quality charters; the gap among
high quality schools emerges because traditional public schools have lower attrition
rates in the tails than their low quality peers.
for power. If we restricted ourselves to just the top and bottom quintile, the results would be based
on 14 charter schools in each bucket. That said, we get qualitatively similar conclusions if we choose
this more restrictive definition of high and low quality. See appendix B for more details.
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Among mid-career teachers (where there exists employment protections in the
public sector), we see smaller differences between charters and publics in the lower
tail of the teacher quality distribution. This is true for both high and low-quality
schools. However, there is a large increase in the probability that a high quality
teacher in the charter sector attrits, and this is also true for both high and low
quality charter schools.
In our view, the results in this section cut heavily against the idea that the exer-
cise of the flexible employment practices afforded charters is an important mediator
of success. The fact that the differential attrition emerges from school quality het-
erogeneity in the traditional public schools (as opposed to within the charter sector)
is difficult to reconcile with the idea that employment regulations are systematically
preventing traditional public schools from removing teachers they would otherwise
like to fire or retaining teachers they would otherwise like to keep.
2.4.3 Attrition and the School Quality Gradient
For completeness, in this section, we will document how attrition varies with school
quality on average. Ideally, we wish to estimate the conditional expectation function
that maps school quality into attrition patterns in each sector:
E(djst|ωs, τjst) (2.10)
However, we face many of the same limitations as outlined in the previous sections,
and hence we use similar methods of approximation: we bin the school quality distri-
bution into quintiles, split the sample before/after the 3rd year of tenure and, because
we must estimate ωs, we calculate the standard errors with a parametric bootstrap
procedure that effectively clusters at the level of the school. Figure 2·9 plots the
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Figure 2·9: School Quality and Teacher Attrition by Sector
results.
Attrition in the traditional public sector appears to exhibit a downward gradient
with respect to school quality. This is especially true among early career teachers.
There also appears to be some non-linearity in the left tail. This broadly replicates
patterns in the public sector documented in Loeb et al. (2012).
Attrition in the charter sector, however, does not exhibit a clear pattern with
respect to school quality. However, we note that the estimates in the charter sector
are based on significantly fewer observation and hence are more noisy. It is possible
that with more power, we would pick up a similar gradient as in the traditional public
schools.
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2.5 Do Charters Create Teacher Labor Force Externalities?
In this section, we look for evidence that charter schools filter low value-added teachers
out of the labor force while keeping high value-added teachers in it. If this is the
case, it is possible that the high attrition levels observed in charters are good for the
education system as a whole even if individual schools do not appear to be using their
employment flexibility differentially across the value-added spectrum.
We start by decomposing the average results on differential attrition examined
in section 2.4.1 into teacher moves and exits. In the lower tail of the teacher value-
added distribution, differential attrition largely emerges from teachers in the charter
sector exiting the Massachusetts teacher labor force. In the upper tail, differential
attrition results primarily from teachers in the charter sector switching schools. While
this pattern exists among teachers at all phases of their career, it is especially true
among teachers with tenure profiles that would make them eligible for employment
protections at traditional public schools. This is consistent with the idea that charters
are creating positive externalities for the education system as a whole.
Next we examine how school quality and teacher value added predict the quality
of the destination school among movers. We find that (1) current school quality
is highly predictive of subsequent school quality in both the charter and traditional
public sectors, (2) unconditionally, teacher value-added is not predictive of the quality
of the destination school in either the charter or public sector, but (3) holding constant
the origin school, high value-added traditional public school teachers move to high
quality traditional public schools, while high value added charter teachers move to low
quality traditional public schools. These results suggest that the externalities created
by charters are disproportionately concentrated in low performing, traditional public
schools.
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2.5.1 Decomposing Differential Attrition into Moves and Exits
In this section, we wish to estimate a conditional expectation function similar to 2.8,
but replacing the indicator for attrition on the left hand side with indicators for moves
and exits. Recall that we have defined a teacher move to mean that a teacher was
employed at school s at time t, but not at time t+ 1, and there exists a school in our
data s′ which employs the teacher at time t+ 1. Exit is defined similarly, except that
there is no school employing the teacher at time t+1. Figure 2·10 presents the results
for math teachers. A similar, but less consistent, pattern holds for ELA teachers. See
the appendix for results on that margin.
From figure 2·10 we learn that differential attrition in the lower tail of the value-
added distribution is comprised disproportionately of exits, while attrition in the
upper tail of the value-added distribution appears to be disproportionately composed
of switching schools. This is true for both early and mid-career teachers, although
the difference is most striking among teachers with 4-7 years employment tenure.
This finding is consistent with the idea that charters create positive externalities
on the educator labor force by providing a pathway into the profession for high value-
added teachers from non-traditional backgrounds, while also filtering out the low
value-added ones. In the next section, we will consider the incidence of this externality
by examining the quality of the destination schools among teachers who move.
2.5.2 The Quality of Destination Schools
From the perspective of any individual school, the loss of a high quality teacher is a
significant cost. However, from the perspective of the education system as a whole,
the movement of a teacher between schools may be efficiency enhancing, especially if
they move to schools where their presence increases the quality of the average teacher.
Unfortunately, we cannot compare directly the average quality of teachers across
76
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
< 4 Years Tenure 4−7 Years Tenure
Exit
M
o
ve
[0, .2) [.2, .4) [.4, .6) [.6, .8) [.8, 1] [0, .2) [.2, .4) [.4, .6) [.6, .8) [.8, 1]
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
Teacher Value−Added Quintile
Pr
o
ba
bi
lit
y
l Charter
Traditional Public
Figure 2·10: Exits versus Moves for Math Teachers
schools since this would imply that we have identified a global distribution of teacher
value added. Further, we are limited in our ability to ask how a teachers value-added
in the current institution predicts their value added in the next institution among
charter teachers because the sample of charter movers is small to begin with, and
many charter teachers go on to positions where we are unable to calculate value-
added.16 However, we can quantify the potential incidence of this externality by
asking to what extent teacher value-added and school quality predict the quality of
the next institution a teacher will join. For example, a positive relationship between
teacher value added and the quality of the school they go on to join implies a rich
getting richer dynamic: high quality schools attract the best teachers from other
schools.
16For example, they may move to a high school or to a position where they do not teach english
or math.
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Figure 2·11: Teacher Value Added and the Quality of Destination
Schools
We find no evidence of this dynamic. Figure 2·11 plots teacher value added in the
current school against the quality of the school where they will work next year for
the subsample of teacher-years that exhibit a move.17 When a teacher is employed at
more than one school in the following year, we use the average quality of all schools
at which the teacher is employed at time t + 1. Figure 2·11 does not indicate any
clear pattern between teacher value added and the quality of the schools where they
go on to work after a move.18
17Note that this result is not mechanical. While we have included school fixed effects in our
teacher value-added model and we use these estimates as our measure of school quality, recall that
we estimate teacher value-added within this model at the teacher-school level. Further, we do
not apply shrinkage across schools. So while a teacher’s value added at school s is mechanically
uncorrelated with their current school, there is no reason it has to be uncorrelated with respect to
the quality of a different school they will go on to teach at in the future.
18Note that this result does not contradict Jackson (2013). In that paper, the author separately
identifies school and teacher fixed effects, while in the present work, we cannot. So while the results
from Jackson (2013) speak directly to matching on global quality, our results only address the
tendency for teachers who are far from the mean within a school’s value-added distribution to move
to schools where average test score gains are high.
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Figure 2·12: School Quality at the Origin and Destination
However, we do find strong evidence that the quality of the school where a teacher
currently works is highly predictive of where they will go on to work in the future.
Figure 2·12 plots a teacher’s current school quality against the quality of the school
where they will work next year for the subsample of teacher-years where the teacher
moves. Teachers who leave high quality schools tend to move to high quality schools
(albeit, slightly worse on average than the school they left). The fact that current
school quality is highly correlated with the quality of the school where a teacher
moves suggests that other factors correlated with employment at the current school
may play a large role in determining teacher movement patterns.19
Thus a natural question to ask is how teacher value-added relates to the quality
of the next school while holding these factors constant. This comparison is difficult
19Such factors could include common professional networks, familiarity with similar instructional
practices, high quality training, or simply location preferences coupled with geographic clustering of
school quality.
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Table 2.3: Quality of the Next School Controlling for the Origin
Quality of Next School
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Teacher Value Added 0.558 0.108 0.094 −0.098
(0.347) (0.031) (0.095) (0.043)
Origin School TPS TPS Charter Charter
Destination School Charter TPS Charter TPS
Observations (teachers) 117 1,600 56 160
Observations 157 2,572 73 212
Adjusted R2 0.617 0.469 0.617 0.192
to represent visually since it requires controlling for origin school fixed effects.20 For
this reason, we regress the quality of a teacher’s next school on current value added
controlling for current school fixed effects. For power, we pool both math and ELA
teachers. Standard errors are calculated using a parametric bootstrap that effectively
clusters at the level of the teacher.
Table 2.3 displays the results. A teacher that is one standard deviation above
average quality in a traditional public school moves to a school that is 0.11 standard
deviations higher quality than the average teacher. On the other hand, when above
average teachers in the charter sector move to a traditional public school, they tend
to move to places that are worse than where the average teacher moves. This finding
suggests that the positive externality generated by charters falls disproportionately
on low quality schools.
20While it is common to plot fixed effect regression residuals for the y-variable against the relevant
x-variable, this sort of visualization can be misleading since the slope of this line will not equal the
regression slope in general. To guarantee that, we would also need to residualize the x-variable.
Going this route has the drawback that the magnitudes become hard to interpret visually. So while
we greatly prefer to present our results by plotting the relationships we find in the data, in this case,
we hope the reader will forgive us for presenting a regression table.
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2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we find little evidence to support the claim that flexible employment
regulations allow charters to remove their worst teachers and better retain their best.
We examine this assertion by estimating the relation between school quality, teacher
value-added, and teacher attrition across sectors in Massachusetts. We find that,
while charter schools are more likely to lose their best teachers, this is driven primarily
by the fact that high quality traditional public schools have low attrition among low
value added teachers. Attrition patterns are similar among high and low quality
charters at all points of the teacher value-added distribution. We also find that
charters are differentially likely to lose their best teachers. This is a potentially
significant cost to charters. Together, these findings suggest that the direct exercise
of the labor force flexibility provided to them is unlikely to be an important component
of the charter model.
However, we do find evidence that high attrition rates in the charter sector
may generate positive labor force externalities for low performing, traditional pub-
lic schools. Charter schools often recruit teachers from non-traditional backgrounds.
This will increase the overall quality of the educator labor force if the charters are
able to take this marginal labor pool and provide a pathway for the best teachers to
enter the labor force while also keeping out the worst ones. To this end, we find that
attrition in the lower tail of the teacher value-added distribution is disproportionately
comprised of exits, while attrition in the upper tail is disproportionately comprised of
teachers switching schools. Further, this switching leads high quality teachers from
the charter sector into lower preforming, traditional public schools. Thus, to the ex-
tent this externality exists, it would appear to benefit lower performing traditional
public schools.
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Chapter 3
Crime and Public Housing: A General
Equilibrium Analysis
Introduction
Conventional wisdom in housing policy since the late 1960’s has held that large con-
centrations of public housing increase crime. Post-war public housing skeptics such as
Jane Jacobs and Oscar Newman famously suggested that concentrating high-poverty
populations into public housing would cause crime to scale non-linearly with popu-
lation at the neighborhood level (Jacobs, 2011; Newman, 1966). It follows from this
theory that the demolition of public housing developments should cause reductions
in aggregate crime as low-income residents leave the slums and reintegrate into the
fabric of the city. This belief that demolitions cause reductions in crime greatly influ-
enced public policy in the 1990’s, when cities tasked with staunching a decades long
urban crime-wave looked to the federal government for solutions and found one in the
form of a 6 billion dollar public housing redevelopment program known as HOPE VI.
The HOPE VI demolitions have since spawned an academic literature that at-
tempts to quantify the impact of public housing demolitions on neighborhood crime.
In virtually all cases, these studies conclude that demolitions reduce crime in aggre-
gate (Popkin et al., 2012; Aliprantis and Hartley, 2015; Sandler, 2017; Stacy, 2017;
Wheeler et al., 2017). Most of this work has leveraged readily available geo-spatial
micro-data on the location of crime and the timing of demolitions to achieve causal
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identification. However, this empirical design relies on the assumption that the con-
trol units are not affected by the treatment. This is unlikely to hold if treatment
induces potentially complicated forms of within-city migration. As with any place-
based policy with scope for spillovers, accounting for such equilibrium effects is a first
order concern.
In this paper, I revisit an influential natural experiment and demonstrate that
existing micro-estimates from the literature relying on parametric spillover restrictions
are wrong. The context is a massive HOPE VI redevelopment program which led to
the demolition of over 22,000 units of public housing in Chicago between 2001 and
2011. In this context, I show that estimates of the city-wide effect from a credible
difference-in-difference design using geospatial micro-data are incompatible with the
city-wide time series. While extrapolations from a difference in difference approach
suggest large aggregate crime reductions on the order of 1.3% by the conclusion of the
program, the time series shows that residual crime exhibits short run average spikes
of 0.5% following the demolition of public housing, with no evidence of offsetting long
run reductions.
While general skepticism of a time series approach is warranted, I argue that
in this case the aggregate time series estimates incorporating both the direct and
spillover effect of demolitions are credibly identified. At issue is wether the timing
of demolitions is uncorrelated with other unexpected shifts in crime trends. In the
context of Chicago, it is likely that the timing of demolitions was primarily determined
by structural concerns related to the integrity of the buildings and the logistical
challenges inherent in a 1.6 billion dollar construction project. This interpretation is
supported by cross-sectional regressions that predict the timing of demolitions using
building and neighborhood characteristics. To further explore the possibility that
treatment dates are as-if random, I conduct placebo tests using randomly generated
83
demolition dates. This test reveals that the relationship I document in the data are
unlikely to be driven by spurious trends or to have arisen by chance alone. I also show
that the experimental design passes a natural falsification test based on the timing
of the demolition of non-residential buildings. Taken together, these results suggest
that a causal interpretation of the time series estimates is warranted.
Motivated by the inconsistency between the micro and macro evidence, I propose
a test for control group contamination in difference in difference designs with many
treatment periods and conclude that the micro estimates of the impact of the Plan
for Transformation are biased by spillovers. The test is based on the simple intuition
that when we have many treatment periods, the estimated treatment effect should
not be driven by sharp trend changes in the control group around treatment dates. I
formalize this intuition at the population level by providing conditions under which
such control group trend changes imply spillovers even when the standard parallel
trend assumption would otherwise hold. By disaggregating the time series variation,
I am able to decompose the estimated difference in difference treatment effect into
control and treatment group trend changes. I find that in micro-areas with public
housing, 50% of the estimated treatment effect from difference in difference estimates
can be explained by spillovers into the control group.
To better understand the spillover mechanism, I apply time series techniques at
the micro level and show that demolition induced spillovers are mediated by the
distribution of gang controlled territory. The motivation for this analysis comes from
a 2008 article in The Atlantic (Rosin, 2008) and Chicago street folk lore.1 At the time
of the demolitions, many public housing projects in Chicago had become the de-facto
base of operations for criminal gangs (Venkatesh, 2008; Belluck, 1998). Thus building
demolitions could force gangs to relocate in ways that might bring them into conflict
1This latter assertion is based on the author’s conversations with the proprietor of chicagoganghis-
tory.com.
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with their rivals, leading to increased levels of crime beyond what would be expected
from a pure relocation effect. I use new data on the location of gang territory in
Chicago to show that when a public housing building is demolished inside a gang’s
territory, it leads to large, unexpected spikes in crime at the gang’s border, providing
suggestive evidence that demolition induced gang migration is partially responsible
for the city-wide crime increases. I bolster this conclusion by using coarse data on
the relocation choices of public housing residents to show that resident movement is
also correlated with changes in crime.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.1, I discuss
the relevant background on housing policy in the United State and the institutional
features of Chicago’s demolition program. I also discuss connections to the existing
literature. In section 3.2, I discuss my data sources along with issues related to
the measurement of crime and public housing demolition. In section 3.3, I produce
difference in difference estimates that, while compatible with the existing literature,
are inconsistent with the aggregate time series. I then perform a battery of placebo
and falsification tests designed to asses the credibility of the time series estimates.
In section 3.4, I reconcile the micro and macro evidence by developing a test for
control group contamination in generalized difference in difference designs with many
treatment periods and show that the difference in difference estimates are likely biased
by previously unaccounted for spillovers. I then take the time series approach to the
micro level to provide evidence that spillovers are mediated by demolition induced
migration across gang territorial boundaries. In section 3.5, I conclude.
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3.1 Federal Housing Policy and Chicago’s Plan for Transfor-
mation
In the early 1970’s, federal government support for housing assistance shifted from fa-
voring the development of large public housing projects to market oriented approaches
such as section 8 vouchers. This shift was driven in large part by an emerging belief
that the post-war boom of federally funded high-rise public housing construction had
led to increasing concentrations of poverty and crime. As Jane Jacobs put it: “Low-
income projects [had] become worse centers of delinquency, vandalism, and general
social hopelessness than the slums they were supposed to replace,” (Jacobs, 2011).
Critics of high-rise public housing often explicitly or implicitly appeal to two
mechanisms which, in their view, lead high-rise public housing to have negative,
causal effects on their occupants and the neighborhoods they inhabit. The first pro-
posed mechanism is that large public housing developments inevitably concentrate
high-poverty, high-needs populations into small geographic areas. This increase in
concentration in turn makes it difficult for public housing residents to connect with
the broader community life in the city, increasing their isolation from economic and
social opportunity. The second mechanism connects crime directly to the physical
architecture of high-rise housing. In a famous HUD pamphlet, architect Oscar New-
man argued that elements of the physical design of many public housing projects,
such as having courtyards isolated from street view and large stairwells or lobbies
with no direct sense of resident ownership, lowered the opportunity cost of criminal
behavior which in turn increased levels of criminal activity (Newman, 1966). To-
gether, these mechanisms hypothesize the existence of public housing fixed effects on
criminal behavior.
The turn against high-rise public housing culminated in 1992 with federal legisla-
tion know as HOPE VI. The purpose of this bill was to provide federal funds for the
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redevelopment of public housing projects into mixed income communities. Between
1993 and 2010, HUD awarded 262 grants totaling over 6 billion dollars (US Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Develoment, 2017). Of this money, 1.6 billion went to the
city of Chicago to fund an ambitious public housing redevelopment project known as
the “Plan for Transformation.” For the city of Chicago, much of the desire to demol-
ish this public housing stemmed from a series of high profile news stories regarding
violent incidents within the projects. For example, in response to the 1992 killing
of seven year old Dantrell Davis by a stray bullet, the Chicago Tribune published
an editorial with the headline, “Tear Down the CHA High-Rises,” (Editorial Staff,
1992).
According to the Chicago Housing Authority, the purpose of the plan for transfor-
mation was to “Ensure that quality housing is integrated into the fabric of the city for
all it’s residents, provide Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) residents with connec-
tions to opportunity, and spur revitalization in communities that were long dominated
by massive CHA high-rise developments.” They sought to accomplish these goals by
demolishing the entire stock of high-rise public housing, replacing it with a mixture
of market vouchers and new, mixed income communities. As a consequence, over the
course of the next 11 years CHA was forced to relocate close to 17,000 households
representing approximately 1.5% of the city’s population2 (Chicago Housing Author-
ity, 2011). In general, every person who was a resident of public housing when the
plan for transformation was announced in October of 1999 was provided the choice to
remain within the public housing system during redevelopment or to accept a private
market voucher. This is particularly problematic for standard cross-sectional iden-
tification strategies, since roughly half of all CHA residents chose to remain in the
public housing system (Chicago Housing Authority, 2011) and as a consequence of
demolition would thus be relocated to precisely the city blocks that form the natural
2This calculation is the author’s own and was made using data available in the referenced report.
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difference-in-difference comparison group.
Since the conclusion of the Plan for Transformation in 2011, there have been sev-
eral academic studies that attempt to quantify the impact of the program on city-wide
crime. Popkin et al. (2012) provides a sociological account with first hand interviews
of CHA residents who went through the relocation process, as well as providing a
descriptive statistical analysis showing that crime was lower than expected after pro-
gram implementation. Aliprantis and Hartley (2015) build on Popkin et al. (2012)
using a generalized difference-in-difference design meant to capture the causal effect
of public housing demolitions on crime. They conclude that the demolition program
caused a 5 to 10% reduction in homicides, shots fired, and vice and prostitution rel-
ative to levels in 1999. However, the identification strategy employed in Aliprantis
and Hartley places strong parametric restrictions on the nature of the equilibrium
response to the demolition program. Their research design effectively rules out causal
changes in crime that do not vary with distance to demolition and, in order to estimate
causal increases in crime due to CHA resident relocation, they require that displaced
residents do not consider future crime trends when choosing new neighborhoods.
Sandler (2017) builds on the difference-in-difference approach employed in Aliprantis
and Hartley (2015) by documenting the dynamics of the estimated treatment effect
and demonstrating that the demolition of poorly maintained housing projects was
associated with larger decreases in crime.
The findings of this line of research are at odds with anecdotal accounts in the
popular press claiming that the demolition programs funded by HOPE VI may have
increased crime levels in cities that participated. One controversial article published
in the Atlantic in 2008 (Rosin, 2008) argued that public housing demolitions forced
gangs that previously occupied well defined territories to move across gang boundaries
and compete for turf, leading to gang wars and increased violence. In fact, CHA itself
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considered this problem when relocating public housing residents to new neighbor-
hoods (Belluck, 1998). The popular account of the impact of HOPE VI demolitions
is supported indirectly by sociological literature emphasizing the primacy of place,
networks, and group identity in gang violence (e.g. Papachristos et al., 2013). More
generally, given the magnitude of the demolition program in Chicago and the large
number or residents relocated throughout the city, it is clear that any analysis claim-
ing to represent a full accounting of the Plan for Transformation’s impact on city-wide
crime should allow for a robust and flexible equilibrium response. This conclusion is
further supported by a large and growing literature on conflict in developing countries
emphasizing the importance of equilibrium effects for understanding the spatial and
temporal distribution of violent activity (Mariaflavia and La Ferrara, 2017; Berman
and Couttenier, 2015; Galiani et al., 2016; Getmansky et al., 2017).
There is mixed evidence on the causal effect that moving out of public housing has
on individual crime propensities. The classic experiment in this literature is Moving
to Opportunity, which randomly offered housing vouchers to public housing residents
(Katz et al., 2001). On average, voucher families relocated to neighborhoods where
they were significantly less likely to self report crime victimization. While violent
crime arrests decreased among young men in voucher families, problem behaviors
and property crime arrests went up (Kling et al., 2005). Recent work following up on
Moving to Opportunity showed little long run benefit to males who were teenagers
at the time of the move (Chetty et al., 2016). Perhaps more relevant to the present
paper is a literature that leverages detailed micro-data on public housing residents
in Chicago to examine the impact of demolition based movement out of public hous-
ing. In particular, Jacob (2004) finds that students who leave public housing due to
demolition do no better or worse than their peers academically. And Chyn (2016)
finds that, as with voucher based movement, leaving public housing increases the
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short run propensity for young men to be arrested for property crimes. However, it is
important to note that in practice the public housing projects in Chicago acted as a
de-facto residence for many individuals who were not official members of CHA house-
holds (Venkatesh, 2008) and for this reason would not be tracked by public agencies.
Thus it is not clear to what degree these results are directly applicable when neigh-
borhood level impacts on crime (as opposed to individual crime propensities) are the
desideratum.
Finally, this paper contributes to the econometric and empirical literature on
spillovers and equilibrium effects. Much of this literature has focussed on identifica-
tion in the context of randomized experiments (Miguel and Kremer, 2004; Sobel, 2006;
Hudgens and Halloran, 2008; Sinclair et al., 2012; Angelucci and Di Maro, 2016). Of
particular note is Rosenbaum (2007), who develops non-parametric tests and bounds
in the presence of stable unit treatment value (SUTVA) violations using randomiza-
tion inference. But, as the author is careful to note, these methods are applicably
only to randomized experiments. To my knowledge, this is the first paper to propose
a non-parametric test that leverages time series variation in the control group in a
non-experimental setting to look for spillovers.
3.2 Measuring Crime and Public Housing in Chicago
3.2.1 Mapping Crime in Chicago
Data on the location and dates of crimes in Chicago comes from several sources. The
Chicago open data portal provides geospatial crime data spanning the years 2001-
2014 and shapefiles mapping Chicago at the community area and census block level.
Baseline demographic and socioeconomic characteristics for the year 2000 come from
the Census. I aggregate this data to produce a panel measuring monthly crime counts
by crime type at the census block level. I also use monthly FBI homicide data since
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Figure 3·1: Geospatial Distribution of Crime
Note: Polygons represent boundaries of Chicago community areas. Crime per capita in each com-
munity area is determined by dividing total crime in 2001 by community area population in the year
2000 as measured by the Census. I use year 2000 population for the denominator since population
measurements are unavailable at the necessary geographic resolution in the Census for the year 2001.
1991 as provided by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research
(ICPSR, 2017) to supplement the aggregate Chicago time series when homicides are
the outcome variable. Figure 3·1 shows the geospatial distribution of per capita
reported crime in Chicago in the year 2001. For a more complete discussion of these
data, their sources, and relevant summary statistics, see Appendix C.
3.2.2 Mapping Chicago’s Gang Territory
This paper contributes new data on the location of gang territorial boundaries in
Chicago. In December of 2016, I submitted a Freedom of Information Act Request
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to the Chicago Police Department (CPD) asking for geospatial information on gang
territorial boundaries. In June of 2017, CPD provided with me with 14 maps of gang
territory, one for each year from 2004 to 2017. While there is at least one paper in the
literature which leverages a geospatial map of gang territory to explore gang violence
in Chicago (Papachristos et al., 2013), to my knowledge this is the first paper with
direct access to CPD shape files containing gang territory over multiple years. Figure
3·2 shows the areas of Chicago believed to be under gang control in the year 2004,
highlighting the five largest gangs by area. From 2004 to 2014, there were a total of
73 distinct gangs that CPD intelligence determined warranted inclusion in their maps
at some point in time. Fourteen gangs not present in the year 2004 enter the data for
at least one year by 2014. Nine gangs present in 2004 no longer appear in the data
as of 2014. In an average year, CPD intelligence mapped the territorial boundary of
58.3 gangs. For summary statistics related to gang territory demographics and crime,
see Appendix C.
3.2.3 Public Housing Demolitions
In December of 2015, I submitted a Freedom of Information Act Request to the
Chicago Housing Authority asking for information on the location and timeline of
demolitions of Chicago public housing. CHA provided me with a .pdf document
containing the addresses of the 586 public housing buildings that had been demol-
ished since 1995. This document also contained the name of the housing project to
which the building belonged, the number of residential housing units contained in
the building, as well as dates corresponding to when the contractor responsible for
the demolition was given a notice to proceed, the date that structural demolition be-
gan, the date the structural demolition was finished, and the date the demolition was
complete. There are 31 buildings which are listed as not having residential dwellings.
Unless otherwise specified, I drop these demolitions from the analysis.
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Gangster Disciples
Black P. Stones
Latin Kings
Two−Six
Black Disciples
Other Gang
Figure 3·2: Gang Territory in 2004
Note: Polygons represent gang controlled territory within the city of Chicago in 2004 as estimated
by CPD intelligence. Included gangs represent the five largest gangs by area and collectively control
over 40% of all gang territory.
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Figure 3·3: Geospatial Distribution of Homicides and Public Housing
Note: Black dots denote census blocks containing at least one unit of public housing demolished
as part of the Plan for Transformation. Polygons represent boundaries of the smallest connected
subset of Chicago community areas that contain all units of demolished public housing. Homicides
per thousand people in nearby community areas is determined by dividing total homicides in 2001
by community area population in thousands in the year 2000. I use year 2000 population for the
denominator since population measurements are unavailable at the necessary geographic resolution
in the Census for the year 2001.
It is important to note that the public housing demolished by CHA was highly geo-
graphically concentrated. In 1995, only 23 of Chicago’s 76 community areas contained
at least one of the 22,454 units of public housing that were eventually demolished.
To put that in perspective, these 23 community areas combined contain only 26%
of Chiago’s 231 square miles. Figure 3·3 shows the geospatial distribution of these
public housing units. Given the high level of geographic concentration of the demo-
litions, it is not clear how the impact of treatment should propagate geo-spatially
which, as I have argued previously, will make it difficult to find a reasonable control
group uncontaminated by spillovers.
It is also not clear how to choose the date a neighborhood should be considered
treated in this context. On the one hand, I would like to define treatment to be the
date that public housing residents were forced to leave the building. On the other
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Figure 3·4: Cumulative Housing Units Demolished
Note: “Notified” refers to the total number of housing units contained in buildings where the
contractor was told to proceed with demolition. “Completed” refers to the total number of housing
units contained in buildings where demolition was complete.
hand, vacant lots are frequently home to criminal activity, hence it might make sense
to define treatment according to the date of demolition. In this case, however, my
hands are tied. Since I do not observe the date of building closure in this data, I
define the treatment date to be the month that the contractor was given the notice
to proceed. CHA typically gave public housing residents 2 months notice to vacate a
building prior the start of demolition (Sandler, 2017). For this reason, I run robustness
checks where I lag the dates of treatment. In all cases, this change has very little
impact on the results. Figure 3·4 shows the cumulative number of units demolished
over time. Note that there is substantial within year variation in treatment status
which justifies the choice of months as the relevant unit of time for the analysis.
In April of 2001, CHA published a report on the status of public housing residents
who had been relocated as part of the Plan for Transformation (AKA “10/99 Resi-
dents”). This report contains an appendix with the number of 10/99 households by
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Figure 3·5: Change in 10/99 Households by Community Area
Note: Polygons in the above figure represent boundaries of Chicago community areas. The shading
indicates the net change in 10/99 households between October 1st, 1999 and December 31st, 2010.
There are five community areas that experienced declines in 10/99 residents in excess of 1,000
households. Plotting this change in its raw form would obscure all other variation in the figure. For
this reason, I have bottom coded these five observations to the size of next largest decrease, which
is 652 households.
community area as of October of 1999. It also gives the number of 10/99 households
living in each community in 2010 in mixed income housing, rehabilitated housing,
and private market housing. Figure 3·5 maps the geospatial distribution of changes
in 10/99 residents at the community area level as of 2010. Note that despite pub-
lic housing being highly concentrated in the middle of the city, there is substantial
geospatial variation outside of this bubble, particularly on the south-side.
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3.3 Micro and Macro Estimates: A Puzzle
In this section, I will attempt to estimate the causal effect of the public housing de-
molition program on crime using two distinct identification strategies. First, I will
use standard panel data methods that identify the causal impact of public housing
demolition on crime provided we rule out spillovers. In particular, I will show that
blocks which are exposed to demolitions early in the sample frame experience rela-
tively faster declines in crime than blocks that are exposed to demolition later. I will
then provide evidence from the time series in Chicago which shows that at the city
wide level the correlation between residual crime and the demolition sequence is pos-
itive. Provided we believe that the demolition sequence is orthogonal to unobserved
predictors of changes in future crime trends, this estimate identifies the causal impact
of the demolition program on city wide crime without placing any parametric restric-
tions on spillovers. I then subject this design to a battery of falsification exercises;
in all cases, I find no evidence against the claim that the time series estimates are
credible.
Taken together, these findings present a puzzle. Since both cannot be true, it must
be that either the time series regressions are confounded by unobserved predictors of
unexpected changes in future crime trends, or that the difference-in-difference strategy
is mis-specified due to the parametric spillover restrictions.
3.3.1 A General Econometric Model of Crime and Housing Demolition
Let ybt denote the number of crimes that occurred in census block b ∈ {1 . . . B} at
time t ∈ {0 . . . T}. Consider the following statistical model:
ybt = y(b, t) +
W∑
w=1
1t>twS(Dbw, b, t) + bt (3.1)
Here y(b, t) describes the expected path of crime without the demolition program. I
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use w ∈ {1 . . .W} to refer to demolition wave w, where by demolition wave I refer to
all buildings demolished at time tw. Hence 1t>tw is an indicator that takes a value of
one in all periods after demolition wave w. Dbw is the distance between block b and
the nearest building demolished in wave w. S() is a function that maps distances into
treatment effects. And bt is a projection residual.
This general model is useful because it nests as special cases both the time series
and panel data identification strategies I will contrast in the remainder of the paper.
For example, if we specify y(b, t) with block and time fixed effects (δb and δt), and we
rule out spillovers by assuming that only blocks which are close to demolitions are
treated so that S(Dbw, b, t) = β1Dbw<D¯, then model (3.1) reduces to the generalized
dif-in-dif specification:
ybt = δb + δt + βzbt + bt (3.2)
Where zbt =
∑W
w=1 1t>tw1Dbw<D¯ counts the number of waves where at least one build-
ing was demolished within distance D¯ as of time t. In the case of a single treatment
wave or multiple treatment waves that do not overlap geographically, zbw is simply a
treatment indicator.
On the other hand, if we wish to identify the treatment effect using the time series
exclusively, we can specify S(Dbw, b, t) = βb and approximate y(b, t) = δb + γbt to get:
ybt = δb + γbt+ βbzt + bt (3.3)
Where zt =
∑W
w=1 1t>tw counts the number of demolitions that have occurred as of
time t. Notice that model (3.3) does not make use of cross-sectional comparisons
to generate estimates of the treatment effect; hence, there is no need for parametric
restrictions on S() that specify which blocks are impacted by any given demolition
wave.
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3.3.2 Micro Estimates: Evidence from a Difference in Difference Design
The geographic distribution of public housing makes implementing a difference-in-
difference strategy in this setting complicated. Ideally, we would like to compare
blocks with similar levels of pre-treament exposure to demolished housing. For ex-
ample, suppose block A is located such that there are three distinct public housing
buildings within one mile of its centroid, and that these three buildings are demol-
ished early on in the sample frame. We would like to find a comparison block B
with a similar demolition risk set in the sense that block B also experiences three
demolition events within a radius of one mile, just at a later point in time. Then,
for identification, we leverage only the fact that B experiences its demolition events
after A. Provided the crime trend of block B early in the sample is a good proxy for
the crime trend Block A would have experienced in the absence of treatment, we can
identify the causal effect of public housing demolition on crime. Note that implicit in
this formulation is the idea that block A’s treatment cannot impact the crime trend
in block B. This idea leads to the following specification.
Measure public housing exposure via xb(i, j) =
∑
w 1i≤Dbw≤j, which counts the
number of demolition waves where the closest demolition to block b occurred within
distance [i, j]. Then estimate the counterfactual path of crime as:
y(b, t) = δb + δt + δt01xb(0,50)>0 + δt501xb(50,100)>0 + . . . (3.4)
Equation (3.4) includes block fixed effects and month-by-year fixed effects interacted
with dummies that take a value of one if the block ever experiences a demolition
event within a given distance ring. Hence, the counter factual trend is estimated
using only blocks with similar demolition risk sets in the sense that the comparison
group experiences at least one demolition event within an identical set of geographic
rings as the treated unit. I also run robustness checks which further subdivide the risk
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sets by allowing different sequences of shocks according to whether a block is exposed
to above or below median numbers of public housing demolitions within each distance
ring.
Similarly, I specify S() as:
S(Dbw, b, t) = β010<Dbw≤50 + β100150<Dbw≤100 + . . . (3.5)
This specification allows the impact of treatment to vary with distance in a way
that is analogous to how we have defined the demolition risk sets. I follow Sandler
(2017) by choosing 4,500 meters as the upper bound of the distance to demolition
at which a neighborhood is considered treated, since this is the largest treatment
ring considered in prior studies that have examined the impact of public housing
demolition in Chicago. Plugging (3.5) into the general model (3.1) yields the following
estimation equation:
ybt = y(b, t) + β0zbt(0, 50) + β50zbt(50, 100) + · · ·+ bt (3.6)
Where zbt(i, j) =
∑
W 1t>tw1i<Dbw≤j counts the number of demolitions that have
occurred within distance [i, j] as of time t.
The results in Table 3.1 show large reductions in average monthly crime in blocks
whose centroids are located within 100 meters of a demolition, with little evidence of a
measurable direct effect at further distances. These estimates are consistent with the
estimates found in Aliprantis and Hartley (2015) and Sandler (2017). Further, these
findings continue to hold when we restrict attention to homicides, which should allevi-
ate concerns that the parameter estimate is driven entirely by reporting biases. They
also continue to hold when I lag the treatment structure to account for the fact that
residents were likely asked to leave the building in advance of the date the contractor
was told to proceed with demolition. More importantly, these results also survive all
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Table 3.1: Dif-in-Dif Estimates of the Causal Effect of Housing De-
molition on Crime
Total Crime
(1) (2) (3)
0 to 50 Meters −6.45 −6.43 −6.42
(1.28) (1.31) (1.31)
50 to 100 Meters −2.71 −2.63 −2.62
(0.67) (0.71) (0.71)
100 to 200 Meters −0.21 −0.14 −0.13
(0.15) (0.20) (0.19)
200 to 300 Meters −0.07 −0.07 −0.06
(0.11) (0.21) (0.21)
300 to 400 Meters −0.10 −0.10 −0.09
(0.07) (0.10) (0.10)
400 to 500 Meters −0.01 0.06 0.06
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
500 to 1000 Meters −0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
1000 to 1500 Meters −0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
1500 to 2500 Meters 0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
2500 to 3500 Meters 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
3500 to 4500 Meters −0.01 −0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Mean of Dependent Variable 1.37 1.37 1.37
Risk Set Specification month-year month-year-dist month-year-dist-num
Observations 4,115,832 4,115,832 4,115,832
Adjusted R2 0.55 0.55 0.55
Note: All specifications include block fixed effects. Column (1) estimates the counterfactual trend
using month-by-year fixed effects. Column (2) estimates the counterfactual trend by interacting the
month-by-year fixed effects from column (1) with a set of dummies that take a value of 1 if the block
experienced at least one demolition at any point in time within a given distance ring. Column (3)
estimates the counterfactual trend by interacting the month-by-year-by-distance fixed effects from
column (2) with a full set of dummies accounting for whether a block experienced an above or below
average number of demolitions within a given distance ring. Standard errors are clustered at the
level of the risk set.
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of the standard robustness checks and falsification tests which are typically applied
to difference in difference designs, to include the standard test of parallel trends in
“pre-period” data which I implement here by regressing the treatment structure from
late in the sample frame on outcomes early in the sample frame. For a complete
discussion these and other robustness checks, see Appendix C.
However, none of the standard falsification tests I apply here are designed to pick
up parallel trend violations that result from spillovers. This is because standard
falsification checks are based on analyzing pre-treatment data which, by definition,
cannot be subject to the confounding spillovers. So provided we believe the parametric
restrictions on spillovers, there is little reason to doubt the results we find in this
section.
Taken at face value, these results suggest that by the conclusion of the plan for
transformation in 2011, city wide crime in Chicago was 1.3% lower than it would have
been had the public housing been left in place. Given the magnitude of the implied
city wide treatment effect, it seems reasonable to expect some evidence of the declines
in crime resulting from the program to show up in city wide aggregates. However, as
I show in the next section, the opposite is true.
3.3.3 Macro Estimates: Evidence from the Time Series
In general, identifying spillovers without parametric restrictions is made difficult by
the lack of an adequate comparison group. In the present context, specifying a cross
sectional control group amounts to finding city blocks in a geographic area of 61 square
miles which were unaffected by the demolition of 22,000 units of public housing and
the simultaneous relocation of the 17,000 households living inside them.
If we are unwilling to take a stand on which cross sectional units are directly and
indirectly affected by any given treatment wave, then the only variation that remains
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given the data I am using are within unit comparisons in the time series.3 While
this type of research design is rarely employed in applied micro work, within unit
comparisons have a natural quasi-experimental interpretation. Provided treatment
dates are randomly assigned, then a systematic relationship between treatment dates
and unexpected changes in the path of the outcome variable are reasonable evidence
of causality.
For this strategy to work in the present context, it must be the case that there
are no unobserved factors coincident with demolitions that are also predictive of un-
expected changes in future crime. So, for example, if the planners at CHA who
determined the demolition sequence chose high crime areas to demolish first, or pri-
oritized areas that were experiencing slower than average reductions in crime, this is
not necessarily a problem for causality, since there is no obvious reason why prioritiz-
ing high crime areas for early demolition should lead to a demolition sequence that
is correlated with other, unexpected shocks to city-wide future crime. On the other
hand, if the Chicago Police systematically came to the CHA planners and asked them
to move demolition dates forward or backward on the basis of intelligence indicating
that gang wars were likely to break out in the near future, that would be a problem for
causality since it would lead us to confound the demolition date with the unexpected
gang war.
So in practice, what determined the demolition sequence? Table 3.2 shows the
cross sectional correlates of demolition timing. Across all specifications, the only
variables with enough predictive power to be selected in a Post-Lasso regression were
those related to the size of the public housing developments. The results of this table
3Another strategy would be to track down city level crime data and use synthetic control methods
to generate a counterfactual from other cities. However, this identification strategy requires that the
path of the outcome variable for the treated unit lie within the convex hull of the set of potential
controls. An examination of the FBI incident level homicide data revealed to me that Chicago has
been in the tail of the distribution of homicides for most of its history; hence, it is not clear that
synthetic control methods are feasible in this context.
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Table 3.2: Cross Sectional Correlates of Demolition Timing
Days Since January 2001
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Units −4.50 −5.25 −5.38 −3.85
(1.78) (1.48) (1.41) (0.96)
Buildings 47.13 39.02 49.11 47.32
(42.74) (42.71) (48.84) (19.29)
Total Crime 0.07
(1.05)
Total Population 1.82
(1.44)
Total Housing −2.54
(3.10)
Homicides −86.62 −147.44
(280.09) (279.29)
Violent Crime −0.08 1.38
(4.01) (3.46)
Narcotics −2.82 −2.83
(2.03) (2.78)
Weapons 142.61 95.13
(60.18) (63.98)
Male −14.67
(7.15)
Female 12.60
(3.79)
Black 2.36
(1.74)
White −23.80
(20.77)
Occupied −1.26 −5.81
(6.74) (5.66)
Vacant −1.38 −1.46
(3.50) (3.76)
Extra Demographic Variables No No Yes Yes
Estimation Method OLS OLS OLS Post-Lasso
Observations 108 108 108 108
Adjusted R2 0.15 0.19 0.14 0.13
Note: Crime variables comes from year 2001 CPD data. All other variables come from the year 2000
census. Population, crime and demographic variables are counts at the census block level. Extra
demographic variables include counts of individuals identifying as White, American Indian, Asian,
Hawaiian, other, and multiple races. Vacant and occupied refer to counts of housing units at the
census block level. Columns 1-3 are estimated with OLS. Column 4 is estimated with post-lasso.
The post-lasso results are invariant to the choice of initial specification from columns 1-3.
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suggest that blocks with a small number of large public housing projects experienced
demolition first. This fact is consistent with the idea that it was primarily structural
concerns related to the integrity of the buildings that drove the demolition sequence,
with large, decrepit high-rises slated for early demolition. In general, these demoli-
tions were complicated, expensive construction projects which took years to plan and
execute. Further, as Aliprantis and Hartley (2015) argue, demolition dates were fre-
quently delayed as a result of litigation by housing residents, potentially introducing
quasi-random variation into the timing of treatment.
To implement the time series strategy, I aggregate the data to the Chicago-month
level and revisit equation (3.1), which then becomes:
yt = y(t) +
W∑
w=1
1t>twS(t, w) + t (3.7)
Notice that S() no longer depends on distance, since Dt = 0 for all demolitions once
we have aggregated the data. I will estimate y(t) non-parametrically using a full set
of monthly fixed effects (denoted by δm(t)) and a flexible polynomial in t. Further,
I will restrict S(t, w) = β to be constant and hence be content with recovering an
average of the underlying function. For an explicit accounting of the time path
of treatment using this specification, see Appendix C. This leads to the following
estimation equation:
yt = δm(t) +
P∑
p=1
αpt
p + βzt + t (3.8)
Where zt =
∑W
w=1 1t>tw counts the number of demolitions that have occurred as of
time t.
Table 3.3 shows results of the time series identification strategy, varying the order
of the trend polynomial from first to fifth across columns. To account for auto-
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Table 3.3: Time Series Estimates of the Causal Effect of Housing
Demolition on Crime
Total Crime
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of Demolitions 241.82 21.42 151.87 184.65 189.28
(32.01) (43.89) (91.55) (99.51) (95.59)
Mean of Dependent Variable 33532.54 33532.54 33532.54 33532.54 33532.54
Polynomial Order First Second Third Fourth Fifth
Observations 168 168 168 168 168
Adjusted R2 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
Note: Estimation uses CPD crime data aggregated to the city wide level. All specifications include
month of year fixed effects to control for seasonality. Columns 1-5 vary the order of the polynomial
trend from 1st to 5th respectively. Standard errors account for auto-covariance of the residuals using
the method of Lumley and Heagerty (1999) which builds on Andrews (1991).
covariance in the residuals, standard errors are computed according to the adaptive
weighting method outlined in Lumley and Heagerty (1999), which is in turn based
on Andrews (1991). In general, I will prefer time series specifications with a third
degree polynomial. This is because the finite sample distribution of the estimator
with linear and quadratic terms alone exhibits non-normality (see permutation tests
in Appendix C); hence it is not clear that inference is reliable for the lower order
specifications.
The results in table 3.3 indicate that the demolition sequence of public housing
was positively correlated with deviations from trend in total crime. In fact, during
a time period when crime in the city as a whole declined substantially, the average
post-demolition month contained approximately 150-190 additional crimes beyond
what would be predicted by a polynomial trend and monthly fixed effects alone. This
result is robust if we restrict attention to homicides; hence it seems unlikely to be
driven entirely by reporting biases. It also continues to hold if I restrict attention
to the extended FBI sample, which suggests that this result is not a feature of the
particular set of demolitions that overlap with the CPD crime data. For more detail
on these robustness checks, see appendix C.
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It is important to note that specifications like (3.8) are unable to account for any
long-run changes in the path of crime that result from public housing demolition.
Intuitively, this is because the trend polynomial is estimated with the entire time-
series; hence long run trend changes resulting from treatment could be absorbed by
a non-parametric specification of y(t). To address this concern, as well as to give an
explicit accounting of the dynamics of treatment, I estimate a vector auto regression
of crime and housing demolition. In the context of the general statistical model, this
amounts to assuming that the counterfactual is given by:
y(t) = δm(t) + αt+
L∑
j=1
γjyt−j (3.9)
Also, I assume that the treatment effects are generated by:
S(t, w) =
L∑
j=1
βj d˜tw−j (3.10)
Where d˜tw−j takes a value of one j periods after demolition wave w began, and is zero
otherwise. Together with equation (3.1) we have:
yt = δm(t) + αt+
L∑
j=1
γjyt−j +
L∑
j=1
βjdt−j + t (3.11)
Where dt−j =
∑W
w=1 d˜tw−j takes a value of one j periods after any demolition oc-
curred and is zero elsewhere. In practice, I will also allow the demolition variable to
depend on lagged crime and lagged demolitions, so that the VAR is given by the joint
estimation of (3.11) and:
dt = δ
′
m(t) + α
′t+
L∑
j=1
γ′jyt−j +
L∑
j=1
β′jdt−j + ut (3.12)
I will report specifications where I choose the maximum lag length L by looking at
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Figure 3·6: Impulse Response of Total Crime to Housing Demolition
Note: Estimation uses CPD crime data aggregated to the city-wide level. Top panel corresponds
to a lag-length of two, which was favored by both HQ and SIC. Bottom panel corresponds to a lag
length of 7, which was favored by AIC and FPE. Both specifications include month of year fixed
effects and a linear trend. Standard errors are computed via bootstrap at the 95% confidence level.
various information criteria.4 I test the crime time series and the demolition indicator
for a unit root using both the Augmented-Dickey Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests. In
all cases, I reject the null of a unit root in favor of stationarity at the 99% level. In
general, I will include a linear trend in my main specifications since these estimates
are more conservative than estimates which omit the trend.
Figure 3·6 shows the resulting impulse response function. As we can see, the VAR
analysis suggests that the estimates from OLS using a non-parametric trend are,
in fact, averages of downward sloping curves with no detectable long run changes in
crime. Together, these results indicate that public housing demolitions are on average
followed by moderate, short-run increases in unexpected crime.
4These include Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Hanna-Quinn Information Criterion (HQ),
Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC), and Final Prediction Error (FPE)
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3.3.4 Are the Time Series Estimates Credible?
To examine the credibility of the time series estimates, I implement a permutation
test based on randomly chosen treatment dates and a falsification test based on the
demolition of non-residential buildings. In both cases, I find no evidence that the
time series estimates are spurious.
To implement the permutation test, I generate a random vector of 63 treatment
dates at the year-month level without replacement between January of 2001 and
December of 2011. I then run the regressions from table 3.3 using the treatment
vector generated from the random dates as the independent variable of interest. After
repeating this procedure ten-thousand times, I plot the resulting placebo distribution.
Across all specifications, the placebo distribution is centered at zero which suggests
that the results are not due to spuriously trending variables. Figure 3·7 shows the
results of the placebo test from the specification with a third order polynomial trend.
The vertical line is the actual parameter estimate from the real vector of treatment
dates. The area to the right of this vertical line is a non-parametric finite sample p-
value. In this case, the p-value is 0.065, which suggests the estimated result is unlikely
to be due to chance alone. For plots of the placebo distributions from specifications
with different order polynomial trends, see Appendix C.
For the second test I leverage the fact that in the CHA data on housing demolitions
I observe demolition dates for 31 non-residential buildings.5 Since these buildings
never contained any public housing residents, it is unlikely that the demolition of
these buildings would spark increases in crime due to migration, yet the choice of
these demolition dates are likely driven by many of the same factors CHA used to
5While my data does not include any information about the purpose of these buildings, the
author of Sandler (2017) has informed me that her data does contain this information. According
to her, this group of buildings contained 2 boys and girls clubs, 7 management offices, 1 warehouse,
1 maintenance building, 2 daycares, 4 community centers, 6 heating plants, 1 swimming pool, and
1 elevator division, with the rest unspecified.
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Figure 3·7: Time Series Permutation Test: Third Order Polynomial
Trend
Note: This figure plots a non-parametric density estimate from a distribution of 10,000 placebo treat-
ment effects each estimated with randomly chosen treatment dates. I all cases, I use a specification
with a third order polynomial trend to estimate the placebo effect. The vertical line corresponds to
the actual estimated treatment effect estimated with the real data. Note that 6.5% of the mass of
the placebo distribution lies to the right of the real estimate.
determine the demolition dates of non-residential buildings. Table 3.4 replicates table
3.3 using only treatment dates associated exclusively with non-residential demolitions.
While imprecise, the point estimates are reassuring since they would indicate that,
if anything, the estimated effects in table 3.3 are biased downward. And for the
specifications with higher order trend terms, the confidence intervals are tight enough
to rule out an upward bias.
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Table 3.4: Estimates from Non-Residential Demolitions: Total Crime
Total Crime
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of Demolitions −553.64 −170.44 −462.92 −537.24 −421.96
(645.88) (114.71) (231.72) (271.88) (288.53)
Mean of Dependent Variable 33532.54 33532.54 33532.54 33532.54 33532.54
Polynomial Order First Second Third Fourth Fifth
Observations 168 168 168 168 168
Adjusted R2 0.93 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
Note: Estimation uses CPD crime data aggregated to the city wide level. All specifications include
month of year fixed effects to control for seasonality. The independent variable uses only demolition
dates corresponding to non-residential buildings. Columns 1-5 vary the order of the polynomial
trend from 1st to 5th respectively. Standard errors account for auto-covariance of the residuals
using the method of Lumley and Heagerty (1999) which builds on Andrews (1991).
Taken together, the available evidence suggests that the estimates in table 3.3
are credible. In the next section, I reconcile these findings with the difference in
difference estimates by developing a test that is capable of detecting control group
contamination in difference in difference designs with many treatment periods even
when the parallel trend assumption would otherwise hold. I then apply it to the
data and find that the difference in difference estimates are biased by spillovers. In
addition, I provide evidence that these spillovers are driven by the interaction of
demolition induced migration and the geospatial distribution of gang territory.
3.4 Reconciling the Micro and Macro Estimates
In this section, I propose a new statistical test that is informative for control group
contamination in generalized difference in difference designs even when the parallel
trend assumption would otherwise hold. The test is a formalization of a simple eye-
ball check frequently employed in seminar rooms: if treatment is supposed to cause
sharp changes in the trend of the treated group, but the estimated effect is in fact
driven by sharp changes in the control, then absent a compelling institutional reason
to justify such a pattern we may suspect the changes in the control are in fact caused
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by the treatment. I show that this intuition becomes powerful when such sharp
changes in the control happen systematically across many distinct treatment dates.
See figure 3·8 for intuition in the simple, 2x2 dif-in-dif case.6 I then apply the test to
the Plan for Transformation and conclude that the difference in difference estimates
are likely biased by spillovers.
Y Treatment
Control
t
!}
"#"	%&'#()'* = !
Counterfactual
(a) Ideal Dif-in-Dif
Y
Treatment
Control
t
,} "#"	%&'#()'* = ,
Counterfactual
,}
(b) Potential Contamination
Figure 3·8: Control Group Contamination in Dif-in-Dif Designs
Note: Panel (a) show the classic picture for a dif-in-dif design where the estimated treatment effect
comes primarily from sharp changes in the treatment group. Panel (b) shows a dif-in-dif design where
the majority of the estimated effect comes from sharp changes in the control, possibly indicating
control group contamination.
Next I provide evidence that spillovers are mediated by gang migration. First,
I show that after a demolition occurs in a given gang’s territory, blocks which are
near to that gang’s boundary experience unpredictable increases in crime. Then I
use coarse public housing resident relocation data to show that the change in 10/99
residents at the community area level is positively correlated with unexpected time
series deviations around demolition dates. Together, these findings are consistent with
anecdotal accounts arguing that public housing demolitions led to increased conflict
between gangs as members were forced out of traditionally defined territory.
6I should emphasize here that the test is useless when there is only one treatment period, since
multiple treatment periods are required for identification. To be taken as evidence of spillovers, the
test requires the picture from panel B to occur systematically over many treatment periods.
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3.4.1 A New Test for Spillovers
The test I propose in this section is based on the intuition that sharp, unexpected
changes of the outcome variable in the control group around treatment dates can
be taken as evidence of spillovers. To formalize precise conditions under which this
statement is true, I will first build a simple, design based framework for interpret-
ing generalized dif-in-dif parameters as the average of many 2x2 dif-in-dif estimates.
Within this framework I provide three conditions which are sufficient for interpreting
the generalized dif-in-dif estimand as being externally valid in the sense that it will
equal the expected impact of treatment supplied on a randomly chosen date. The
first condition is that there are no spillovers. The second condition is a standard
parallel trend assumption. The third condition requires that treatment dates are
chosen as-if random with respect to the control group. The first and third conditions
together generate a testable implication in the data which will reject in the presence
of spillovers when parallel trends would otherwise be true: forecast errors around the
timing of treatment in the control group should be zero when averaged over many
treatment dates.
First, I introduce some notation. Recall that we consider data indexed by t ∈
{1 . . . T} periods and observe treatment occurring in waves at times tw ∈ {t1 . . . tW} ⊂
{1 . . . T}. Within each wave, we observe an indicator τw which equals one if the
observation was directly treated in wave w. We will also consider an alternative
indicator τ ∗w which equals one if the observation was affected directly via treatment
or indirectly via spillover. Note that τ ∗w is unobservable. Last, consider a potential
outcome framework where the observable outcome post treatment wave w is Ypost,w =
τ ∗wY
1
post,w + (1− τ ∗w)Y 0post,w, and superscripts denote potential outcomes in the affected
and the unaffected states. Analogously, we will let Ypre,w denote the outcome prior
to treatment wave w.
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A simple dif-in-dif design considers identifying the impact of a single treatment
wave w. To do this, the econometrician assumes two conditions:
(1) No Spillovers: τw = τ
∗
w
(2) Parallel Trends: E(Y 1post,w − Ypre,w|τ ∗w = 1) = E(Y 1post,w − Ypre,w|τ ∗w = 0)
Provided these two conditions are satisfied, the simple dif-in-dif identifies:
βw = E(Y
1
post,w|τ ∗w = 1)−E(Y 0post,w|τ ∗w = 1) (3.13)
Note that this parameter is a heterogenous effect particular to the timing of the treat-
ment wave, and hence properly interpreted in the context of any contemporaneous
aggregate shocks. In other words, it is not necessarily the case that βw is the same as
the expected impact of treatment administered on a randomly chosen date. Denote
this latter quantity by β. As a concrete example, consider that a housing demolition
that occurs during a recession need not have the same expected impact as a housing
demolition that occurs during an average economic time period.
Suppose we are interested in estimating the impact of treatment in an average
time period (β), and that we have access to many such simple dif-in-dif experiments
occurring at different points in time. Let upost,t = Ypost − Eˆ(Ypost|ωt), where ωt is
information known up to time t. Hence upost,t is the prediction error from a forecast
of the outcome after time t using all information observed prior to time t. By abuse of
notation, let t1 =∞ denote a state of the world where the first treatment date occurs
infinitely far in the future, so that none of the dif-in-dif experiments ever occur.
Suppose that no-spillovers and parallel trends continue to hold. Then a sufficient
condition to identify β is given by:
(3) Unbiased Counterfactual Forecast: E(upost,tw |t1 =∞, t∗w = 0) = 0
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This condition says that, in a world where none of the treatments ever occurred,
we could do a good job forecasting future outcomes with pre-period data for the
control group around the dates of treatment. Note that in principle, we can examine
this condition indirectly provided we have enough data before the first treatment
date. This condition implies that:
E(βw|t1 . . . tW ) = E(βw) = β (3.14)
Where β does not depend on the particular choice of treatment dates.
Observe that no spillovers and counterfactual forecast unbiasedness together pro-
vide a directly testable implication in the data: across many treatment waves, the
forecast error around treatment dates should go to zero. Thus, provided we believe
counterfactual forecast unbiasedness is true, we can test for control group contami-
nation directly in the data by, for example, regressing a non-parametric function of
t and treatment wave indicators on the outcome of interest in the control group and
then averaging the resulting parameter estimates across waves.
Note that the three conditions discussed here together imply that we could also
identify β from the treatment group time-series alone. However, we only need two of
the three conditions to generate a test that will reject in the presence of spillovers;
hence, this idea is more general than a straightforward application of time-series
identification to micro-data in the sense that it will reject for spillover induced control
group contamination regardless of whether or not the parallel trend assumption is
valid.
Last, it is also true that failures of this test might be driven by a failure of coun-
terfactual forecast unbiasedness. When that is true, the econometrician is limited
to estimating the local average effect linked to the particular sequence of aggregate
shocks that occurred in the context in which the data were generated. This would
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imply that the parameter estimate may have bad external validity properties in the
sense that the expected impact of treatment assigned to the same sample on a ran-
domly chosen date would not necessarily be equal to the parameter identified by the
research design. Which assumption violation is more plausible will depend on the
institutional context of the experiment under consideration.
I will implement the test in my data as follows. Specify the expected path of crime
as:
y(b, t) = δb + δbm(t) +
P∑
p=1
αbpt
p (3.15)
Further, I specify the spillover function as:
S(Dbw, b, t) = βw1Dbw<4500 + γw(1− 1Dbw>4500) (3.16)
This specification defines direct treatment as being within the 4,500 meter ring that
forms the upper bound of the rings used to estimate heterogeneous treatment effects
in the generalized difference in difference design.
Since the test requires averaging over treatment waves, I impose the restrictions
that βw = β and γw = γ. Plugging (3.16) into the general model (3.1) and imposing
the restriction yields the estimation equation:
ybt = y(b, t) + βzbt(0, 4500) + γzbt(4500,∞) + bt (3.17)
Where zbt(0, 4500) counts the number of demolitions that have occurred within 4,500
meters of block b’s centroid as of time t, and zbt(4500,∞) counts the number of
demolitions that have occurred beyond 4500 meters.
Without imposing any assumptions, we can interpret β as measuring how much
of the estimated treatment effect is driven by sharp changes in the treatment group
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trend, and we can interpret γ as measuring how much of the treatment effect is
driven by sharp changes in the control group trend. If we believe the counterfactual
is forecast unbiased, then testing γ = 0 is analagous to testing the no spillovers
assumption. Finally, if we believe the conditions for identification in the aggregate
time series hold, then β identifies the direct effect of treatment on the average treated
block while γ identifies the average indirect effect on the untreated.
I will show two sets of results. The first restricts the data to a sample where
the estimated impact in the regular dif-in-dif is highest: those that ever experience a
demolition within 50 meters. This restriction is interesting because the comparison
group for this sample contains public housing that has not yet been demolished; hence,
by design of the program, we would expect some portion of the 50% of public housing
residents who elected to remain within the public housing system to be relocated to
these control blocks. Thus spillovers may be larger here than in the average block.
The second set of results includes the full sample.
Table 3.5 contains the results for the restricted sample. Column 1 reproduces
the generalized dif-in-dif specification with the new treatment variable from equation
(3.16). Note that the estimated coefficient here is small since it is the average impact
across all demolitions within 4500 meters, and not just the impact of demolitions
within 50 meters. Column 2 is identical to column 1 but uses a cubic trend at the
risk set level in place of time period fixed effects. Together, column’s 1 and 2 show that
replacing time period fixed effects with a polynomial trend makes little difference to
the estimated coefficient when using the dif-in-dif strategy. Hence, it is unlikely that
this particular choice is what is driving the results. Column 3 implements equation
(3.16) and thus decomposes the coefficient from column 2 into unexpected treatment
and control group trend changes. While imprecise for the small sample, the point
estimates suggest that 50% of the estimated coefficient is actually driven by sudden
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increases in crime in blocks that contain housing and which are outside the 4500
meter treatment ring for a given demolition.
Table 3.6 is identical to table 3.5 except I use the full sample. We can see from
column 3 that the deviation from trend in the control time series is positive and
statistically different from zero. Provided we believe our estimate of the trend satisfies
counterfactual forecast unbiasedness, we can take this as evidence of spillovers in the
larger sample. I am aware of no other institutional feature of Chicago during this time
period which could explain such systematic deviations in the control group around
treatment dates; hence, spillovers seem to be the most likely conclusion.
Table 3.5: Testing for Spillovers - Restricted Sample
Total Crime
(1) (2) (3)
Demolitions Within 4500 Meters −0.46 −0.51 −0.34
(0.57) (0.25) (0.29)
Demolitions Outside 4500 Meters 0.30
(0.27)
Mean of Dependent Variable 4.37 4.37 4.37
Block Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Time FE x Risk Set Yes No No
Time Polynomial x Risk Set No Yes No
Block Specific Time Polynomial No No Yes
Observations 11,760 11,760 11,760
Adjusted R2 0.45 0.53 0.64
Note: Sample includes only those blocks that ever experience a demolition event within 50 meters.
Column 1 includes block and time-period by risk-set fixed effects to replicate identification via dif-in-
dif. Column 2 replaces the time-period by risk-set fixed effects with risk set specific cubic polynomials
in time, showing that this particular specification of the time trend does not appreciable impact the
dif-in-dif point estimate. Column 3 replaces the time-period by risk-set fixed effects with block
specific cubic polynomials in t to isolate the time series variation. Standard errors are clustered at
the risk set level.
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Table 3.6: Testing for Spillovers - Full Sample
Total Crime
(1) (2) (3)
Demolitions within 4500 Meters 0.007 0.007 −0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Demolitions outside 4500 Meters 0.008
(0.002)
Mean of Dependent Variable 4.37 4.37 4.37
Block Fixed Effects Yes Yes No
Time FE x Risk Set Yes No No
Time Polynomial x Risk Set No Yes No
Block Specific Time Polynomial No No Yes
Observations 4,115,832 4,115,832 4,115,832
Adjusted R2 0.557 0.560 0.644
Note: Sample includes all blocks. Column 1 includes block and time-period by risk-set fixed effects
to replicate identification via dif-in-dif. Column 2 replaces the time-period by risk-set fixed effects
with risk set specific cubic polynomials in time, showing that this particular specification of the time
trend does not appreciable impact the dif-in-dif point estimate. Column 3 replaces the time-period
by risk-set fixed effects with block specific cubic polynomials in t to isolate the time series variation.
Standard errors are clustered at the risk set level.
3.4.2 Relating Spillovers to Migration and the Distribution of Gang Ter-
ritory
The popular accounts of the impact of Hope VI in Chicago suggest that public hous-
ing demolitions drove gang members out of traditionally defined territories, forcing
them into areas where they would be more likely to come into conflict with rival
gangs. To see if the data support this account, I first show that when a public hous-
ing demolition occurs within a gang’s territory, this well predicts unexpected violence
at the border, which suggests that the distribution of gang territory played a role in
the generation of spillovers. I then show that coarse relocation data on 10/99 resi-
dents at the community area level are positively correlated with time series deviations
around demolition dates. While imperfect due to the possibility that choices of re-
location neighborhood induce selection bias, this result provides suggestive evidence
that demolition induced migration played a role in spillovers.
First, I examine whether demolition waves where a public housing building is
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demolished within a gang’s territory predict unexpected increases in crime at the
gang border. I specify the counterfactual path of crime y(b, t) with block specific
month of year fixed effects, block fixed effects, and a block specific cubic polynomial
as in equation (3.15). Let g ∈ G denote a gang, and let χg = {tw′ . . . tw∗} be the set of
treatment dates such that a building contained inside gang g’s border was demolished
on that date. I will specify the function S() as:
S(Dbw, b, t) = ΩX˜bw +
∑
g∈G
βg1tw∈χg + γg1tw∈χgdbg (3.18)
Here dbg is the distance from the centroid of block b to the border of gang g, and
X˜bw = {1Dbw∈[i,j]}[i,j] is a vector of controls for distance to demolition accounting for
the direct effect of demolition, with distance bins defined identically to those used for
the generalized dif-in-dif specification from section 3.3.2.7
Plugging (3.18) into the general model (3.1) yields:
ybt = y(b, t) + ΩXbt + βZt + γZtDb + bt (3.19)
Here, Zt = {zgt}g is a vector such that zgt counts the number demolitions that have
occurred within gang g’s territory as of time t, Db = {dbg}g is the corresponding vector
of distances from block b’s centroid to the boundary of gang g, and Xbt = {zbt(i, j)}[i,j]
controls for distance to demolition, with each zbt(i, j) counting any demolition inside
the [i, j] distance ring relative to block b.8 Note that, in practice, I define each gang’s
territory for the purposes of this regression according to the boundaries observed in
2004. This is because I do not have access to gang maps prior to that year. For this
reason, I also restrict the data to crimes and demolitions that occur post-2003. There
7Including controls for distance to demolition makes sense conceptually, since proximity to the
gang border is predictive of distance to demolition; however, the results in this section are robust to
their exclusion.
8This variable is identical to the zbt(i, j) variables described in section 3.3.2.
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are 8 gangs that ever experience a demolition inside their territory over this period.
Note that the parameters of interest are the βg’s, which give average unexpected crime
at the border of gang g following the demolition of a block within gang g’s territory.
I start with a slightly modified version of equation (3.19) where I restrict attention
to a single gang (the Gangster Disciples9) and estimate the relationship between bor-
der distance and residual crime semi-parametrically by binning the distance variable
from equation (3.19) into 20 quantiles of the Gangster Disciple border distance dis-
tribution. The coefficients from the interaction of these border distance bins with the
variable counting demolitions inside Gangster Disciple territory are plotted in figure
3·9. The purpose of figure 3·9 is to show semi-parametrically the relationship between
distance to the border and unexpected crime following a demolition. Visually, figure
3·9 suggests that there are large spikes in unexpected crime at the Gangster Disci-
ple border following the demolition of a public housing project inside the Gangster
Disciple territory.
Table 3.7 confirms our suspicion from the visualization by presenting the full set
of results from equation (3.19). Columns 1-8 of table 3.7 show results from individual
regressions where I only consider the impact of demolitions inside the indicated gangs
territory. Examining the border impact coefficients, four are positive and statistically
significant. The remaining four are not statistically significant. Column 9 shows
the joint estimation using all gangs. While we should interpret these estimates with
caution due to obvious concerns related to multiple testing, jointly these estimates
suggest that blocks at the border of certain gangs’ territory experienced unexpected
increases in crime in response to public housing demolition.
To assess the relationship between demolition and resident migration, I specify
the counterfactual trend y(b, t) with a block specific polynomial as in equation (3.15),
9I choose this gang for the simplified analysis since they experience demolitions inside their
territory on 30 distinct dates over this period, which is the most of any gang. The next most is 6.
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Figure 3·9: Unexpected Crime at the Gangster Disciple Border
Note: The y-axis is crime net of census block fixed effects, a block specific cubic polynomial in t,
block specific month of year fixed effects, and controls for distance to any demolition. The x-axis
is distance to the 2004 Gangster Disciple border. Each point on the graph is the coefficient from a
variable that counts the number of demolition dates when a building was torn down inside Gangster
Disciple territory interacted with a distance to Gangster Disciple border indicator. Each distance bin
contains 5% of the data. These coefficients are plotted against the mid-point of the corresponding
distance to border bin. Thus the points describe, at each of 20 distances relative to the Gangster
Disciple border, average unexpected crime following the demolition of a public housing building
inside Gangster Disciple territory. The line is a non-parametric fit of the distance to border bin
coefficients relative to the mid-point of the distance bin.
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Table 3.7: Demolition and Crime at the Gang Border
Total Crime
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Gangster Disciple 0.0123 0.0104
(0.0040) (0.0038)
Black Disciple 0.0214 0.0062
(0.0090) (0.0098)
Black P. Stones 0.0779 0.0789
(0.0153) (0.0178)
Four Corner Hustlers −0.0039 −0.0022
(0.0087) (0.0087)
Mafia Insane Vice-Lords −0.0273 −0.0141
(0.0152) (0.0143)
New Breed −0.0080 0.0042
(0.0100) (0.0106)
Satan Disciples 0.0907 0.0514
(0.0263) (0.0259)
Traveling Vice-Lords 0.0111 −0.0138
(0.0090) (0.0098)
Total Demolition Dates 30 5 2 6 3 4 1 3 36
Observations 3,233,868 3,233,868 3,233,868 3,233,868 3,233,868 3,233,868 3,233,868 3,233,868 3,233,868
Adjusted R2 0.6520 0.6519 0.6520 0.6519 0.6519 0.6519 0.6519 0.6520 0.6520
Note: The sample is restricted to the years 2004-2014. The gang border is defined using the 2004
gang map. All specifications include a block specific intercept, a block specific cubic trend, block
specific month of year fixed effects, and controls for distance to any demolition. All specifications
include a count of gang specific demolitions interacted with distance to the gang border. For clarity,
I report only the border intercepts; hence, the coefficients in this table are properly interpreted as
the unexpected increase in crime at the gang border when a building is demolished within that
gang’s territory. “Total demolition dates,” refers to the total number of distinct treatment waves
where at least one building was knocked down within an included gang’s territory. Standard errors
are clustered at the community area level.
and I further specify the spillover function as:
S(Dbw, b, t) = β1t>tw + γWc(b) (3.20)
Where Wc(b) contains variables related to resident relocation measured at the com-
munity area level c(b). Plugging these into the the general model (3.1) gives the
estimation equation:
ybt = y(b, t) + βzt + γWc(b)zt + bt (3.21)
The coefficient γ thus tells us whether the resident relocation patterns at the commu-
nity area level are predictive of unexpected time series deviations in the crime trend.
Table 3.8 contains the results.
Column 2 of table 3.8 shows that the net change in public housing residents at
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Table 3.8: Resident Relocation and Time Series Deviations
Total Crime
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Demolitions 0.0002 0.0012 0.0020 0.0013
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0017) (0.0022)
Demolitions x Change in 10/99 Residents 0.0099
(0.0050)
Demolitions x Total Residents in 2010 0.0001
(0.0215)
Demolitions x Voucher Residents 2010 0.0224
(0.0357)
Demolitions x Mixed Income Residents 2010 −0.0108
(0.0221)
Demolitions x Rehab Housing Residents 2010 −0.0352
(0.0415)
Demolitions x 10/99 Residents in 1999 −0.0071 −0.0005
(0.0090) (0.0086)
Observations 4,115,832 4,115,832 4,115,832 4,115,832
Adjusted R2 0.6440 0.6440 0.6440 0.6440
Note: The sample here is restricted to the years 2001 to 2010. All specifications include a block
specific intercept, block specific month of year fixed effects, and a cubic polynomial in t. Standard
errors are clustered at the community area level.
the community area level is positively correlated with unexpected changes in crime in
the time series. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that demolition induced
migration is a channel for spillovers. However, the relationship is weak in general and,
as columns (3) and (4) demonstrate, sensitive to how we measure resident relocation.
Finally, it is not clear that even with better relocation data and more precise estimates
whether it would be appropriate to interpret these estimates as causal, since relocation
neighborhood might be determined by expectations over future crime trends.
Taken together, these results show that the demolition of a public housing project
within a gang’s border is typically followed by unexpected increases in crime at the
gang’s border. This is consistent with the anecdotal accounts which suggest that
the public housing demolition led to causal increases in crime as gang members were
forced to expand into new markets.
124
3.5 Conclusion
Did the demolitions that occurred as part of Chicago’s Plan for Transformation re-
duce aggregate crime city-wide? While estimates from a difference in difference design
suggest large causal decreases, these results are likely biased by equilibrium spillovers.
Over the course of 63 treatment periods, the control group exhibits systematic, unex-
pected increases in total crime following demolition dates. This suggests that either
there were unobservable, systematic, city-wide aggregate shocks coincident with de-
molition or that the control group is contaminated by spillovers. Since I am aware
of no institutional feature of Chicago over the relevant time period that could ex-
plain such systematic deviations, control group contamination seems to be the most
plausible conclusion.
Taking an aggregate time series approach seriously suggests that demolitions
caused increases in criminal activity. In the short run, demolitions appear to raise
aggregate crime by 0.5% per month relative to baseline crime levels, with no evidence
of compensatory long run reductions. Anecdotal accounts suggest that this increase is
at least partially due to demolition induced migration across gang territorial bound-
aries. Suggestive evidence from time series variation in the micro-data corroborates
this story.
However, it is important to note that this analysis will not pick up other benefits
to public housing demolition not captured in the contemporaneous crime data. For
example, Chetty et al. (2016) show that long term benefits to moving residents out of
public housing may accrue across generations. It follows that even if public housing
demolitions increase crime in the short term, it may still be worthwhile as a policy
on a cost-benefit basis in the inter-generational long run.
More generally, this paper demonstrates that applied micro work could greatly
benefit from increased attention to pure time series variation. While it is rare to find
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economy wide aggregate variables that are not co-determined, interventions admin-
istered at the micro level at many points in time may exhibit plausibly exogenous
variation in treatment timing even when they do not exhibit plausibly exogenous
variation in cross-sectional assignment. In fact, this must be true in a difference-
in-difference design if the target parameter is externally valid in the sense that it
corresponds to the expected impact of treatment in an average time period. Along
these lines, I provide population level conditions under which time series variation
in the control group around treatment dates can provide evidence of spillovers even
when parallel trends would otherwise be satisfied.
A natural next step is to ask whether or not it is possible to construct a reason-
able difference in difference comparison group even when we suspect spillovers exist.
Intuitively, we would like to find a principled method to select a subset of the control
group such that the average forecast residual around treatment dates goes to zero.
Provided the control group subset constructed in this manner well approximates the
trend the full control group would have experienced in the absence of contamination,
and provided the standard difference in difference assumptions continue to hold, we
should be able to identify the average treatment effect. This, however, is left for
future work.
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Appendix A
Supplementary Material for Chapter 1
A.1 Data Appendix
A.1.1 Primary Data Sources
Lottery Data
The lottery data I collected came in many forms. Most districts were able to provide
me with a spreadsheet that contained the relevant information. One district only
maintained paper records and recorded the results of the lottery on the physical
record. I compiled these by hand. Another district only maintained records in the
form of digital copies of letters which were mailed to student families and which
contained the outcome of the lottery. I also compiled these by hand.
As discussed in the body of the paper, a number of districts did not document
their lottery process in sufficient detail to warrant inclusion in my sample. Typically,
this was due to the fact that every student in the lottery eventually received an of-
fer of admission (after earlier admitted students declined), and the secretary wrote
over the initial results of the lottery when indicating who received these later offers.
There was also one district that used a complex scheme of highlighting, strikeouts,
bold, italics, and shading cells to encode information related to their lottery based ad-
missions process. Reverse engineering the outcomes of this lottery ultimately proved
impossible.
From the lottery records, I extracted student names, application grade and year,
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lottery preferences (e.g. sibling or late application), and the results of the lottery. As
discussed in the main text, this resulted in four different lottery instrument types.
Nearly every district used what I term an “initial offer” instrument where-by some
students were randomly selected and initial offers of admission made to the family
either via email or phone call. I coded this as a binary indicator. Some districts then
randomized students to positions on a waitlist. I code the numerical value of these
positions as a “waitlist number” instrument. There is one district which, for one
lottery in my data, did not use waitlist numbers and instead randomly chose students
from the waitlist pool. I code this as a binary “wait list offer” instrument. Some of of
the first stage and reduced form results using this instrument look odd. However, due
to the small sample size involved, and the fact that all important results in the paper
go through when I drop this instrument, I am not concerned. However, omitting the
instrument due to odd looking results could, in theory, create a garden of forking
paths problem (Gelman and Loken, 2013). For this reason, I include the instrument
in my main specifications. Finally, there was one district which assigned students
random lottery numbers but did not record which students received initial offers. I
code the random number as a ‘lottery number” instrument.
When available, I also extracted date of birth and town of residence from the
lottery data, since these were useful for matching. Town of residence was frequently
misspelled. I corrected these by hand as necessary. Observations in the lottery
data frequently contained a census designated place rather than a town of residence
that would be recognizable in the state data. Where this occurred, I used zip code
and publicly available information online to determine the town in which the census
designated place was located, and replaced the census designated place with the
appropriate town. However, all by-hand corrections (town misspellings and census
designated place replacements) are documented in the code.
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As discussed in the text, a number of the lotteries exhibited idiosyncrasies. For
example, there was one district which provided me a spreadsheet of lottery results
that had a column labeled “admission rounds” and the numbers 1-3 entered into
the corresponding cells below. The secretary I spoke with was unable to recall what
this information was in reference to. For this reason, I coded indicators for each
admission round and included them in the relevant specifications. There was also
one district that, after the initial lottery results, asked students whether they wanted
to be included on the waitlist before randomly assigning them waitlist numbers. I
created indicators for this and included them in my main specifications. Omission of
these idiosyncratic lotteries does not alter the results.
MCAS Data
The state of Massachusetts provided MCAS data to me for the spring test adminis-
tration spanning the years 2002 through 2017. In all cases, I drop students taking
alternative assessments. For years 2002-2014, I use raw MCAS scores and standardize
them within year to have mean zero and standard deviation one. In 2015 and 2016,
the state piloted a next generation assessment based on the Partnership for Assess-
ment of Readiness for College Careers (PARCC). For those years, some students in
the state took PARCC, some took MCAS, and others took both. In 2017, the state
transitioned entirely to PARCC. Thus for the years 2015-2017, I take the raw MCAS
scores wherever available. When unavailable, I use use raw PARCC scores. For the
2015 test administration, the state was unable to locate raw PARCC scores, so I used
PARCC theta scores in their place.1 Within each of these years, I standardized the
test scores at the test-type level (raw MCAS, raw PARCC, PARCC theta) to have
mean zero and standard deviation one. In addition, I include indicators for test types
1These are transformed versions of the raw scores meant to adjust for question difficulty using
techniques from item response theory.
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(raw MCAS, raw PARCC, PARCC theta) in the relevant specifications. For specifi-
cations that include lagged or baseline test scores, I also include lagged or baseline
test type indicators.2
SIMS Data
The state of Massachusetts provided information on the universe of public school stu-
dents in Massachusetts spanning academic years 2001-2002 through 2016-2017. This
data contained information on student names, gender, birthdates, assigned schools,
grade, attendance, race, ethnicity, disabilities, and free and reduced price lunch sta-
tus. It also contained a variable describing which students were enrolled in a district
via the inter-district school choice program. For years 2006-07 through 2016-17, stu-
dents could identify as multiple races (e.g. black and white). Prior to 2006, students
were restricted to choosing only one. For this reason, I code the race / ethnicity
variables as a series of indicators that take a value of one if a student in the given
year identified as belonging to the given category. Since all specifications in the main
text include year fixed effects, this will account for the fact that the meaning of the
variables changes over time.
SCS Data
The state of Massachusetts provided me with student course scheduling data spanning
academic years 2010-11 through 2016-2017. From this data, I determine which courses
are AP classes by searching for “AP” within the course name. The remaining course
designations I use in the paper (advanced, general, and remedial) come from a variable
already contained in the data. I then count the number of each course type each
student in the state is enrolled in during the given academic year.
2The one exception here is the regressions for post-secondary outcomes. I do not include these
indicators here since all test scores observed at baseline for this sample are raw MCAS. Hence, they
are unnecessary.
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NSC Data
The state of Massachusetts contracts with the National Student Clearinghouse (NSC)
to produce data on post-secondary outcomes for students. The NSC data itself con-
tains information on college enrollment and completion from over 3,600 universities
enrolling 98% of all college students in the United States. The data I received was
split into two folders based on whether the student had or had not graduated from
high-school at the time NSC conducted the search. I use this division to determine
whether or not a student graduated from high-school. I code variables for two-year
and four-year college attendance based on enrollment dates contained in the national
student clearinghouse data. Because only a small minority of my sample would have
an on-time four year college graduation date of 2016 or earlier, I do not examine
outcomes related to college completion.
A.1.2 Data Matching
To match the state data to the lottery data, I first looked for students with exact
first and last name matches in the appropriate grade and year. When available, I
wold break ties with date of birth, followed by town of residence as necessary. If
town of residence was unavailable and I was unable to produce a unique match using
birthdate, I would look for unique first name last name matches within the empirical
distribution of towns such that I either observe a student apply from that town in the
lottery data, or I observe a student enroll from that town in the state data. When
I was unable to break a tie in this manner, I would consider the student unmatched
and drop them from the data.
When I was unable to find an exact first name / last name match anywhere in
the state, I would calculate the Levenshtein distance3 between the first and last name
3Given two strings “a” and “b”, the Levenshtein distance calculates the number of insertions,
deletions and substitutions necessary to turn b into a.
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of the observation in my lottery data and the rest of the state and restrict the state
data to observations falling within a distance of 2.
A.1.3 Additional Descriptive Statistics
Lottery Characteristics
In this section, I present some additional descriptive information related to the lotter-
ies. Figure A·1 is a histogram of lotteries by the number of students involved. Figure
A·2 shows the distribution of lotteries over time.
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Figure A·1: Distribution of Lotteries by Size
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Student Characteristics
Figure A.1 presents summary statistics for the 85 non-initial offer lottery students
dropped from the corresponding summary statistics table in the main text.4 The
column labeled “All Lotteries” provides descriptive statistics for the entire lottery
sample used in estimation. The column labeled “Initial Offer Lotteries” includes only
students involved in initial offer lotteries and hence replicates the “Lottery Sample”
column from the corresponding table in the main text. And the “Other Lotteries”
column provides summary statistics for the 85 students that were dropped.
4Recall that these students were dropped when calculating the numbers in the table purely for
convenience when calculating complier averages. Unless otherwise specified, they are used in all
regressions in the main text.
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Table A.1: Student Selection: Full Sample
All Lotteries Initial Offer Lotteries Other Lotteries
Math 0.12 0.11 0.27
ELA 0.15 0.14 0.28
White 88% 90% 92%
Black 9% 10% 4%
Hispanic 5% 5% 2%
Male 47% 46% 51%
Subsidized Lunch 21% 21% 14%
Limited English 0% 0% 0%
Disability 11% 11% 9%
Days Attended 168.16 167.91 170.81
Observations 966 881 85
A.1.4 Differential Attrition
For the specifications in the main body of the paper, I restrict the sample to students
for whom I observe a baseline and at least one post-lottery test score. Thus for
this sample, differential attrition is problematic if winning the lottery affects the
probability of a student subsequently appearing in the state data. For example, if
high ability lottery losers attrit by leaving for private schools, the post-lottery winners
would be higher ability on average, and this could potentially cause imbalance along
baseline characteristics for the estimation sample.
To check for this possibility, I start with the raw lottery data and restrict it to the
sample of students I am ever able to match in the state data. I drop students that
received sibling preference or applied late. I then regress an indicator for whether I
observe a student in the post-lottery period on the lottery instruments and a vector
of lottery fixed effects.5 Table A.2 presents the results. Columns (1) presents results
for the entire lottery sample. Column (2) controls for demographic characteristics.
Column (3) further restricts the sample to students I observe in the data at baseline
5As mentioned in the main body of the paper, there was one lottery that had “admission rounds”
indicated in their spreadsheets without further explanation. I also include indicators where this
happens. There was also one district that asked lottery losers whether they wanted to be included
on the waitlist before randomly assigning waitlist numbers. I include indicators where this happens
as well.
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and includes additional baseline controls.6 Column (4) further restricts the sample
to the set of student for whom I observe a baseline test score and includes these
baseline scores as controls. In all cases, it would appear that winning the lottery is
unrelated to the probability a student subsequently appears in the state data. Thus
it is unlikely that the results in the main body of the text are affected by differential
attrition.
Table A.2: Predicting Post-Lottery Observation
Observed After Choice Year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Initial Offer −0.0003 0.0004 0.0001 0.003
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
Waitlist Offer 0.069 0.075 0.056 0.046
(0.048) (0.050) (0.045) (0.037)
Lottery Number −0.0002 −0.0003 −0.001 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Waitlist Number −0.002 −0.002 −0.003 −0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Demographic Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Baseline Controls No No Yes Yes
Baseline Test Scores No No No Yes
Probability Observed Post-Choice Year 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94
Observations (Students) 1920 1920 1586 1305
Adjusted R2 0.665 0.665 0.731 0.770
A.1.5 Falsification Tests
In this section, I present the results of a standard IV falsification test for Math
and ELA test scores. Intuitively, if the IV exclusion restriction holds, then for sub-
samples or time periods where the first stage is known to be zero, we should not find
a reduced form relationship between the instrument and the outcome. In the school
choice context, this means there should be no relationship between winning a lottery
offer and pre-lottery test scores.
Consistent with the covariate imbalance discussed in the main body of the paper,
I find that the lotteries do not pass this test. As I argue in the main body of the
paper, it is likely that this is due either to sampling variation or poor record keeping
6Indicators for any disability, subsidized lunch status, and english language learners
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on the part of some districts with respect to things like sibling preference. Given the
strong anti-discrimination language of the state legislation, the timing of how lotteries
were conducted , discussions I had with district administrators related to their lottery
process, and the incentives around sharing data with me, I believe it is unlikely that
the failure here is due to cheating. In any event, whatever the cause of the imbalance,
I need to correct for it to achieve consistent estimates of the parameter of interest.
Importantly, I find that conditional on a lagged test score, there is no relationship
between baseline scores and the results of the lottery. I start by restricting the sample
to the set of students I can match to the state data who were not indicated as receiving
a sibling preference in the lottery or as having applied late and who also have at least
one pre-lottery test score. I then regress the most recent pre-lottery test score on
the vector of lottery instruments and a set of lottery fixed effects.7 Tables A.3 and
A.4 present the results. Column (1) presents the otherwise uncontrolled comparison.
Column (2) shows results with the inclusion of other baseline demographic controls.
Column (3) restricts the sample to the set of students for whom I observe at least
2 test scores prior to the lottery and presents results for the otherwise uncontrolled
comparison. Column (4) adds baseline controls to the two-test sample. Column
(5) uses the two-test sample but exchanges the baseline demographic controls for a
second pre-lottery test score. And Column (6) presents results for the two-test sample
controlling both for demographic characteristics and the second pre-lottery test score.
As we can see from tables A.3 and A.4, conditioning on an earlier test score
substantially reduces unexplained variation and eliminates the relationship between
the lottery vector and the baseline test scores. For this reason, all lottery specifications
7As mentioned in the main body of the paper, there was one lottery that had “admission rounds”
indicated in their spreadsheets without further explanation. I also include indicators where this
happens. There was also one district that asked lottery losers whether they wanted to be included
on the waitlist before randomly assigning waitlist numbers. I include indicators where this happens
as well.
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in the main text are restricted to the sample where I observe at least one test score
prior to randomization and include an average of pre-lottery test scores as a control.
Table A.3: Falsification Test: Math
Math Score (Baseline)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial Offer 0.17 0.08 0.15 0.07 0.01 0.001
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04)
Waitlist Offer 0.39 0.10 0.21 0.07 −0.15 −0.16
(0.40) (0.36) (0.34) (0.36) (0.21) (0.21)
Lottery Number 0.01 0.004 0.01 0.003 −0.001 −0.0004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Waitlist Number 0.003 0.01 0.001 0.01 −0.01 −0.005
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Sample All All 2-test 2-test 2-test 2-test
Baseline Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Pre-Baseline Test Score No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 1,275 1,275 1,036 1,036 1,036 1,036
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.23 0.71 0.72
Table A.4: Falsification Test: ELA
ELA Score (Baseline)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial Offer 0.15 0.08 0.16 0.10 0.02 0.02
(0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04)
Waitlist Offer 0.24 0.06 0.12 0.08 −0.04 0.02
(0.37) (0.32) (0.33) (0.32) (0.22) (0.23)
Lottery Number 0.01 0.003 0.01 0.003 0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Waitlist Number −0.01 −0.01 −0.02 −0.01 −0.02 −0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Sample All All 2-test 2-test 2-test 2-test
Baseline Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Pre-Baseline Test Score No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 1,275 1,275 1,036 1,036 1,036 1,036
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.29 0.12 0.30 0.61 0.63
A.2 Supplemental Results
A.2.1 District Take-up
Table A.5 presents a series of regressions where I predict a year-by-district indica-
tor for participation in inter-district choice since 2009 with district level observable
characteristics. Column one estimates the model with OLS and includes nearly all
observables at my disposable: demographic composition of students and teachers,
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average test scores, rates of suspensions and unexcused absences, an urban indicator,
a METCO participation indicator, and per-pupil expenditures across 11 categories.
Column two presents results from a post-lasso regression where model selection was
performed over the set of variables included in column one. The variables displayed
in the table are those which were Lasso selected. Columns three and four provide the
results from regressions using the time varying observables from columns one and two
but with the inclusion of district and time fixed effects. In effect, columns three and
four ask, ”Are trends in the predictors related to changes in the status of choice?”
While trends in the predictors appear to be unrelated to the decision to participate
in choice,8 in levels there are a number of economically meaningful covariates. This
suggests that over the short term, participation in choice is driven largely by the
geographic distribution of covariates. While the most important predictors appear
to be average test scores, I will not speculate on what that implies for the decision
to participate. Test scores are highly correlated with many other observables, which
makes the relationship difficult to interpret. On the other hand, other economically
meaningful covariates such as the student teacher ratio and per-pupil expenditures
appear to agree with informal conversations I’ve had with district administrators.
The decision to participate in choice is often driven by a desire to supplement revenue
subject to class-size constraints.
8At least, this is true over a 7 year time-span.
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Table A.5: Predictors of District Participation
Accepting New Choice Students
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Students (thousands) −0.04 −0.01 0.01 0.04
(0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04)
Average Math Score −0.30 −0.39 0.04 0.05
(0.16) (0.16) (0.07) (0.07)
Average ELA Score −0.18 −0.15 −0.04 −0.04
(0.15) (0.16) (0.05) (0.05)
100x(Fraction White) 0.01 −0.001 −0.01 −0.01
(0.01) (0.004) (0.01) (0.005)
100x(Fraction Asian) 0.01 −0.002 −0.01 −0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
100x(Fraction Hispanic) −0.01 −0.01 −0.004 −0.004
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
100x(Fraction ELL) −0.001 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004
(0.01) (0.01) (0.003) (0.003)
100x(Fraction HQ Teachers) −0.01 −0.01 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Student-Teacher Ratio −0.07 −0.07 −0.002 −0.002
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Per-Pupil-Spending: Instruction −0.08 −0.05 0.04 0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Per-Pupil-Spending: Pupil Services 0.15 0.23 0.03 0.04
(0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
Per-Pupil-Spending: Teachers −0.01 −0.001 −0.05 −0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
Metco Students (tens) −0.01 −0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.005) (0.005) (0.02) (0.02)
Estimation Method OLS Post-Lasso OLS OLS
Additional Variables Yes No Yes No
District Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Dependent Variable Mean 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55
F-Stat (Projected) 14.61 26.43 0.79 1.11
Observations 2,280 2,280 2,280 2,280
Observations (Districts) 285 285 285 285
Adjusted R2 0.34 0.31 0.88 0.88
A.2.2 Robustness Tests
Omitting Idiosyncratic Lotteries
In this section, I present evidence that the results are not driven by lotteries with
idiosyncratic randomization procedures. Recall that there was one lottery in my data
were the district had labeled “Admission Rounds” in the lottery records without
explanation as to how these were used. For the specifications in the main text, I
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control for this using admission round indicators. In addition, there was one district
that, after initially randomly selecting students to receive initial offers, would ask
students whether or not they wanted to be assigned a random waitlist number. For
the specifications in the main text, I control for this with an indicator for the students
who are affected. Table A.6 presents robustness checks where I omit these lotteries.
Columns (1) and (4) replicated the specifications from the main text. Columns (2)
and (5) drop the lottery with admission rounds. Columns (3) and (6) drop the waitlist
request lotteries.
Table A.6: Omitting Idiosyncratic Lotteries
Standardized Test Score
Math Math Math ELA ELA ELA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Choice 0.16 0.16 0.16 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
Admission Round Lotteries Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Waitlist Request Lotteries Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Observations 1,705 1,683 1,611 1,705 1,683 1,610
Observations (Students) 966 944 894 969 947 896
Adjusted R2 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.56 0.56 0.56
Results Using Only Initial Offer Instrument
In this section, I present evidence that the results are robust to omitting the less
frequently observed instruments. I do this by restricting the sample to the set of
lotteries that used initial offer instruments and replicating the main specification
using only the initial offer instrument. Table A.7 shows the results. Columns (1) and
(3) replicate the main specification using all instruments. Columns (2) and (4) drop
students that were not involved in initial offer lotteries, and only uses the initial offer
lottery in the first stage.
140
Table A.7: Initial Offer Lotteries
Standardized Test Score
Math Math ELA ELA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Choice 0.16 0.18 −0.01 −0.01
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
F-Stat Excluded Instruments 120.9 219.1 120.1 213.5
Instruments All Initial Offer All Initial Offer
Observations 1,705 1,559 1,705 1,559
Observations (Students) 966 881 969 883
Adjusted R2 0.66 0.65 0.56 0.56
Specifications with Additional Controls
In this section, I present evidence that the results are robust to the inclusion of addi-
tional sets of controls. Table A.8 presents the results. Columns (1) and (4) replicate
the results from the main specification in the text. Columns (2) and (5) add con-
trols for demographic characteristics. These include race/ethnicity indicators as well
as indicators for whether the student received a subsidized lunch at baseline, had
any disability at baseline, or was labeled as an english language learner at baseline.
Columns (3) and (6) expand the sample to include all student years observed prior to
the lottery, and replaces all controls with year and student fixed effects. This speci-
fication is thus an IV dif-in-dif, and generates reduced form and first stage estimates
by comparing the trends in test scores and choice status across lottery winners and
losers relative to the date of the lottery. While the magnitudes of the estimates do
move in response to the change in specification, the basic results continue to hold.
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Table A.8: Additional Controls
Standardized Test Score
Math Math Math ELA ELA ELA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Choice 0.16 0.12 0.08 −0.01 −0.05 0.01
(0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05)
F-Stat Excluded Instruments 120.9 118.8 344.6 120.1 121.5 343.2
Lottery Controls Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Baseline Test Score Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Demographic Controls No Yes No No Yes No
Student Fixed Effect No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 1,705 1,705 5,151 1,705 1,705 5,207
Observations (Students) 966 966 966 969 969 969
Adjusted R2 0.66 0.68 0.78 0.56 0.59 0.71
A.2.3 Coursework Results: Intensive Margin
In this section, I present results on coursework using intensive margin variation.
Specifically, I replicate the specifications used to analyze coursework in the main
body of the text, but use as an outcome variable the number of classes of each type
the student was enrolled in. While noisy, the point estimates show that the number
of classes taken labeled general has also increased, which suggests that the course-
work substitution works by pushing students from remedial into general classes, and
from general classes into advanced or AP classes. Note that there is no adding up
constraint on these coefficients, since there are many classes in the data (e.g. gym
and music) that do not receive any of the three labels. This suggests that some of
the increases are also being driven by substitution away from non-academic classes.
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Table A.9: Intensive Margin Coursework Results
Number of Classes
AP Remedial General Advanced
Choice 0.16 −0.19 0.47 0.82
(0.11) (0.09) (0.43) (0.20)
Mean Dependent Variable 0.3 0.22 9.24 0.92
Observations 809 2,418 2,418 2,418
Observations (students) 470 933 933 933
Adjusted R2 0.26 0.12 0.22 0.33
A.3 Statistical Appendix
A.3.1 Additional Details of Heterogeneous Effect Estimation Procedure
To generate the consensus posterior modes of the heterogeneous effects that incorpo-
rate both the experimental and non-experimental variation, I proceed in five steps:
1. Estimate the center of the parent distribution.
2. Estimate the heterogenous effects.
3. Estimate the variance-covariance matrix of the parent distribution.
4. Estimate the asymptotic covariance matrix of the heterogeneous effects.
5. Calculate the posterior-modes.
Estimating the center of the parent distribution:
To recover the center of the experimental distribution βˆ0, I estimated the following
model on the lottery sample using two-stage least squares:
yit = δ0 + δ` + β0dit + γwWi + γxXit + it (A.1)
dit = δ
′
0 + δ
′
` + piZit + γ
′
wWi + γ
′
xXit + ηit (A.2)
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Where yit is the post-lottery test score of student i at time t, δ0 is an intercept, δ` is
a lottery fixed effect, dit is an indicator for whether student i appeared outside their
home district under the choice program at time t, Wi is the vector of baseline observ-
ables described in the main text, and Xit are the relevant margins of heterogeneity
as described in the body of the main text.
To recover the center of the non-experimental distribution βˆn0 = β̂0 + b0, I esti-
mated the following model on the non-experimental data using OLS:
yit = δh + δg + δt + β
n
0 dit + θxXit + uit (A.3)
Where δh is a home district fixed effect, δg is a grade fixed effect, and δt is a time
fixed effect.
Estimating the heterogenous effects.:
To recover the heterogeneous effect estimates, I first estimate the following model
on the lottery sample using two-stage least squares:
yit = δ0 + δ` + α
e
0dit + α
eXitdit + γwWi + γxXit + it (A.4)
dit = δ
′
0 + δ
′
` + pi0Zit + piXitZit + γ
′
wWi + γ
′
xXit + ηit (A.5)
I then estimate the following model on the non-experimental sample using ordinary
least squares:
yit = δh + δg + δt + α
n
0dit + α
nXitdit + θxXit + uit (A.6)
(A.7)
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And from there, I recover the observable heterogeneity as:
βˆe = αˆe0 + αˆ
eX (A.8)
βˆn = αˆn0 + αˆ
nX (A.9)
Where X = (X1t, . . . XEt) is the matrix of support points for covariates found in the
lottery sample.
Estimating the variance-covariance matrix of the parent distribution:
To estimate the variance-covariance matrix of the parent distribution, I calculate
Σˆ = cov(βˆe, βˆn).
Estimating the asymptotic covariance matrix of the heterogeneous effects:
As discussed in the main body of the text, I assume the off diagonal entries of
the asymptotic covariance matrix Ωk are zero. This is reasonable because I have
dropped the students appearing in the lottery sample from the non-lottery data when
estimating the non-experimental model. To recover the diagonal entries, observe that:
Ωk = diag(var(βˆ
e
k), var(βˆ
n
k )) = diag(X
′
itvar(αˆ
e)Xit, X
′
itvar(αˆ
n)Xit) (A.10)
Hence I recover Ωˆk by replacing var(αˆ
e) and var(αˆn) with standard sample analogues.
Calculating the posterior-modes:
Let θk =
[
βek
βnk
]
and θ0 =
[
β0
β0 + b0
]
, and recall that the hierarchical model induces
the following bayesian structure:
p(θk|θˆk) ∝ p(θˆk|θk)p(θk) (A.11)
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Then by the normality assumption on the parent distribution, the posterior distribu-
tion is given by N(µk,Γk) where:
Γk = (Σ
−1 + Ω−1k )
−1 (A.12)
µk = ΓkΩ
−1
k θˆk + ΓkΣ
−1θ0 (A.13)
And thus we can plug in in the empirical analogues Σˆ, Ωˆk, and θˆ0 to recover an
estimate of the consensus posterior mode µˆk.
Jack-knife and split sample procedures:
Ultimately, I recover the posterior modes because I wish to correlate them with
the application and take up behavior of students. For this reason, I estimate the
posterior-modes using a jack-knife procedure to ensure there is no mechanical cor-
relation between the treatment indicator and heterogeneous effects. The jack-knife
algorithm for the experimental data proceeds as follows:
1. Drop all students associated with lottery ` from the sample.
2. Estimate the pooled and heterogeneous experimental and non-experimental
models.
3. Estimate the joint covariance matrix of the parent distribution.
4. Use the estimated experimental and non-experimental models to predict the
heterogeneous effects of the students associated with lottery ` along with the
corresponding covariance matrices Ωk.
5. Calculate the posterior modes for the students associated with lottery `
To estimate the posterior modes of the heterogenous effects of students not con-
tained in the lottery data but who were eligible to apply, I use a split sample procedure
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where I divide the pool of eligible applicants in half. I use the first half of the potential
applicants to estimate the relevant models along with the joint covariance matrix. I
then predict the heterogeneous effects for the second half of students out of sample
using the models estimated on the first half and apply the shrinkage.
A.3.2 Properties
A general expression for the posterior modes:
For all empirical results in this paper, I have assumed the off-diagonal elements of
the joint covariance matrix Ωk are zero. This is justified because I do not include the
students in the lottery data in the non-experimental models. Under this assumption,
we can write the consensus posterior modes as:
βsk = β0 + αk(βˆ
e
k − β0) + δk(βˆnk − β0 − b0) (A.14)
αk =
φkn − ρ2
φknφ
k
e − ρ2
(A.15)
δk =
ρ (ω
k
e )
2
σeσn
φknφ
k
e − ρ2
(A.16)
Where Where ρ ≡ corr(βk, βk + bk) is the correlation between the experimental
and non-experimental estimands, φke ≡ σ
2
e+(ω
k
e )
2
σ2e
is the inverse of the weight you would
recover if applying a standard empirical-Bayes idea to the experimental data alone,
and φkn ≡ σ
2
n+(ω
k
n)
2
σ2n
is the inverse of the weight you would recover if applying a standard
empirical-Bayes idea to the non-experimental data alone.
Now I will provide general expressions for the weights when we relax the as-
sumption on the off-diagonal elements of the variance covariance matrix. First, I
will move to matrix notation. Let θk =
[
βek
βnk
]
and θ0 =
[
β0
β0 + b0
]
, Σ =
[
σ2e σ
2
en
σ2en σ
2
n
]
,
and Ωk =
[
(ωke )
2 (ωken)
2
(ωken)
2 (ωkn)
2
]
. Observe that we can write the posterior distribution of
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heterogeneous effect k as: θk ∼ N(µk,Γk) where:
Γk = (Σ
−1 + Ω−1k )
−1 (A.17)
µk = ΓkΣ
−1θ0 + ΓkΩ−1k θˆk = W0θ0 +W1θˆk (A.18)
Where W0 and W1 are weighting matrices. The expression for these matrices are:
W0 =
[
(ωke )
2(σ2n+(ω
k
n)
2)−(ωken)2(σ2en+(ωken)2)
(σ2e+(ω
k
n)
2)(σ2e+(ω
k
e )
2)−(σ2en+(ωken)2)2
σ2e(ω
k
en)
2−σ2en(ωke )2
(σ2n+(ω
k
n)
2)(σ2e+(ω
k
e )
2)−(σ2en+(ωken)2)2
σ2n(ω
k
en)
2−σ2en(ωkn)2
(σ2n+(ω
k
n)
2)(σ2e+(ω
k
e )
2)−(σ2en+(ωken)2)2
(ωkn)
2(σ2e+(ω
k
e )
2)−(ωken)2(σ2en+(ωken)2)
(σ2n+(ω
k
n)
2)(σ2e+(ω
k
e )
2)−(σ2en+(ωken)2)2
]
(A.19)
W1 =
[
σ2e(σ
2
n+(ω
k
n)
2)−σ2en(σ2en+(ωken)2)
(σ2n+(ω
k
n)
2)(σ2e+(ω
k
e )
2)−(σ2en+(ωken)2)2
σ2en(ω
k
e )
2−σ2e(ωken)2
(σ2n+(ω
k
n)
2)(σ2e+(ω
k
e )
2)−(σ2en+(ωken)2)2
σ2en(ω
k
n)
2−σ2n(ωken)2
(σ2e+(ω
k
n)
2)(σ2e+(ω
k
e )
2)−(σ2en+(ωken)2)2
σ2n(σ
2
e+(ω
k
e )
2)−σ2en(σ2en+(ωken)2)
(σ2n+(ω
k
n)
2)(σ2e+(ω
k
e )
2)−(σ2en+(ωken)2)2
]
(A.20)
The simplified expression can be found by setting ωken = 0 and rearranging the ex-
pression for the weights.
Consistency:
To see that the estimator is consistent under the same conditions as IV, observe
that as the IV sample E becomes large, then given standard regularity conditions
and a fixed non-experimental sample N , we have:
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plimE!1 ˆ0 =  0
plimE!1 ˆek =  k
plimE!1 ˆke =
plimE!1 ˆ2e + plimE!1(!ˆ
k
e )
2
plimE!1 ˆ2e
=
plimE!1 ˆ2e + 0
plimE!1 ˆ2e
= 1
plimE!1↵ˆk =
plimE!1 ˆkn   plimE!1⇢ˆ2
(plimE!1 ˆkn)(plimE!1 ˆke)  plimE!1⇢ˆ2
=
plimE!1 ˆkn   plimE!1⇢ˆ2
(plimE!1 ˆkn)(1)  plimE!1⇢ˆ2
= 1
plimE!1 ˆk =
(plimE!1⇢ˆ)(plimE!1(!ˆke )2)
plimE!1( ˆe ˆn)
plimE!1( ˆkn ˆke   ⇢ˆ2)
==
(plimE!1⇢ˆ)(0)
plimE!1( ˆe ˆn)
plimE!1( ˆkn ˆke   ⇢ˆ2)
= 0
(A.21)
And we can see that:
plimE!1 ˆsk =  0 + (1)( 
e
k    0) + (0)( ˆnk  \ 0 + b0) =  ek (A.22)
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And we can see that:
plimE!1 ˆsk =  0 + (1)( 
e
k    0) + (0)( ˆnk  \ 0 + b0) =  ek (A.22)
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Appendix B
Supplementary Material for Chapter 2
B.1 Data Appendix
B.1.1 SIMS Data
The SIMS data comes from information transmitted from school districts to the state
of Massachusetts. The data is reported to the state three times per year. The data
was provided to us in the form of 27 separate SPSS .sav files, each one corresponding
to one of the the three reporting periods over the course of the 9 years that span this
study. We used only the information as reported in Spring of the relevant academic
year. The unit of observation in these data files is the student. After standardizing
variable names to be common across years, we merged the files to generate a panel
data set a the student-year level. From there, we resolved inconsistencies in the
labeling of the data. For example, the gender variable sometimes coded males as
”M” and others as ”m”; we ensured such coding was common across all years.
B.1.2 MCAS Data
The state of Massachusetts provided MCAS data for the spring test administration
spanning the years 2008 through 2016. This data was transmitted to us in 9 separate
SPSS .sav files, one each year for the relevant period. In 2015 and 2016, the state
piloted a next generation assessment based on the Partnership for Assessment of
Readiness for College Careers (PARCC) standard. For this reason, the 2015 and
2016 data files that we initially received were missing a large number of student test
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scores. DESE then sent us two additional files which contained the missing scores.
After standardizing variable names across years, we merged the files into a panel data
set at the student-year level.
For the years 2008-2014, we use raw MCAS scores and standardize them within
year and grade to have mean zero and standard deviation one. For the years 2015
and 2016, some students in the state took PARCC, some took MCAS, and others
took both. For these years, we take the raw MCAS scores wherever available. The
state was unable to locate raw PARCC scores for this study. For the 2015 test we
used PARCC to MCASS concordance scores and for the 2016 test, we used PARCC
theta scores1 Within each of these years, we standardized the test scores at the test-
type (raw MCAS, PARCC concordance, PARCC theta) and grade level to have mean
zero and standard deviation one. In addition, we control for test types (raw MCAS,
PARCC concordance, PARCC theta) in the relevant value-added and school quality
specifications.
B.1.3 EPIMS Data
The EPIMS data comes from information transmitted from school districts to the
state of Massachusetts. The data was provided to us in 9 separate SPSS .sav files,
each one corresponding to an academic year. The unit of observation in this data is
a teacher-school-course-section-term. After standardizing variable names, we merged
the files into a single data set at the teacher-year-school-course-term level. From there,
we resolved inconsistencies in the data. For example, the gender variable sometimes
coded males as ”M” and others as ”m”; we ensured such coding was common across
all years.
1These are transformed versions of the raw scores meant to adjust for question difficulty using
techniques from item response theory.
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B.1.4 SCS Data
The SCS data come from information transmitted from school districts to DESE. It
was provided to us in 5 separate SPSS .sav files, once file for each year spanning 2011-
2016. Prior to 2011, the state did not collect data on student coursework. The unit of
observation in this data is a student-school-course-section-term. After standardizing
variable names, we merged the files into a single data set at the student-year-school-
course-section-term level. This data came to us with consistent year-to-year coding
and required virtually no cleaning after merging. The research assistant working on
this project was very excited about this development.
B.2 Estimation Details and Robustness
B.2.1 Bootstrap Details
Recall that all of our primary specifications involve estimation in three stages. First
we estimate test score residuals within teacher:
yijst = δjs + ρXist + ijst (B.1)
Where yijst is the test score of student i assigned to teacher j at school s in academic
year t, δjs is a teacher by school fixed effect, and Xist is the vector of controls detailed
in the body of the paper. We then construct test score residuals:
y˜ijst = yijst − ρˆXist ≈ δjs + ijst (B.2)
We then estimate the following correlated random effects model:
yˆijst = ωs + δjs + uijst (B.3)
Where ωs is fixed and δjs is random. In practice, we do this by estimating random
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effects models with a fixed intercept school by school.
We then take the the teacher value-added and school quality measures from this
model, and typically estimate models of the following form:
djst = f(δˆjs, ωˆs; β) + ηjst (B.4)
Where djst are indicators for whether teacher j made some kind of labor market
transition relative to school s at time t. The particular function f() we specify varies
from application to application as detailed in the main body of the text. To perform
inference correctly for equation (B.4), we need to account for the extra variability
that is induced when we estimate equations (B.1) and (B.3).
We account for the extra variability induced by the first stage estimation via a
parametric bootstrap. Let {δˆj}j∈J = δˆ and {ωˆs}s∈S = ωˆ, and make the standard
distributional assumptions necessary for inference on these parameters:
δˆ ∼ N(δ,ΣJ) (B.5)
ωˆ ∼ N(ω,ΣS) (B.6)
Where ΣS is a diagonal variance-covariance matrix and ΣJ is a block diagonal variance-
covariance matrix with the blocks corresponding to clusters at the level of the teacher
or school depending on what is appropriate in the given regression.
After estimating ΣˆS and ΣˆJ via standard methods, the bootstrap algorithm pro-
ceeds as follows:
1. Draw a bootstrap sample (δ˜, ω˜)n from the distributions in equations (B.5) and
(B.6) using the estimated variance-covariance matrices. Note that here n refers
to the bootstrap iteration.
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2. Estimate equation (B.4) using the bootstrap sample (δ˜, ω˜)n in place of the true
values and record the parameter of interest β˜n.
3. Repeat steps 1 and 2 for n ∈ N = {1 . . . N}. In practice, we set N equal to
1,000.
4. Calculate the relevant test statistics from the bootstrap distribution:
Fˆβˆ(β) =
1
N
∑
n∈N
1(β < β˜). (B.7)
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B.2.2 Extending the Primary Results Beyond 7 Years of Tenure
In this section, we present results calculated identically to figure 2·7, but for teachers
with greater than 7 years of tenure. First, to motivate the sample restrictions we
imposed in the main body of the text, we present a histogram of teachers by year of
tenure for the charter and public sectors.
As is clear from figure B·1, the support of the tenure variable is very different
across the two sectors. Beyond 7 years of tenure in the charter sector, no individual
year of tenure in either subject has more than 90 observations; after year 17, none
have more than 14 observations; and after year 27, there are zero. By contrast, in the
traditional public sector, there are at least 100 observations per year of tenure until
year 38, and there are at least 10 observations until year 45.
With these facts in mind, figure B·2 presents results for teachers with greater than
7 years of tenure. The results are similar to those presented in the main body of the
text.
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Figure B·1: Histogram of Teachers by Year of Tenure
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B.2.3 A More Restrictive Definition of High and Low Quality Schools
In this section, we present results that are identical to those shown in figure 2·8 except
that we use a more restrictive definition of ”high” and ”low” quality schools. In figure
2·8 a high quality school is one that fell within the top two quintiles of the within
sector distribution of school quality, and a low quality school fell within the bottom
two quintiles. In figure B·3 we restrict high and low quality schools to reflect the top
and bottom quintile respectively. The broad take-aways are virtually unchanged.
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Figure B·3: School Quality (Restrictive), Teacher Value Added, and
Attrition by Sector
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B.2.4 Differential Attrition by School Quality Across Subjects
In this section, we present results that are identical to those shown in figure 2·8 except
that we produce the figure separately for math and ELA teachers.
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Figure B·4: School Quality, Math Teacher Value Added, and Attrition
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Figure B·5: School Quality, ELA Teacher Value Added, and Attrition
by Sector
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B.2.5 Attrition Decomposition for ELA Teachers
In this section, we present results that are identical to figure 2·10 except that we
use ELA teachers instead of Math teachers. The results are broadly similar, with
the exception being that, among experienced teachers, high value-added teachers in
charters are also significantly more likely to exit the profession.
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Figure B·6: Exits versus Moves for ELA Teachers
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Appendix C
Supplementary Material for Chapter 3
C.1 Sources of Data and Summary Statistics
C.1.1 Crime Data
The Chicago Police Department makes detailed geospatial crime data available on
the City of Chicago Open Data Portal. This data is compiled by the Chicago Police
Department via their Citizen Law Enforcement Analysis and Reporting System and
contains the universe of reported crime from 2001 to the present day. These data
include variables describing the type of crime committed, the date the crime was
reported to have occurred, and the location where the crime was reported to have
happened. For a detailed description of the data, see Herrnstadt and Muehlegger
(2015).
I will note here that crime which is not reported does not appear in this nor any
other data. Thus all the parameters I estimate in this paper are properly interpreted
as reflecting the impact of housing demolition on reported crime. There are a number
of reasons why we might believe that the demolition of housing and subsequent relo-
cation of households throughout the city would lead to systematic reporting biases. I
will be able to do little to rule out such effects in general. However, the main conclu-
sions of this paper continue to hold when I restrict my attention to homicides which,
it has been frequently argued in the literature, should be less subject to reporting
bias concerns. Since all results are robust in this manner, I have dropped the reported
qualifier when referring to the target parameters in the body of the paper.
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I aggregate the incident level data by crime type to the census-block level at a
monthly frequency from 2001 to 2014. Thus the final unit of observation in this data
set is the block, crime-type, month. Figure C·1 shows the time-series of common
crimes from 2001 to 2014. Note that over this time period the total number of
reported crimes declined by 44%. Figure C·2 shows the geospatial distribution of
homicides per thousand people.
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Figure C·1: Common Crimes by Year
Note: All crimes are defined according to the Illinois Uniform Crime Reporting Codes. Theft,
battery, criminal damage, and narcotics violations are the four most commonly reported crimes in
the CPD data between the years 2001 and 2014. Yearly population estimates used to convert total
crime to per-capita crime come from FBI data. Results are reported in crimes per thousand Chicago
residents.
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 Thousand
Figure C·2: Geo-spatial Distribution of Homicides
Note: Polygons represent boundaries of Chicago community areas. Homicides per thousand Chicago
residents in each community area is determined by dividing total homicides from CPD data in 2001 by
community area population in the year 2000 as measured by the Census. I use year 2000 population
for the denominator since population measurements are unavailable at the necessary geographic
resolution in the Census for the year 2001.
Because the geo-spatial crime data begins in 2001, while the first public housing
demolitions occur in 1995, all cross-sectional comparisons in this paper are restricted
to demolitions that occur from 2001 onward. However, the FBI makes available in-
cident level homicide data as part of its supplemental homicide report back to 1976
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which I aggregate monthly to the Chicago Police Department level to supplement
the portions of the paper that rely on time-series variation ICPSR (2017). Unfortu-
nately, prior to 1991, the FBI data disagrees dramatically with other publicly available
sources on the number of murders per year in Chicago. For this reason, I drop mur-
ders in the FBI data occurring prior to January 1st, 1991. Figure C·3 shows the FBI
time series as compared to the Chicago Police Department time-series.
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Figure C·3: Per Capita Homicides by Year
Note: FBI homicides come from the FBI Supplemental Homicide Report and are defined to include
only homicides classified as “Murder and Non-negligent Manslaughter.” CPD homicides are defined
via the Illinois Uniform Crime Reporting Code. Yearly population estimates used to convert total
homicides to per-capita homicides come from the FBI data. Results are reported in crimes per
thousand Chicago residents.
C.1.2 Gang Maps
In December of 2016, I submitted a FOIA request to the Chicago Police Department
asking for geospatial information on gang territorial boundaries. In June of 2017,
CPD provided with me with 14 maps of gang territory, one for each year from 2004 to
2017. From 2004 to 2014, there were a total of 73 distinct gangs that CPD intelligence
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determined warranted inclusion in their maps at some point in time. Fourteen gangs
not present in the year 2004 enter the data for at least one year by 2014. Nine
gangs present in 2004 no longer appear in the data as of 2014. In an average year,
CPD intelligence mapped the territorial boundary of 58.3 gangs. Tables C.1 and C.2
provides summary statistics for the city areas controlled by select gangs.
Table C.1: Gang Territory Demographics
N Population Black White Hispanic Male Male U-18
No Gang 12095 91.31 0.16 0.68 0.18 0.49 0.11
(139.8) (0.31) (0.32) (0.22) (0.1) (0.07)
Black Disciples 834 113.69 0.97 0.01 0.02 0.45 0.16
(109.92) (0.11) (0.05) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07)
Black P. Stones 1603 133.09 0.88 0.06 0.05 0.46 0.14
(152.82) (0.24) (0.15) (0.14) (0.09) (0.07)
Gangster Disciples 4662 118.15 0.89 0.06 0.05 0.46 0.15
(130.2) (0.24) (0.17) (0.15) (0.09) (0.07)
Latin Kings 1276 198.21 0.1 0.49 0.56 0.5 0.15
(301.01) (0.19) (0.23) (0.31) (0.08) (0.06)
Two-Six 685 156.44 0.04 0.52 0.65 0.51 0.16
(109.15) (0.1) (0.21) (0.28) (0.06) (0.05)
Other Gang 5383 160.99 0.46 0.3 0.34 0.49 0.15
(144.52) (0.45) (0.3) (0.35) (0.09) (0.07)
Note: Summary statistics are averages across census-blocks using demographic data from the year
2000 Census. Black, white, hispanic, male, and male under 18 are block level population shares.
Rows correspond to census blocks that intersected with the indicated territory in the year 2004. “No
Gang” refers to census blocks that did not intersect with any gang’s territory. “Other Gang” refers
to all gangs not explicitly named. The remaining rows correspond to the 5 largest gangs by area.
Standard deviations in parentheses.
165
Table C.2: Crime in Gang Controlled Areas
Population Violence Theft Sex Crime Murder Narcotics Other
No Gang 91.31 1.96 4.95 0.22 0 0.51 3.14
(139.8) (4.36) (11.96) (1.74) (0.07) (2.7) (5.25)
Black Disciples 113.69 10.77 8.58 0.97 0.04 5.33 8.83
(109.92) (12.6) (8.98) (3) (0.22) (12.13) (15.14)
Black P. Stones 133.09 8.64 8.99 0.6 0.04 3.92 7.87
(152.82) (10.72) (15.3) (2.4) (0.2) (7.68) (10.74)
Gangster Disciples 118.15 8.63 8.11 0.63 0.04 4.57 7.77
(130.2) (11.17) (12.99) (2.39) (0.19) (14.4) (12.9)
Latin Kings 198.21 5.28 7.57 0.67 0.02 1.94 6.52
(301.01) (7.66) (9.21) (3.04) (0.16) (3.62) (7.45)
Two-Six 156.44 3.53 5.62 0.39 0.02 1.01 4.68
(109.15) (4.74) (9.6) (3.47) (0.14) (2.02) (4.61)
Other Gang 160.99 7.57 8.38 0.74 0.03 4.92 7.19
(144.52) (9.96) (10.51) (3.04) (0.19) (12.7) (10.11)
Note: Summary statistics are averages across census-blocks using Chicago Police Department crime
data for the year 2004. All crimes are defined according to the Illinois Uniform Crime Reporting
Codes. “Violence” includes assault and battery; “Theft” includes burglary, motor vehicle theft,
robbery, and theft; “Sex Crime” includes criminal sexual assault, human trafficking, prostitution
and sex offenses; “Narcotics” includes narcotics violations; and “Other” includes all other offenses
in the data. Rows correspond to census blocks that intersect with the indicated territory in the year
2004. “No Gang” refers to census blocks that did not intersect with any gang territory. “Other
Gang” refers to all gangs not explicitly named. The remaining rows correspond to the 5 largest
gangs by area. Standard deviations in parentheses.
C.2 Difference in Difference Robustness Checks and Falsifi-
cation Tests
C.2.1 Robustness to Lagged Treatment Structure
Table C.3 shows that the difference in difference estimates are robust to lagging the
treatment structure to account for the fact that I do not observe the exact date of
building closure. All columns in this table include block and time-period by risk-set
fixed effects. Each column assumes that the treatment date is x months earlier than
the date I have used in the main text, with x ranging from 3-24 months as listed in
a row at the bottom of the table.
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Table C.3: Dif-in-Dif Estimates: Robustness to Lagged Treatment
Structure
Total Crime
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0 to 50 Meters −6.16 −5.76 −4.50 −3.25 −2.04
(1.30) (1.22) (1.09) (1.19) (0.97)
50 to 100 Meters −2.45 −2.29 −1.81 −1.36 −0.53
(0.68) (0.65) (0.60) (0.60) (0.68)
100 to 200 Meters −0.18 −0.21 −0.21 −0.25 −0.31
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.22) (0.22)
200 to 300 Meters −0.07 −0.08 −0.07 −0.09 −0.13
(0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.19) (0.17)
300 to 400 Meters −0.10 −0.10 −0.08 −0.07 −0.08
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08)
400 to 500 Meters 0.07 0.09 0.12 0.14 0.13
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
500 to 1000 Meters 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
1000 to 1500 Meters 0.01 0.00 0.00 −0.00 −0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
1500 to 2500 Meters 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
2500 to 3500 Meters 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
3500 to 4500 Meters −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Mean of Dependent Variable 1.38 1.38 1.4 1.42 1.43
Months Prior to Demolition 3 6 12 18 24
Observations 4,042,335 3,968,838 3,821,844 3,674,850 3,527,856
Adjusted R2 0.55 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56
C.2.2 Evidence of Parallel Trends
Figures C·4, C·5, C·6, and C·7 show the dif-in-dif visually, which is a useful eyeball
check on the plausibility of parallel trends. In each case, I take one treatment ring
(for example, blocks within 50 meters of demolition) and average total crime in blocks
that were treated in that ring early (i.e. prior to median treatment date) and compare
it to the average total crime in blocks that were treated late (i.e. after the median
treatment date). Since I observe treatment as early as the second month of the sample,
in all cases I restrict attention to blocks treated after the date at the first quartile
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of the treatment vector, to ensure there is a reasonably long pre-period to examine
visually. The first vertical line denotes the first quartile of the treatment vector for
that treatment ring. Thus, all observations to the left of this line occur prior to any
unit included in the averages being treated. The second line denotes the median
treatment date. Thus, all blocks in the “Early” group receive treatment between this
line and the first line. The third vertical line represents the last treatment date, and
thus all blocks in the “Late” treatment group receive treatment in between the second
line and the third line.
Table C.4 is the standard test of parallel trends. Because I do not observe a true
“pre-period,” I implement the test as follows. First I lag the treatment structure
by a number of years (3, 4, and 5, respectively). I then restrict the sample to the
largest time period feasible such that none of the units in the sample actually become
treated. Let’s use the 5 year lagged structure as an example. For this test, if a block
was treated in December of 2011, I now assume it was treated in December of 2006.
I then drop all observations from 2007 onward. Similarly, if a block was treated in
January of 2006, I now assume it was treated in January of 2001. I then drop all
observations that occur prior to January, 2001. This is necessary because otherwise,
the block that was treated in 2006 would actually become treated at some point
during the sample period. The end result is a treatment structure that preserves the
timing of treatment late in the sample frame but which I assume occurs early in the
sample frame when none of the indicated demolitions actually occur. I then repeat
the dif-in-dif analysis on this sample and present the results.
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Figure C·4: Total Crime in Blocks within 50 Meters of Demolition
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Figure C·5: Total Crime in Blocks between 50 and 100 Meters of
Demolition
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Figure C·6: Total Crime in Blocks between 100 and 200 Meters of
Demolition
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Figure C·7: Total Crime in Blocks between 500 and 1000 Meters of
Demolition
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Table C.4: Parallel Trend Test in Pre-Period
Total Crime
(1) (2) (3)
0 to 50 Meters 1.44 1.19 2.35
(0.64) (1.26) (1.48)
50 to 100 Meters 1.88 −0.32 −0.12
(0.59) (0.89) (0.40)
100 to 200 Meters 0.10 −0.23 −0.51
(0.17) (0.20) (0.42)
200 to 300 Meters 0.19 −0.23 −0.51
(0.14) (0.13) (0.26)
300 to 400 Meters −0.04 0.08 0.02
(0.14) (0.11) (0.07)
400 to 500 Meters 0.10 0.02 −0.02
(0.10) (0.12) (0.06)
500 to 1000 Meters −0.01 0.03 0.02
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
1000 to 1500 Meters −0.02 0.00 0.03
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
1500 to 2500 Meters −0.02 0.01 0.04
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
2500 to 3500 Meters −0.00 0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
3500 to 4500 Meters −0.00 −0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Mean of Dependent Variable 1.38 1.52 1.47
Treatment Lag (Years) 3 4 5
Observations 1,469,940 1,175,952 881,964
Adjusted R2 0.61 0.63 0.64
C.2.3 Heterogenous Dif-in-Dif Effects
Table C.5 repeats the dif-in-dif specification restricting the sample to various sub-
categories of crime. All specifications include block fixed effects and time-period by
risk-set fixed effects. Importantly, the main results hold for homicide, which suggests
they are not driven entirely by reporting biases.
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Table C.5: Treatment Effect Heterogeneity by Crime Type
Total Homicide Violent Narcotics Weapons
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0 to 50 Meters −6.429 −0.006 −1.470 −2.181 −0.052
(1.312) (0.002) (0.365) (0.531) (0.011)
50 to 100 Meters −2.633 −0.003 −0.756 −0.806 −0.030
(0.713) (0.001) (0.281) (0.207) (0.007)
100 to 200 Meters −0.140 −0.001 −0.014 −0.018 −0.002
(0.199) (0.001) (0.046) (0.088) (0.002)
200 to 300 Meters −0.070 0.000 −0.011 −0.012 −0.001
(0.212) (0.001) (0.062) (0.082) (0.002)
300 to 400 Meters −0.101 −0.000 0.006 −0.033 −0.002
(0.102) (0.000) (0.025) (0.030) (0.001)
400 to 500 Meters 0.056 0.000 0.012 −0.004 −0.001
(0.046) (0.000) (0.008) (0.011) (0.001)
500 to 1000 Meters 0.012 0.000 0.016 0.006 −0.000
(0.011) (0.000) (0.005) (0.004) (0.000)
1000 to 1500 Meters 0.007 0.000 0.012 0.002 −0.000
(0.011) (0.000) (0.004) (0.004) (0.000)
1500 to 2500 Meters 0.012 −0.000 0.008 0.003 −0.000
(0.009) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000)
2500 to 3500 Meters 0.011 −0.000 0.008 0.006 −0.000
(0.007) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000)
3500 to 4500 Meters −0.001 −0.000 0.003 −0.000 −0.000
(0.009) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000)
Mean of Dependent Variable 1.369 0.002 0.334 0.156 0.013
Observations 4,115,832 4,115,832 4,115,832 4,115,832 4,115,832
Adjusted R2 0.553 0.003 0.375 0.233 0.038
C.3 Time Series Robustness Checks and Falsification Tests
C.3.1 Checking for Spurious Correlation via Permutation Test
Figures C·8, C·9, C·10, C·11, and C·12 check for the possibility that the regression
results in table 3.3 are driven by spurious trends. I do this via permutation test by
choosing a random vector of 63 treatment dates from the years 2001-2011, generating
the treatment variable as described in the text, and then estimating the models from
table 3.3. After repeating this procedure 10,000 times, I graph placebo distributions
of the target parameter for each specification in table 3.3, which vary the order of the
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trend polynomial from 1-5 respectively.
In all cases, the placebo distribution is centered on zero, suggesting the main
results are not the result of spuriously trending variables. However, the densities of
the placebo distribution with first and second order polynomials exhibit some evidence
of non-normality, which suggests the specifications with lower order trends may not
provide correct inference in finite sample. Table 3.3 indicates that adding higher
order terms beyond a cubic does not appreciably change the point estimates, hence
I take the cubic trend as my preferred specification since it is the most parsimonious
specification that does not exhibit the non-normality. This permutation test also
generates non-parametric p-values of around 0.065 for the specifications containing a
third order and higher polynomial trend.
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Figure C·8: Time Series Permutation Test: First Order Polynomial
Trend
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Figure C·9: Time Series Permutation Test: Second Order Polynomial
Trend
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Figure C·10: Time Series Permutation Test: Third Order Polynomial
Trend
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Figure C·11: Time Series Permutation Test: Fourth Order Polyno-
mial Trend
0.0000
0.0005
0.0010
0.0015
0.0020
−300 0 300 600
Permutation Estimate
D
en
si
ty
Figure C·12: Time Series Permutation Test: Fifth Order Polynomial
Trend
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C.3.2 Time Series Robustness Checks
Table C.6 replicates table 3.3 but restricting attention to homicides in the Chicago
Police Department Data. With the exception of the linear trend (which is imprecisely
estimated), the main conclusion holds, suggesting that the result is unlikely to be
driven entirely by reporting biases.
Table C.7 replicates table C.6 using FBI homicide data which extends back to
1991. This allows me to use the full set of demolitions, including the 7,000 units
demolished between 1995 and 2000. The result continues to hold here for the 3rd,
4th, and 5th order trend polynomials, which suggests that the main result is not a
feature of the particular set of demolitions I am able to use with the CPD data.
Table C.8 replicates table C.7 but normalizing the dependent variable by yearly
population figures contained in the FBI data. Since the results continue to hold for
the 3rd, 4th, and 5th order polynomials, this suggests that the result is not biased by
demolition induced migration outside of the city limits.
Table C.6: Time Series Estimates of the Causal Effect of Housing
Demolition on Homicides
Homicides
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of Demolitions −0.32 1.02 1.21 1.95 1.89
(0.16) (0.33) (0.63) (0.65) (0.62)
Mean of Dependent Variable 41.3 41.3 41.3 41.3 41.3
Polynomial Order First Second Third Fourth Fifth
Observations 168 168 168 168 168
Adjusted R2 0.58 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.66
176
Table C.7: Time Series Estimates of the Causal Effect of Housing
Demolition on Homicides Using FBI Data
Homicides
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of Demolitions 0.12 −0.09 1.01 1.18 1.23
(0.13) (0.10) (0.45) (0.61) (0.65)
Mean of Dependent Variable 54.8 54.8 54.8 54.8 54.8
Polynomial Order First Second Third Fourth Fifth
Observations 288 288 288 288 288
Adjusted R2 0.69 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72
Table C.8: Time Series Estimates of the Causal Effect of Housing
Demolition on Homicides Per Million Chicago Residents Using FBI
Data
Homicides Per Million
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of Demolitions 0.04 −0.05 0.48 0.40 0.43
(0.06) (0.04) (0.16) (0.22) (0.23)
Mean of Dependent Variable 19.52 19.52 19.52 19.52 19.52
Polynomial Order First Second Third Fourth Fifth
Observations 288 288 288 288 288
Adjusted R2 0.68 0.72 0.73 0.73 0.73
C.3.3 Estimating the Time Path of Treatment
While the VAR provides an explicit accounting of the time path of treatment as
estimated via the time-series, for completeness I also estimate the time path here using
specifications analogous to those in table 3.3. I do this by replacing the independent
variable, which counts the cumulative number of demolitions, with a series of variables
that count the number of demolitions that have occurred within a given calendar
quarter relative to the current date. Figure C·13 shows the results for the 2nd though
5th order polynomials. The top left panel is 2nd order, top right is 3rd, bottom left
is 4th, and bottom right is 5th.
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Figure C·13: Time Path of Treatment for Main Specification
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